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F. E. SPARSHOTT

The Central Problem of Philosophy

This paper offers no solution to the problem of its title. Those who still think that title pretentious should bear in mind that the centre of even the largest circle is a single point that has no dimensions; that, if Leibniz and others are to be believed, one may regard as the centre of the Universe any point which it is for the time being convenient to treat as such; and that, as the inspection of any doughnut will show, the centre of a thing is not always the part of it which offers most for one to get one's teeth into.

I

I have never thought of myself as a philosopher. By "philosopher" here I mean one who displays the same professional competence in his subject that professors of other subjects do in theirs: one who, when you make any philosophical remark to him or put to him any philosophical question, can at once tell you the sixteen things it may mean, the principal articles and books in which it is discussed, the positions taken up on it by the leading authorities both living and dead, and which if any of those positions are intellectually respectable. This competence I do not possess. When confronted with philosophical discourse I am struck all of a heap. I cannot even give a clear and straightforward answer to such questions as whether the will is free or what Plato's Theory of Ideas was; and this is not, as you probably think I am trying to imply, because my mind is too subtle, but because it is too confused. As the years pass I become more glib. But it is still true that, as St. Augustine might have said, if somebody asks me, I know; if nobody asks me, I don't know.

This widespread and basic stupefaction used not to trouble me greatly, since I was able to represent myself to myself as one who was just filling in the time teaching a little philosophy till some more suitable occupation should suggest itself. But as the years go by it gets clearer and clearer

that this was an illusion, and that I am just filling in the time teaching a little philosophy. Since I am stuck with the job, it behoves me to diagnose and remedy my intellectual block.

The diagnosis is easy. I make no progress because I can't get started, and I can't get started because I can't make out what philosophy is about and what it's for.

As for remedies, the obvious one would be to go to a dictionary, or perhaps even an encyclopaedia or Introduction to Philosophy, where these things are explained. But this cure doesn't take. What one finds in such sources, intellectually unobjectionable though it may be, does not carry the kind of conviction one needs in what is to be, after all, the foundation of one's life-work. Such a foundation must be something personal, and central or able to be made central to one's concern.

The proper starting-point for the sought construction would then be some idea, or inkling, or experience,[1] around which thoughts cluster, and which seems or has seemed at least for a little while to provide, if not the key to the meaning of the universe, at least some problem which could serve as a centre for one's philosophical enquiries. Often, usually late at night, I am struck with notions which do seem to have such possibilities—to open vistas of enquiry or speculation whose end I do not see. It is my custom to scrawl these down on pieces of paper and file them. When I examine them next morning or later, they are usually illegible and always unintelligible. I thereupon throw them away. But when I diagnosed the predicament I have outlined I thought it advisable, the next time I had such an idea, to work it up and see how far I could get with it.

II

The experience which gave me my opportunity, and the reflections it aroused, were of what I gather to be a quite ordinary kind; they have no importance but the importance they seemed at the moment to have.

I had been reading a sociological article on "The Measurement of Aesthetic Folkways"[2] and brooding on its technical flaws. Its author sought an index to the fluctuations of musical taste in a statistical study of the changes in the representation of various composers in the programmes of certain symphony orchestras over several decades. He did not analyse or assess or even enumerate the factors other than taste that influence those who compose programmes. He did not mention the fact

that, while the forty or so composers represented changed places often enough in the order of preference, there were many more composers whose works were never played at all. In the mood of exasperation induced by this reading I put a record on my record-player. Through whatever cause, the music had on me that effect which great works of art sometimes do have and often do not. It at once occurred to me that this effect was the one thing above all others that the author of the article ought to have mentioned, but hadn't; and further that *no* theory of aesthetics, at least in its strictly theoretical part, would lead one to expect an effect of this kind, although with the effect fresh in one's recollection one could see that this was in fact what they were often trying to explain.

In what I have to say of that effect I shall speak, to speak metaphorically, metaphorically: not that what I mean to say could have been said literally in other terms, but that though what I say is as close a statement as I can manage of what I mean to say—and this is true even though, in retrospect, I recognize that the phrases I have used are current clichés—it is obviously not literally true.

I noted four things. First, that the music is *there*: *confronting* one; a "presence" as we say: not something to be desired, or explained, or enjoyed, or to be anythinged, but *there*, in its own right, achieved. Second, that it has a *perfection* which one cannot imagine altered or exceeded (Aristotle and Plato, with many others, use this as a criterion of artistic success, so I feel quite respectable in mentioning it). Third, that this perfection is something one could not have expected and *could never have deserved*—I find it curious that I should feel impelled to speak of desert in this connection, but it was the very first thing that struck me. It is a *gratuitous* perfection. Fourth, that it presents itself as a standard by which one is *judged*—not as something that satisfies criteria, or provides a criterion for judging other works (though in other contexts those might be the right things to say), but as a standard by which one personally falls short.

When considered in the context of the music thus found, sociological explanations of taste seemed not so much inadequate as beside the point; and, I thought, surely for aesthetics this point of all points is the one not to be beside. The central problem of aesthetics might well be to do justice to such an experience. But how could one? One would not wish to make a philosophical theory of the four points just put before you, which must have seemed extravagant in what they suggest, jejune in what they

say, and all in all somewhat silly. At least, I hope that they have seemed so; and I expect they have, because in the light of this experience thus considered I was able to see the point of certain theories in aesthetics which had previously seemed ridiculous or hyperbolic. In particular, Mr. Clive Bell's remarks on aesthetic emotion[3] seem, *in this context*, no more than reasonable. And yet I cannot see that this possibility of sympathy with his feelings makes Mr. Bell's theory a good theory. Such theories as his, though not (like the sociologist's article) completely *beside* the point, certainly fail to do justice to it: the explanations seem incommensurate with what most of all needs explaining.

In this failure of aesthetic theory to measure up to the most strikingly obvious of its tasks I found the explanation of something that had puzzled me: the widespread complaint that aesthetics is dreary whereas art is thrilling. I used to think that this was like complaining of a cook-book for not tasting good—as indeed it is; but one can perhaps sympathize with it as a reaction to this failure. Those who complain thus do not find the explanations they are offered powerful enough for the astounding facts. Their feelings may be justified, though they find an absurd way of expressing them—for they write as if they wanted all books on aesthetics to be printed in capital letters, or in red.

III

The next move must be to generalize what we have found true of aesthetics: to see whether there are within the scope of other philosophical disciplines similar judgements or confrontations,[4] and similar attempts and failures by philosophy to cope with them.

In the philosophy of science and the philosophy of history I expected to find none such, taking the former to be devoted to questions of logic and such epistemological questions as are purely technical, and the latter to be concerned with the possibility of the knowledge of the past (which can no longer *confront* us) and with attempts to read pattern and "meaning" into trains of events which likewise cannot *confront* the enquirer.

To the philosophy of religion I turned with more hope. In his undisciplined but memorable *Time and Western Man*, which has influenced the wording of this paper if no more, Wyndham Lewis affirms that what we (i.e. W. L.) read of God we experience in Mozart—an absolute perfection. So it may be that what we have found in Mozart[5] we may

read of God. What then do we find in the philosophy of religion? Rudolf Otto, in *Das Heilige*, placed at the centre of that subject an experience of holiness—a *confrontation* with that which inspires awe. And it has become common to speak of God, in so far as God reveals himself to men, as a being Wholly Other; possessor and bestower of a perfection beyond what we could ever deserve; and our judge. If those who speak thus speak honestly of what they have found, or believe others to have found, and if I have described honestly my own finding, there is here an analogy striking enough to justify Mr. Lewis's statement. The difference, an important one, is that in so describing a musical experience one speaks with more consciousness of metaphor than when speaking of religious experience. For it is often maintained quasi-literally that God is a judge; but in the musical experience we have judgement possibly, but no judge.

The analogy between aesthetics and philosophy of religion is far-reaching and striking, and has been much exploited though little discussed. Each is concerned with an aspect of human passion and action which has no known biological function, but which is none the less virtually universal (no culture without either is known ever to have existed), and to which men attach a very high value. For this reason those philosophers who are primarily concerned with what one may term the *depth* of human experience tend to make one or both of these disciplines their starting-point. The general feel of the resulting philosophical structure is much the same, whichever is chosen. On a less pretentious level, it is possible to take what Durkheim says[6] of the nature and function of religion and apply it to art—in fact, this is often done almost unconsciously, the cases are so similar. The actual tendency of religions to find artistic expression and of art to acquire religious significance needs no argument; and it is a mere cliché that people in "our society" who forswear religion often "make a religion of" art. I hope I will not infuriate anyone if I refer at this point to the work of that rather sickly thinker the Abbé Bremond, whose *Prière et poésie* pursues the connection between art and religion at least as far as anyone would wish to go. If Bremond won't do I cite Professor H. D. Lewis, who writes: "The wonder and mystery of art, as indeed of religion in the last resort, is the revelation of something 'wholly other' by which the inexpressible loneliness of thinking is broken and enriched," quite brazenly using, as he habitually does, the language of theology to speak of art.[7]

In general, I would say that when one is faced with a problem in

aesthetics it is never a waste of time to look for an analogous problem in the philosophy of religion, and *vice versa*; it is on this basis that the argument of this paper moves forward.

IV

Professor H. H. Farmer points out that two approaches to the philosophy of religion are possible: one may start by considering the ubiquity of religious institutions and generalizing from what is variously done, or one may start by considering the nature of what seems most vital and essential in one's own religious life and allowing the term "religion" to be applied solely to what answers to this notion.[8] This vital and essential element is for Professor Farmer that experience of the Holy of which I have spoken.

We may say of this dichotomy, that a consideration of the *ubiquity* of religious behaviour generates curiosity and raises problems which call for discussion; whereas a consideration of the *depth* of religious experience generates amazement, where words fail. But the latter approach alone, as Farmer says, does justice to our main concern. So it seems that to get anything said one is condemned to start from what doesn't matter greatly.

The same holds in aesthetics. Some theories start by considering as art the whole range of artistic expression: all the songs, carved combs, tattooings, and what not of all the peoples of the world without regard to their excellence or their relevance to their own preoccupations; others start by considering the greatness of great works and their effect. But here again we meet the dilemma: only the latter theories deal with what we feel important, but only the former have anything to say. One has apparently to choose between a competent discussion of trivialities and a series of emotional outbursts about what matters.

This dichotomy of approach, and consequently of style, suggests that we dealt too summarily with the philosophy of history. That discipline, as we represented it, was the competent discussion, not indeed of trivialities, but of matters of less than vital concern. But there are also philosophies of history which take their start from a consideration not of all recorded happenings equally but of a single event of which they use such terms as I have used to describe my own experience. Such a philosophy is that of Berdiaev's *The Meaning of History*. It is true that Berdiaev is not

reduced to speechlessness, although he has a great deal to say about silence; but it is also true that what he does say about the significance of this crucial event looks, when critically considered, like tripe. Memorable tripe, perhaps, but tripe.

V

In ethics, the dichotomy between ubiquity and intensity, between extension and depth, is readily found. The ubiquity of morality is no less striking than that of art and religion, and again generates problems which can be and are fruitfully discussed: the meaning of ethical terms, the function of moral judgements, the authority of moral laws, the relation of morality to prudence, and the like. But when we look for an experience of that which confronts and judges, of a perfection by which we are abashed, we find not one but at least three different kinds.

There is, first, saintliness of character—a quality which is, I think, recognizable, which is quite different from respectability, and to which no definition of moral virtue seems adequate or even relevant; a quality which puts one to shame, and whose importance in the moral lives of those who come across it is paramount, and which yet plays no part in most moral philosophies. One is heartily glad that it doesn't; but its absence makes ethical theory look trivial. Secondly, quite different from holiness, there is heroism in action, together with the peculiar force of character called greatness. The awe-inspiringness of such a quality of deed or character is very widely attested—in poetry; but again, though moral philosophers often enough feel constrained to mention it, they seldom feel obliged to reckon with it. And again one is thankful that this is so, especially when one reads the work of those (such as Nicolai Hartmann) who bring it in. The classical case of its formal omission is Aristotle, who in spite of himself when defining virtue was impelled to use terms which made him seem an advocate of half-heartedness and bourgeois respectability. One would never guess from a casual reading of the *Ethics* that Aristotle wrote a poem on the heroism of Hermias in terms so extravagant as to expose himself to a charge of blasphemy;[9] or that he could write of Plato that he was one "whom it is not lawful for bad men even to praise"[10]—which I take to be a typical response to saintliness.

Attempts to bring saintliness and heroism within the bounds of theory are found less often in ethics than in aesthetics, where discussions of the "sublime" (common in the eighteenth century but extinct since the

1914–18 war)[11] are perhaps best thought of as confused attempts to account for those philosophically intractable aspects of living with which this paper is concerned. What happens when such accounts are critically (rather than sympathetically) examined, with reference to what the words say rather than to what the speakers would be saying, may best be seen from Mr. Carritt's chapter on the sublime in his *Theory of Beauty*. His strictures on theories of the sublime are irrefutable: the theories as intellectual constructions he destroys utterly; but, just because of the incommensurability between such experiences and any explanation of them, he seems like a bull that charges a matador's cloak but thereby misses the matador.

The third type of experience I have to put alongside those of confrontation by saintliness and by heroism is one which I take on trust. It forms the foundation of a theory of ethics which probably for that very reason has seemed to many to be the only theory of ethics worth taking seriously—and to many others to be pernicious rubbish. When I mentioned the "judgement without a judge" in an aesthetic experience some at least among you must have thought of a law without a lawgiver: of Kant's Categorical Imperative. And the experience of which I now speak is that described in the Conclusion of the *Critique of Practical Reason*: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe (*Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht*), the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me, and the moral law within me." We do not have to seek these out, says Kant, we see them before us—in the terms I have been using, they *confront* us. Being no Kantian I say no more than that the terms Kant here uses are appropriate only to an experience such as that I have described.

If we are justified in taking such experiences to be of central importance to philosophy, the three types of such experience in the field of morality must correspond to some threefold division in the subject of ethics. And this we do find, although the correspondence is less neat than one would like, and also a bit disconcerting. To the relationship between the encounter with heroism and that with the moral law answers the relationship between the good and the right, between ideals and commitments, a relationship which provides ethics with one of its major topics. The distinction between sanctity and heroism has found less systematic expression in modern times; but we find in Aquinas a distinction between infused and habitual virtues which corresponds to it, and in Augustine a

distinction between the true virtues of Christians and the splendid vices of pagans which is a less polite version of the same thing.[12] This contrast between Greek-style virtue culminating in greatness and Christian-style virtue culminating in holiness is familiar indeed; but the precise nature of each and the relationship between them have for some reason dropped out of ethical discussion.

So far, not so bad. What is disconcerting is that the nuttiest chestnut of ethics, Kant's antinomy of the *summum bonum*, the connection between virtue and happiness, has not appeared. For it to appear there would have to be a fourth type of experience comparable to the other three: an overwhelming intimation of happiness. This seems impossible to find; but those who say that the Beatific Vision of God is the only true happiness have found it for us. The disconcertingness arises because I am tempted to preserve the symmetry of my discourse by placing this vision and the intimations thereof alongside the other three experiences as the fourth psychological foundation of ethics; and if I do that I have only to succumb to the further temptation to regard such experiences as veridical, as experiences of something real, and I shall have deduced the existence of God from a theory about ethical theories. This deduction I am, pardonably I hope, reluctant to make.

Hastily, therefore, I avert my gaze from ethics.

VI

I have now no recourse but to turn to metaphysics. I fasten here upon the kind of experience in which one is overwhelmingly aware of the reality, otherness, and what have you of the external world, and is overtaken by what Professor Lewis in his essay "On Poetic Truth" calls "a sense of wonder that a thing should be this and not that." It is the kind of experience that finds expression most often in recollections of childhood, as in Wordsworth's "Ode" and the purple passages of Traherne's *Centuries of Meditations*. The distinction between what gives rise to problems and what gives rise to wonder, what generates talk and what is beyond talk, is here that which everyone since Aristotle has made between what things are and the fact of their existence (*Post. An.* II.7—A. J. Ayer makes the same distinction in his *Philosophical Essays* by saying that indicators are not short-hand predicates); and our point is made for us by Wittgenstein in the words: "Not *how* the world is is the mystery,

but *that* it is."[13] The term "mystery" here is not to be taken as a mere term of abuse. Its implications are brought out in a remark of Aristotle: that those who are initiated into mysteries are not supposed to learn anything, but to experience something.[14]

The notion, which this distinction and these remarks entail, that however accurately one describes anything one simply circles round and round the object without ever coming to grips with it in its full reality, is of course Bergson's; but I am prevented by ignorance grounded in antipathy from doing justice to him. Bergson aside, the thinker who has made most use of the distinction between what things are and the fact that they exist is probably Thomas Aquinas, in so far as his very elusive theory of the relation between essence and the "act" of existence can be made out. Aquinas's philosophy does indeed seem to be that of a man vividly aware of the reality of things—I am glad to find that Fr. Copleston in his Pelican *Aquinas* also suggests that his theory of existence and essence was connected with experiences of this kind—but, Aquinas being the most self-effacing of writers, we cannot positively assert this; and our hesitation is increased when we notice the prominence of students of Bergson among those who have rescued this aspect of Thomist thought from 650 years of almost unbroken misunderstanding. However, *if* we are right in connecting Aquinas's thought with experiences of this kind, and *if* the theory of existence has as central a place in his thought as Gilson and others maintain, we can say that the experience was at the core of his philosophy, and can trace all the misunderstandings of his theory, which tend in various ways to assimilate existence to essence, to attempts to conceptualize what must escape all concepts.

Be that as it may, this "awareness of the irrevocability by which a thing is what it is," to quote Professor Lewis for the third and last time, is not all that metaphysics has for us. Not only is there an aspect of all things which may provide an experience of confrontation and with which words cannot cope, but some have thought it necessary to postulate an entity which has no other aspect than this. For Aquinas this is a being, namely God, in which existence and essence cannot be distinguished, so that nothing can be said of Him with literal truth except that He exists; and we don't even know quite what we mean by "exist" here. For Plotinus it is an entity, namely the One, which is beyond reality and beyond thought, and of which nothing can be said with literal truth except that it is the cause of all other things, and even this is really not a

truth about it but a truth about all other things. Aquinas and Plotinus agree that this indescribable being can be the object of an experience such as we are discussing. They, then, make everything which can be discussed depend for its existence upon that which can be experienced but cannot be an object of adequate discursive thought; so that philosophy is confined, if not to trivialities, at most to matters of secondary importance. It is not surprising that, after an experience he had while celebrating mass in December 1273, Aquinas decided not to proceed with the third part of his *Summa Theologiae*, because in the light of his experience all that he had written seemed to him like so much straw. The wonder is that he went on so long.

The practice of at least some great metaphysicians bears out, then, what we had inferred from the nature of the case: that the philosophical discipline which purports to take as its province everything that there is must confine its discussions to small things or the lesser aspects of great things. This restriction, though necessary, is a standing reproach to philosophy. Tertullian (*De Praescr. Heret.* 7) blamed it on "that twerp Aristotle, who invented philosophy for these people: the art of setting up and knocking down, a turncoat in its opinions, forced in its speculations, niggling in its arguments, a breeder of controversy, a nuisance even to itself, reconsidering everything lest it should have to consider something." Tertullian would.

VII

My theme is now ripe for the introduction of a little pseudo-Cartesian Doubt. Not as a methodological expedient but in morbid earnest we may ask: is all this "otherness" and "confrontation" not an illusion? Our experiences of "otherness" are still *our* experiences, surely; whatever we experience (or are confronted by) falls necessarily *within* our experience. We are tempted at first to dismiss this as an undergraduate's paradox, as indeed it is. How, we ask in reply, can one be thought to spin out of one's own intellectual entrails that by which one seems confronted?—let alone that by which one feels judged! This is meant for a rhetorical question; but a return to our musical experience suggests an answer. A finished product of human thought, whether it be symphony or poem or statue or mathematical demonstration or philosophical treatise or railroad system, does not represent the average quality of its producer's thinking. The latter is but fitfully rational, neither continuously bent on

the production of the artefact nor, when so bent, either always successful or uniformly coherent. Were this not so, one could write good books by thinking aloud extempore and transcribing the result. The artefact embodies the running-together of the most successful moments of this process and also the criticism of that running-together. Hence any competent work of art or skill, *even one's own*, represents a standard by which the quality of one's unrehearsed thought-processes at any time must fall short. Confronted by one's own work, one asks: "How could *I* possibly have done *that*?" But one *has* done it. One *has*, in the phrase just used, spun out of one's own intellectual entrails that by which one seems confronted, and even judged. And so, perhaps, we should hesitate to denounce those who go on to say that the idea of a Wholly Other God before whom we are abashed is a figment of our unconscious minds, or that the world on which we stub our toes is a product of our imaginations.[15]

By adopting this attitude to the experiences we are considering, that if we are judged it may be only by our own amplified echoes, or our own enlarged images in a non-existent mirror, we are thus forced into the kind of idealistic tizzy in which the boundaries between self and not-self either are blurred or, if they remain distinct, merely divide the *ego* from the *alter ego*. The German philosophies in which this fusion takes place are also those in which man's artistic creativity has been given an important place; and this is no mere coincidence, since it is in artistic creation above all that what seems other than and greater than a man is none the less plainly his own product. In such idealisms the kind of experience from which we began is important, but is not what it seems.

If on the other hand we keep sharp, as we may well wish to do, the kind of distinction we usually make between individual and environment, and if we then allow full weight to our confrontations by the external world, to those moments of heightened awareness when we are so keenly awake to its reality that we are tempted to say that we are judged by it, the results are likely to be unsettling. The manipulability of the external world[16] both in thought and in practice is a sort of guarantee that it cannot have the kind of status it here seems to have. We have here a judgement whereby we are judged—but there is no judge. Such an experience lies at the heart of certain modes of atheist existentialism. (I should remark here parenthetically that all existentialisms are philosophies of extreme situations.[17] Existentialism may be defined as any

philosophy which makes such situations and the experiences grounded in them its primary concern, so that this paper might have been called "Existentialism.")

When the hero in Sartre's *Nausea* looks at the tree root, it makes him dizzy. There is the root, set over against him, *confronting* him. It is excessive, it overflows the concepts which one applies to roots. But of course, though Sartre doesn't say this, the realization of the root's aggressive and superabundant individuality would not have this vertiginous effect were it not that the root is, after all, only a root. It has no *business* to set itself up as a judge. Curiously enough, we find another phase of this existentialist tizzy (which is quite different from the idealist tizzy, but none the less a tizzy) in the book which provoked these reflections, Wyndham Lewis's *Time and Western Man*, although Lewis seems to regard himself as a follower of the good Bishop Berkeley. According to him, "The material world must . . . be imaginary: and the very effrontery of its superb solidness and the bland assurance with which it is camped before us, should actually help us to realize that" (p. 478). One feels like saying "come off it," but one sees what he means: that inanimate things have the fixed and brazen glare of a mask, not the continual evasiveness of a living face. Just as an immobile countenance may lead one to suspect that its owner is asleep, entranced, or dead, so here the conviction may grow that *there is nothing behind the mask.*

The failure of existentialism to make headway in the English-speaking world suggests that this notion of a world of contorted masks with Nothing behind them is to "healthy-minded" people exotic and gratuitous nonsense. But in the context of ethics it engages our sympathies rather more readily. I have said that in morality that by which we feel ourselves humbled is sanctity and heroism. But heroism for what? One is only heroic in defence of something (if only one's own name) in which one believes passionately. But the heroism by which Sartre was confronted was often useless, incapable of defending anything; or in defence of something which one could find nothing to justify. In a rather similar situation Nietzsche felt quite comfortable (until he went mad), perhaps because he was not exposed to the Gestapo. Considered abstractly, the situation is stimulating and even joyful and liberating:

> All the beauty and sublimity we have lent to real and imaginary things, I intend to reclaim as property and production of man: as his most beautiful justification. Man as poet, as thinker, as god, as love, as power—: O, the royal munificence with which he

has endowed things, to *impoverish* himself and feel wretched! That was his greatest selflessness hitherto, that he admired and worshipped, and was able to conceal from himself that *he* it was, who made that which he admired.[18]

But the men of the Resistance were faced with the prospect of endurance for an ideal whose justification, when one died, one would no longer be able to remember; and which indeed *had* no justification. It was pointless to say "I endure because I choose" if the choice itself had no justification. To live for an ideal of one's own creation may be magnificent, as Nietzsche thought; to die for such an ideal is only horrible. For Sartre, the heroism which judges us is a pointless one; there is a judgement without judge and without justice. There is nothing behind the mask.

VIII

We have now reached the watershed of our discussion. Let us proceed downhill. . . .

There is a sense in which any experience to which our concepts are adequate, and any experience whatever in so far as our concepts are adequate to it, may be said to be "under our control" or "mastered by us." In so far as we can understand, describe, or explain an experience adequately, we have obviously in some manner reduced it to our measure.[19] Experiences by which we feel that we are judged must then be experiences to which we feel our words and thoughts inadequate. This is what I have been saying all along. But what is thus unsayable or indescribable must be unintelligible and therefore, so far as we are concerned, indefinite. For such pre-Socratic thinkers as Anaximander and (more explicitly) Parmenides, whatever is thus indefinite is unreal. For this way of thinking, whatever "judges" our thought and therefore ourselves by transcending or evading our concepts must be, simply, nothing; or rather, Nothingness—*das Nichts*. Among the existentialists, Martin Heidegger explicitly bases himself on these primitive thinkers. For him, the given, the ultimate reality, is simply *das Nichts*; and *das Nichts*, as we all know, *nichtet*. Behind the mask of things is not merely a void, but an aching void. The position of man in such a world is absurd: painfully absurd. We can be judged only by what transcends us; and what transcends us must be unsayable; and what is unsayable is, for Heidegger, *nothing*.

Well—who cares? But we do care that what is unsayable is *for philosophy* nothing. And isn't this true? Must we not agree with whoever it was who

said of the mystic Jakob Boehme that "If Jacob had experienced the inexpressible, Jacob should not have tried to express it"? Aristotle (*De Part. An.* I.5) posed this problem without apparently realizing its implications as Plato had done and Plotinus was to do:

> The scanty perceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more delight than all our knowledge of the world in which we live.... On the other hand, in certitude and completeness our knowledge of terrestrial things has the advantage.

But if you go high enough don't you perhaps come to something about which there is *nothing* to know, and which therefore escapes the philosopher? The conclusion, as we have seen, has been drawn. But the scope of my present argument is far wider. In our awareness of anything whatever, it has seemed, there is something which escapes description—which we do not even feel tempted to try to describe; and in the experiences which seem most significant to those people to whom some experiences do seem significant, this unsayable element is paramount. What's a poor fellow to do?

IX

The answer of L. Wittgenstein is short and simple. *Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen*: whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent (*Tractatus* 7).

X

Wittgenstein's advice is irreproachable, but has something of the air of a prudent evasion. Its irreproachableness and evasiveness may serve to explain what otherwise seems inexplicable: the mutual contempt of the logical analysts, who mostly adhere to this policy, and the metaphysicians or friends of metaphysics, who don't—or (since metaphysics is more praised than practised) don't think they ought to. The contempt is puzzling because of the grotesqueness of the misunderstandings which always accompany it. This cannot be a mere difference of opinion, but must involve some fundamental difference of attitude or approach. And in fact the irritations which give rise to misunderstanding can here be traced to different attitudes to what cannot be said. The analysts must seem to the metaphysicians to be living in a fool's paradise of triviality and

evasion, because they habitually speak as if no such problem as ours existed. *Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.* They attain peace of mind by destroying the sense of wonder in which (said Plato) philosophy begins. Since they regard it as the whole of a serious thinker's job to state and elucidate plain facts, they tend to misrepresent all expressions of wonder or puzzlement as requests for information, and pretend to be at a loss to tell what sort of information is requested. Misrepresentation and pretence are alike deliberate; but they affect to think that all metaphysical theories are attempts to comply with such requests. It isn't that they don't have or won't admit having the experiences which give us our problem, but they think they should be left out of philosophical consideration. To its opponents this attitude looks less like self-abnegation than complacent pettiness. The irritation is justified; and yet, how right they are not to try to say the unsayable. What could be more sensible and even noble than this renunciation of claptrap? They for their part are infuriated to see their metaphysically inclined colleagues time and time again crashing the sense-barrier without even noticing that it is there, spattering their pages with such terms as "infinite," "ultimate," "transcendental," and the like without any sense of intellectual responsibility, beating their mental chests for sheer delight in the hollow sound that ensues. They bring disrepute upon philosophy by making claims for it which they do not attempt to fulfil, and which no one could possibly fulfil. This accusation too is justified; and yet, is it not heroic, even at the cost of making a fool of oneself, to struggle against the limitations of one's method and storm the ineffable heights and unplumbable depths? And what are we to say of a philosopher who cheerfully admits that his philosophy leaves out the greater half of his own experience?

But if both these parties are in error, though error with which we can sympathize, what recourse have we? We seem to be committed to exploring and charting, without crossing, the limits of the sayable. "Philosophy," writes Wittgenstein, "should delimit the unthinkable from within, through the thinkable—it will indicate the unsayable (*das Unsagbare bedeuten*) by clearly setting forth the sayable" (*Tractatus* 4.114–4.115). This was Kant's problem, too, and Kant's solution to it. The recommended attitude would be that of the man pictured by Lucretius as standing at the outermost edge of a finite universe, poised ready to hurl outward an experimental spear—a position unlikely to yield practical results, but full of theoretical interest.

Perhaps, however, the Kantian balance is too precarious to be maintained: one either slides back or topples over. And in any case, can philosophy's task be merely to strike an attitude? It would not be altogether ridiculous to say so: that it is the prime task of philosophy to be not, as Locke and Carnap thought, science's pander, but science's bad conscience, and continually to remind reason that (in Pascal's phrase) there are an infinity of things which surpass it; or, that essence is not existence. Or, if you will, to be like the bad man in a Western movie who keeps shooting round the feet of respectable citizens to make them dance.

But this conclusion is not inevitable; for the dictum of Wittgenstein on which it rests is not, as it seems to be, a mere application of the law *tertium non datur*, but the assertion of an opinion which is plainly false. The *sprechen* whose possibility the argument precludes is the bare assertion of plain facts without purpose or context; and it is not true that one must either speak *thus* or be silent. One may, for example, drop hints, or ask questions. Even in science, Mr. Campbell assures us,[20] "A theory is valuable, and is a theory in any sense important for science, only if it evokes ideas which are not contained in the laws which it explains." If even physical theories, then, function not by stating facts but by drawing one's attention to things and suggesting possibilities, we can scarcely forbid the philosopher to try to *do something about the unsayable*. Indeed, I think this may be regarded without absurdity as the central problem, or constellation of problems, of philosophy: not necessarily *how to say* the unsayable, but rather *what to do* about it.

More precisely, and therefore more confusingly, the problem is this. There fall within the purview of certain philosophical disciplines (aesthetics, philosophy of religion, ethics, metaphysics) experiences or objects of experience of which the following seems true: a philosophy which ignores them or prescinds from them is condemned to aridity or triviality, and may quite fairly be accused of evading the most important issues in its field; but a philosophy which treats of them *either* falls into a sickening and embarrassing rhetoric, *or* makes statements which, though they may be true, so fail to be adequate to their subject-matter as to be incomprehensible to anyone who reads them without a vivid sense of the kind of experience to which they refer, and are in any case by the most rigid standards intellectually disreputable. And this quandary arises, not through anyone's negligence, but through the very nature of the experiences in question.

In saying that this is the central problem of philosophy I am claiming that different approaches to it, different attitudes towards it, and different degrees of awareness of it determine, or are at least an index of, differences of approach and attitude and different degrees of sophistication in philosophy in general. Such a proposition can scarcely be *proved*; I leave it to your leisured consideration. What I have briefly said of various philosophers will indicate the kind of evidence I should regard as appropriate.

XI

Now, you will doubtless be saying: if this is the central problem, what are you going to do about it? But at this point my shoulders droop. I have nothing to say. At best, I hover around the problem like a candle-flame round a moth. So far as I am concerned, at the centre of philosophy, as at the centre of the field of vision, is a blind spot.

The most appropriate action, it seems, would be to write poems. But poetry is not philosophy. Poet and philosopher both speak responsibly, but their responsibilities are not the same. Philosophy cannot solve its problems by ceasing to be philosophy.

So it looks as if philosophy can do nothing here but, as I suggested, keep the sore places of knowledge sore. But in saying this I seem to myself rather like the rustic who visited a great city and was gazing about him when a boy inserted in his gaping mouth a handy piece of horse-dung. He said to the boy: "I shan't chew it, and I shan't swaller it. I shall just stand here and wait for a policeman." The question one would have asked that rustic, and the question I ask myself, is: Why don't you spit it out?

XII

Let us now conclude by returning to the individual predicament in the context of which I placed this discussion. The experience, and the ideas connected therewith, which were to serve as a starting-point for my philosophical enquiries, have certainly done all that could be expected of them. We have chased them through almost the whole gamut of philosophical concerns, and have brought into their discussion a collection of names which only ignorance and boredom kept from being much longer. But how has this helped me? Not only am I left just as confused as ever by the problem whose ramifications I have explored, but it has left me in the *same kind* of confusion as I started in. Given this problem,

I still see no way of getting started on its solution. The supposed cure for philosophical paralysis has proved no more successful than looking "philosophy" up in a dictionary. Perhaps what was in error was the diagnosis itself: what I had taken for an inability to philosophize was simply a particular style of philosophizing—a style imposed on me by habits of thinking which I am not able to alter. "From nothing *in the field of sight*," writes Wittgenstein, "can it be inferred that it is seen from an eye" (*Tractatus* 5.633). And that is how I came to overlook this obvious conclusion. So perhaps I had better thrust myself back into the purgatorial fire, as Mr. T. S. Eliot recommends, and abandon the illusion that there is any technique with whose aid a philosopher of one kind can change himself into a philosopher of a different kind.

notes

1 By an "experience," an expression often used in this paper, I mean something that happens to you as it seems to you when it happens—i.e. a happening as seen "from the inside" and not by a third party.

2 By J. H. Mueller in the *American Journal of Sociology*, 1946.

3 Clive Bell, *Art* (London, 1914). For a different (and unsympathetic) interpretation by a careful critic, see H. Osborne, *Theory of Beauty* (London, 1952), 68.

4 Here and in all that follows, sometimes one and sometimes another of the four "notes" of my experience is used. There is no system in this.

5 Was it Mozart? I don't remember. But I noticed that my original audience assumed that it was.

6 *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie réligieuse, passim.*

7 This and other quotations from Professor Lewis are from his essay "On Poetic Truth" in his *Morals and Revelation* (London, 1951), 232–55.

8 H. H. Farmer, *Revelation and Religion* (London, 1954), chap. 1.

9 See W. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1948), 117ff. Text in *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* (Oxford, 1955), Carmina 4.

10 See Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 106ff. Text, *loc. cit.*, Carmina 2.

11 That is, in the English-speaking philosophical world; but see P. A. Michelis, *An Aesthetic Approach to Byzantine Art* (London, 1955).

12 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae q. 63; *Q. Disp. de Virtute* q. 1 a. 10. Augustine, *The City of God*, V, 12ff.

13 *Tractatus* 6.44: "Nicht *wie* die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern *dass* sie ist."

14 "Ou mathein ti dein, alla pathein" (*De Philosophia*, Frag. 15 Ross).

15 It always amazes me how well I dream, considering how badly I draw.

16 Cf. Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (Edinburgh, 1937), 7ff.

17 I owe this phrase to an article by Albert Votaw in *Horizon* (Sept., 1949).

18 *The Will To Power*, II.1. *ad init.* (Schlechta, 680). The translation is adapted from that of G. A. Morgan, *What Nietzsche Means* (Harvard, 1941).

19 My paper shows at this point the influence of M. Untersteiner's discussion of Protagoras in *The Sophists* (New York, 1954). "Fas est et ab hoste doceri."

20 N. R. Campbell, *Physics: The Elements* (Cambridge, 1920), 132.

E. D. H. JOHNSON

Robert Browning's Pluralistic Universe: A Reading of The Ring and The Book

William James's devotion to Browning's poetry can be confidently dated from the summer of 1858, when the James family had returned from Europe to take up residence in Newport. In his autobiographical *Notes of a Son and Brother* Henry James gives credit to John La Farge for at this time "revealing" Browning to him and his brother, although their parents had apparently been long familiar with the poet's work. In 1858 William was sixteen and Henry a year younger; but the interest thus early instilled was an enduring one. Eleven years later Minnie Temple, writing to her cousin Henry in Switzerland, a few months before her untimely death, commands his presence in North Conway that summer, the given reason being: "I can't wait longer than that for the Browning readings." "Which would have been of The Ring and the Book," Henry comments. And in July of the same year Henry, who had remained in Europe, received a letter from his mother which described William dawdling away the morning in a hammock under the pines "with a volume of Browning in his hand." This volume, it seems safe to conjecture, would have contained a portion of Browning's masterpiece, which had been published in four instalments between November 1868 and February 1869.

That William James found in Browning support for his own virile and jovially combative temper of mind is apparent from a passing reference to "A Grammarian's Funeral" in a letter from Berlin of January 1868: "It always strengthens my backbone to read it. . . ." And somewhat later the philosopher was to take issue with Santayana's attack on Browning in "The Poetry of Barbarism" as follows: "Give me Walt Whitman and Browning ten times over. . . . The barbarians are in the line of mental growth, and those who insist that the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous are those by whom the world is to be saved."

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In view of the perceptiveness of the preceding statement, it is surprising that William James did not more frequently comment on the poet's affinity to his own teaching. This paper, however, is in no way concerned with the extent to which Browning may have exercised a formative influence on James's thinking. Rather, it is here proposed to show that the Jamesian philosophy, especially as it embodies pluralistic speculations, throws fresh and suggestive light on many of Browning's characteristic assumptions. And while this argument might well have been developed in reference to the entire corpus of the poetry, it has seemed best in the interests of concision to restrict its application to *The Ring and the Book*, the work in which by general agreement Browning's genius stands most broadly displayed.

I

Speaking to the Harvard Young Men's Christian Association in 1895 on the subject "Is Life Worth Living?", William James declared: "Yet, on more intimate acquaintance, the visible surfaces of heaven and earth refuse to be brought by us into any intelligible unity at all. Every phenomenon that we would praise there exists cheek by jowl with some contrary phenomenon that cancels all its religious effect upon the mind. Beauty and hideousness, love and cruelty, life and death keep house together in indissoluble partnership. . . ." The imperviousness of the perceptual world to man's age-old aspiration to discover in it evidence of some unified plan or meaning lay at the root of the philosophic system which James called radical empiricism. As he wrote in the Preface to his collection of popular addresses, *The Will to Believe*: "There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact. Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to 'overcome' or to reinterpret in monistic form."

The variousness of human nature and the incommensurateness of any individual's experiences with those of his fellows oblige us, James maintains, to adopt a pluralistic habit of mind: that is, to view life as an indeterminate and contingent process. The day-to-day events of existence reveal to rational inquiry no intelligible order or purpose; the things that happen to us are "partly joined and partly disjoined," composite of good

and evil, essentially ambiguous. To replace the ideal demand for absolutes with a common-sense acceptance of the actual in all its multiplicity and heterogeneity is the mark of the Jamesian pluralist. "The obvious outcome of our total experience," said James in his Gifford lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, "is that the world can be handled according to many systems of ideas, and is so handled by different men, and will each time give some characteristic kind of profit, for which he cares, to the handler, while at the same time some other kind of profit has to be omitted or postponed."

That Robert Browning fully subscribed to such a view of the world must be evident to any reader of his early volumes of poetry, whether *Pippa Passes*, *Dramatic Romances and Lyrics*, *Men and Women*, or *Dramatis Personae*. The total impression created by this work is of a pluralistic universe made up of people of all sorts and conditions, living in all ages and climes, each uniquely inclined to a course of action by character and circumstance. These actions portend no final resolutions; at best they are approximations more or less satisfactory according to the number of truths which they embody. For Cleon, Karshish, and the Saint John of "A Death in the Desert" the problems posed by the Christian revelation are wholly distinct, and each tries to come to terms with its enigma in his own way. The conditions which make for artistic success or failure are variously assessed by Fra Lippo Lippi, Andrea del Sarto, and the Pictor Ignotus.

Correspondingly, in the dramatic monologue Browning developed a medium extraordinarily responsive to his sense of the indeterminacy of the human condition. However artful and persuasive the pleading of any speaker in his own behalf, the reader is kept constantly mindful that this body of testimony is susceptible of interpretations at variance with its avowed tenor. Through the poet's handling the most trivial incident takes on implications suggestive of the many facets of truth. In "My Last Duchess," for example, the Duke, although bent on presenting his previous marriage in the light most flattering to himself, inadvertently prejudices his case by instilling in the reader's mind three alternate positions from which to judge it: that of the dead wife whose behaviour, as reported, stirs our sympathy; that of the Count's emissary whose implied distaste for the Duke we share; and finally, that more objective evaluation of the speaker's character symbolically configured in the piece of sculpture to which he draws attention at the end of the poem.

It is *The Ring and the Book*, however, which both in conception and form most comprehensively exhibits Browning's pluralism. Here the poet's method of allowing nine different individuals to present their separate reconstructions of a single series of happenings has the effect of investing with tragic grandeur events which on their surface would seem to constitute, in Henry James's phrase, "a mere vulgar criminal anecdote." Browning insisted that his poem was built on facts throughout; and each of those who bears witness to these facts is sure that he is rendering them veraciously. This holds even for Guido, of whom Pompilia says "hate was thus the truth of him," a sentiment echoed in the Pope's saddened admission: "Out of some core of truth the excrescence comes. . . ." And however partial the truth emerging from most of the monologues, however much it comes to us perverted by malice or the errors of self-delusion, we yet find that the limited awareness of each successive speaker has contributed to the total awareness which Browning is building up in our minds. The cumulative effect of so many conflicting versions is to evoke that kind of complex response to existence for which William James was to become the philosophic advocate. "For pluralism," as James stated in his lectures on *A Pluralistic Universe*, "all that we are required to admit as the constitution of reality is . . . that nothing real is absolutely simple, that every smallest bit of experience is a *multum in parvo* plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else. . . ."

That Browning had deliberately adopted a pluralistic approach to his material is demonstrable from certain analogies which he invokes at the outset of the poem. As the months in their rotation strike forth "Each facet-flash of the revolving year," so will the twelve books of the poem project a series of kaleidoscopic views: "The variance now, the eventual unity, / Which makes the miracle." Confronted by first one, then another aspect of the story, the reader will be baffled in his inclination to settle for easy answers, to cast his "sentence absolute for shine or shade." The ring metaphor, furthermore, operates in two ways to call attention to the poem's pluralistic implications. In the first place, it symbolizes the plasticity of factual reality. And secondly, through likening the separate monologues to the segments of a circle within the circumference of which the elusive truth resides, its aspect altering with every change in perspective, the poet expresses his sense of the multiform nature of all truth.

Browning's pluralism provides the structural key to *The Ring and the*

Book. Postponing for later discussion the first and last books which the poet reserved for his own comments, the remaining monologues present in chronological sequence the testimony of nine witnesses. This body of evidence falls, as Browning himself noted, into three categories: Books II–IV being devoted to the gossip current in Rome in the days immediately following the crime; Books V–VII and Book XI giving the statements of the three principal actors; and Books VIII–X containing the summations of the representatives of the law. Each speaker, isolated from the others, addresses an audience not immediately implicated in the action (the Pope alone soliloquizes). The monologues thus offer a serial pattern of discrete narratives which, nevertheless, constantly intersect, supplementing, qualifying, or contradicting each other as the case may be. There results an impression of unity in apparent disunity remarkably conformable to William James's description of the nature of reality, as contained in the following passage from *A Pluralistic Universe*: "If the each-form be the eternal form of reality no less than it is the form of temporal appearance, we still have a coherent world, and not an incarnate incoherence, as is charged by so many absolutists. Our 'multiverse' still makes a 'universe'; for every part, tho it may not be in actual or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some possible or mediated connexion, with every other part however remote, through the fact that each part hangs together with its very next neighbors in inextricable interfusion."

The three monologues which contain samplings of the hearsay in Roman society at once establish the author's pluralistic approach to his "murder story." "Half-Rome's feel after the vanished truth" yields to the Other Half-Rome's "opposite feel / For truth," to which then succeeds Tertium Quid's "reasoned statement of the case." The three speakers rest their verdicts on ascertainable facts; yet what disparate meanings each deduces from these facts! As a jealous husband, Half-Rome cannot but side with Guido; the Other Half-Rome, a sentimental bachelor, is no less strongly drawn to Pompilia's defence; while Tertium Quid, he of the "critical mind," displays the born sceptic's inability to make a choice. Meanwhile the sequential ordering of these monologues makes for a steady accumulation of fresh details ("So do the facts abound and superabound," says Tertium Quid); and correspondingly, the speakers show themselves increasingly scrupulous in sifting the bits of evidence, so that Tertium Quid's suspension of judgment in the fourth book is a real measure of the ambiguities which the affair has taken on.

It was Henry James who, in his brilliant paper on "The Novel in *The Ring and the Book*," first pointed out the additional purpose which these opening monologues serve in evoking as the poem's setting "those wonderful, dreadful, beautiful particulars of the Italy of the eve of the eighteenth century. . . ." The atmosphere created by Browning "stirs up, to my vision," said Henry, "a perfect cloud of gold-dust. . . ." This figure may well have lingered in the novelist's memory out of an extraordinary passage from his brother's *A Pluralistic Universe*, where William comments, as follows, on the teeming and random mediocrity which in this world environs every form of excellence:

> Since when, in this mixed world, was any good thing given us in purest outline and isolation? One of the chief characteristics of life is life's redundancy. The sole condition of our having anything, no matter what, is that we should have so much of it. . . . Everything is smothered in the litter that is fated to accompany it. Without too much you cannot have enough, of anything. Lots of inferior books, lots of bad statues, lots of dull speeches, of tenth-rate men and women, as a condition of the few precious specimens in either kind being realized! The gold-dust comes to birth with the quartz-sand all around it. . . .

If the second, third, and fourth books of the poem are primarily narrative in interest, the dramatic aspects of the case are played up in the three following monologues which give a hearing to the trio of leading characters, while in Books VIII–X the emphasis shifts once more, now towards the philosophic, as the foregoing evidence undergoes judicial examination. In this way, a single set of circumstances is not only appraised from different points of view, but with varying degrees of intensity referable to the demands of each speaker's role, whether it calls for the casual curiosity of the spectator, the life-and-death involvement of the protagonist, or the theoretic detachment of the arbiter. Within the three groupings of monologues there exist, furthermore, certain structural parallels which confirm the pluralistic implications of the subject-matter. Books II, V, and VIII, given to Half-Rome, Guido, and the latter's attorney for the defence, develop complementary arguments in Guido's support; whereas the case for Pompilia is pleaded by the Other Half-Rome, Caponsacchi, and the prosecutor in Books III, VI, and IX. The duplicating interplay between thesis and antithesis thus established is then resolved in the syntheses recurrently proposed in the culminating monologue of each triad. Tertium Quid's weighing of pros and cons steers a sober middle course between the irrational prejudices which sway the

partisans of Guido and Pompilia. By the same token, Pompilia's intuitive grasp of essentials rectifies the self-delusions to which her husband and her champion are subject. And lastly, the Pope's monologue, combining Tertium Quid's objectivity with Pompilia's insight, disengages the truth so sorely travestied in the lawyer's speeches.

The monologues of Tertium Quid, Pompilia, and the Pope have this additional quality in common, that the speakers are equally cognizant and tolerant of the aberrant motives which have split Rome into opposing camps. In other words, these three, who otherwise have so little in common, share the attribute of open-mindedness which, according to William James, characterizes the pluralist in his confrontation of reality. For Tertium Quid, as has already been observed, the indeterminacy of the issues involved hopelessly complicates the apportioning of innocence and guilt. Pompilia, dying, would forgive all those who have wronged her. "Wherefore should I blame you much?" she humbly asks:

> So we are made, such difference in minds,
> Such difference too in eyes that see the minds!

It is the Pope, however, who, as Browning's mouthpiece, most clearly takes up a pluralistic position in his grappling with the ultimate bearings of the case. Significant in this connection are Innocent's preliminary deliberations on the subject of papal infallibility, occasioned by his study of the perplexed history of Pope Formosus. Chastened by the errors of his predecessors in office, he turns to review the facts appealed to him with full awareness of their ambiguity:

> Truth, nowhere, lies yet everywhere in these—
> Not absolutely in a portion, yet
> Evolvable from the whole . . .

At line 1252, roughly the midpoint of his monologue, the Pope is ready to condemn Guido; yet he is withheld from signing the death-warrant by a host of new doubts, all resulting from his recognition that human faculties can at best attain to partial glimpses of the truth:

> Man's mind—what is it but a convex glass
> Wherein are gathered all the scattered points
> Picked out of the immensity of sky,
> To reunite there, be our heaven on earth,
> Our known unknown, our God revealed to man?
> Existent somewhere, somehow, as a whole;

> Here, as a whole proportioned to our sense, —
> There, (which is nowhere, speech must babble thus!)
> In the absolute immensity, the whole
> Appreciable solely by Thyself, —
> Here, by the little mind of man, reduced
> To littleness that suits his faculty,
> Appreciable too in the degree . . .

He hears ghostly voices, the advocates of views not endorsed by the Church. First speaks Euripides, who would defer the determination of justice to God ("who only knows the thing He made"), and who questions whether Christian ethics have promoted conduct nobler than that which prevailed in ancient Greece. The Quietist doctrines of the Molinists next come forward to trouble the old man's thoughts. In heretically denying "At peril of their body and their soul, —/ Recognized truths," were they not, he asks himself

> obedient to some truth
> Unrecognized yet, but perceptible?

And lastly, "the spirit of culture," premonitory of the age of enlightenment dawning with the new century, solicits Innocent with its seductive worldly plea: "Mercy is safe and graceful." The Pope at no point endeavours to oppose a reasoned rebuttal to any of these arguments which, as projections of his anti-dogmatism, are perhaps irrefutable on pluralistic grounds. Rather, he invokes the appeal to which Guido has given so cynical a twist in Book V, "*Quis pro Domino*?", and acting under the kind of instinctual compulsion which William James was to call the will to believe, he seals the murderer's doom with lightning pen-strokes.

There remain the eleventh and the narrative portions of the twelfth books, the structural and thematic functions of which have habitually stirred up controversy among admirers of *The Ring and the Book*. In his first monologue Guido uttered what he hoped would seem true to his inquisitors in the witness-chamber; allowed a second chance to justify his actions, he speaks his own "naked truth." When Julia Wedgwood, Browning's friend and sympathetic critic, protested against the unrelieved evil of Guido's character, as depicted in Book V, the poet replied that his portrait was faithful to the recorded facts: "But here, — given the subject, I cannot but still say, given the treatment too: the business has been, as I specify, to explain *fact*—and the fact is what you see and, worse, are to see. . . . here my pride was concerned to invent nothing: the minutest

circumstance that denotes character is *true*: the black is so much—the white, no more." In sending Miss Wedgwood the concluding books of the poem, Browning added: "The worst is, I think myself dreadfully in the right, all the while, in everything: apart, of course, from my own incapacities of whatever kind, I think this *is* the world as it is, and will be—*here* at least." Hate is Guido's truth, as Pompilia had perceived; and he goes to his death unregenerate. For it is surely inconsistent with his nature to interpret that last despairing apostrophe to his wife as a token of grace. Nor does the aftermath in Book XII materially lighten the gloom cast by Guido's second monologue. Here again Browning's method is pluralistic: the details which wind up the story are presented through a series of letters from individuals variously implicated. Their total effect is to give substance to the Pope's desponding observation: "What does the world, told truth, but lie the more?" Even Fra Celestino, whose sermon is reported verbatim by Bottini, derives no lasting consolation from the issue of the trial:

> Because Pompilia's truth prevails,
> Conclude you, all truth triumphs in the end?

But while those who would read an unmitigatedly hopeful message into Browning's poetry must be disconcerted by the conclusion of *The Ring and the Book*, the impression which it creates is quite consistent with a pluralistic interpretation. For the pluralist in William James's definition is prepared to accept the actuality of evil in the natural order of things as a given fact, inexplicable perhaps, but incontrovertible and inescapable. James's conception, delivered in the following passage from his important address, "The Dilemma of Determinism," might, indeed, be taken as a gloss on the kind of world in which *The Ring and the Book* is set:

> The world is enigmatical enough in all conscience, whatever theory we may take up toward it. The indeterminism I defend, the free-will theory of popular sense based on the judgment of regret, represents that world as vulnerable, and liable to be injured by certain of its parts if they act wrong. And it represents their acting wrong as a matter of possibility or accident, neither inevitable nor yet to be infallibly warded off. In all this, it is a theory devoid either of transparency or of stability. It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever inacceptable.

II

So far the purpose of this discussion has been to suggest that in *The Ring and the Book* Browning projects a world-view which is remarkably

conformable to that elaborated in William James's philosophy. It remains to show that the poet also shared the ethical suppositions which the philosopher associated with this world-view. Put simply, Browning anticipated James's contention in "Is Life Worth Living?" that man is at home in a pluralistic universe: "For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted."

The very manifoldness and indeterminacy of the phenomenal world exists, as James said in his address entitled "The Sentiment of Rationality," "to elicit from the man every form of triumphant endurance and conquering moral energy." In choosing amidst conflicting alternatives, the individual exercises, again in James's words, this time from *Varieties of Religious Experience*, "mankind's common instinct for reality, which in point of fact has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism." To this end the plasticity of circumstance contributes. The given lends itself to remoulding; and we find, as James declared in *Pragmatism*, that "in our cognitive as well as our active life we are creative. We *add*, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man *engenders* truths upon it." The primacy which James accorded to the creative impulse as a component of the pluralistic habit of mind may be inferred from the fact that he particularly stressed this aspect of his philosophy in an interview which he granted the *New York Times* in 1907:

> Mind *engenders* truth *upon* reality. . . . Our minds are not here simply to copy a reality that is already complete. They are here to complete it, to add to its importance, by their own remodeling of it, to decant its contents over, so to speak, into a more significant shape. In point of fact, the *use* of most of our thinking is to help us to *change* the world.

The ethical postulates of pluralism are dramatically realized in the central conflicts of *The Ring and the Book*, Thus, Caponsacchi and Pompilia on conventional grounds betray their prescribed duties, he as a priest, she as a wife. For the pluralist, as we have seen, however, the imperfections inherent in the status quo call for unconventional measures. The compulsion on which Caponsacchi acts,

> That dares the right and disregards alike
> The yea and nay o' the world,

is an heroic one, accompanied by a sense of religious conversion: "Into another state, under new rule/I knew myself was passing swift and

sure. . . ." In the chapter entitled "Saintliness" from *Varieties of Religious Experience* occurs the following passage which might have been inspired by the example of Caponsacchi:

> The man who lives in his religious centre of personal energy, and is actuated by spiritual enthusiasms, differs from his previous carnal self in perfectly definite ways. The new ardor which burns in his breast consumes in its glow the lower "noes" which formerly beset him, and keeps him immune against infection from the entire groveling portion of his nature. Magnanimities once impossible are now easy; paltry conventionalities and mean incentives once tyrannical hold no sway.

The resolve to assert their wills, however unorthodox the consequences, comes to Pompilia and Caponsacchi alike through the recognition of evil. For the pluralist, as we have also seen, evil is an existing fact, ingrained in the very texture of reality, not to be overlooked or temporized with or explained away. The Comparinis, with their "Sadly mixed natures: self-indulgent,—yet/Self-sacrificing too," constitute for the Pope an object lesson in the price individuals must pay for moral obliquity: "Life's business being," as he says, "just the terrible choice." In contrast, Pompilia and Caponsacchi stand fully exonerated in his eyes because they have fearlessly acted, in William James's words from *Varieties of Religious Experience*, on "the belief that there is an element of real wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor evaded, but which must be squarely met and overcome by an appeal to the soul's heroic resources, and neutralized and cleansed away by suffering."

A world without evil, as both Browning and James believed, would be a world without conflict, wherein there would be no opportunity for ethical discriminations. Over and over again, the Pope's monologue testifies to the speaker's conviction that human existence acquires its highest meaning under the stress of alternate possibilities, in choosing amongst which the individual's moral attributes are perpetually searched and tested: "All till the very end is trial in life," and "This life is training and a passage." James reaches an identical conclusion in "The Dilemma of Determinism":

> Not the absence of vice, but vice there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal human state. And there seems no reason to suppose it not a permanent human state. . . . Our moral horizon moves with us as we move, and never do we draw nearer to the far-off line where the black waves and the azure meet. The final purpose of our creation seems most plausibly to be the greatest possible enrichment of our ethical consciousness, through the intensest play of contrasts and the widest diversity of characters.

And this argument is significantly amplified in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, where the author states that saints are the true world-changers by virtue of their genius for creatively affirming those transcendent values which point the way to higher states of being:

> The saints are authors, *auctores*, increasers of goodness. The potentialities of development in human souls are unfathomable. . . . The saints, with their extravagance of human tenderness are the great torch-bearers . . . , the tip of the wedge, the clearers of the darkness. Like the single drops which sparkle in the sun as they are flung far ahead of the advancing edge of a wave-crest or of a flood, they show the way and are forerunners. The world is not yet with them, so they often seem in the midst of the world's affairs to be preposterous. They are impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animators of potentialities of goodness which but for them would lie forever dormant. It is not possible to be quite as mean as we naturally are, when they have passed before us. One fire kindles another; and without that over-trust in human worth which they show, the rest of us would lie in spiritual stagnancy.

It is on precisely such grounds that the Pope derives from the conduct of Pompilia and Caponsacchi not only private spiritual consolation, but also faith in man's perfectibility:

> The moral sense grows but by exercise.
> 'T is even as man grew probatively
> Initiated in Godship, set to make
> A fairer moral world than this he finds . . .

In summary, then, it is apparent that Browning's poetry supports William James's pluralistic contentions that the individual engenders truths on the world, that he does so by rebelliously asserting his will in opposition to the evil which he perceives, and that through the resulting conflict he not only grows in moral stature but also acts as a redemptive agent in the cause of humanity. This is the point at which to investigate still another important link between Browning's thought and the psychological premises on which James's pluralism rests. Recent research has called attention to the significant ways in which his early exposure to evangelical Christianity influenced the poet's intellectual development. And the sources cited in *Varieties of Religious Experience* are evidence enough that the same Protestant tradition is instrumental to an understanding of the Jamesian philosophy. But even allowing for this common background, one cannot but be struck by the similarities which the two writers present in their treatment of the psychology of the religious experience.

James's pluralism does not end with the manifoldness of perceptual reality; it is extended to include the hypothesis (which can be matched in many of Browning's poems, "Rephan" for example) that this world is only one among many, that, in other words, we inhabit a pluralistic universe. "The whole drift of my education," James confessed in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, "goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in." To the eloquent elaboration of this belief James devoted himself in the concluding lectures of both *A Pluralistic Universe* and *Varieties of Religious Experience*; but he had introduced it in pragmatic terms as early as his address, "Is Life Worth Living?", in a passage which is worth quoting at length for the light it throws on Browning's own preoccupation with surmises of a like nature:

> Suppose, however thickly evils crowd upon you, that your unconquerable subjectivity proves to be their match, and that you find a more wonderful joy than any passive pleasure can bring in trusting ever in the larger whole. . . .
>
> Now, in this description of faiths that verify themselves I have assumed that our faith in an invisible order is what inspires those efforts and that patience which make this visible order good for moral men. Our faith in the seen world's goodness (goodness now meaning fitness for successful moral and religious life) has verified itself by leaning on our faith in the unseen world. But will our fatih in the unseen world similarly verify itself? Who knows?
>
> Once more it is a case of *maybe*; and once more *maybes* are the essence of the situation. I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is not better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight, —as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem; and first of all to redeem our own hearts from atheisms and fears. For such a half-wild, half-saved universe our nature is adapted. The deepest thing in our nature is this *Binnenleben* (as a German doctor lately has called it), this dumb region of the heart in which we dwell alone with our willingnesses and unwillingnesses, our faiths and fears. As through the cracks and crannies of caverns those waters exude from the earth's bosom which then form the fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths of personality the sources of all our outer deeds and

decisions take their rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature of things; and compared with these concrete movements of our soul all abstract statements and scientific arguments—the veto, for example, which the strict positivist pronounces upon our faith—sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth. For here possibilities, not finished facts, are the realities with which we have actively to deal . . .

From the foregoing passage emerge at least three ideas which are relevant to the present discussion. The first of these is self-evident, and need only be noted in passing. The higher realms of being postulated by James lie beyond cognition, and are solely apprehensible through influxes of intuitive knowledge coming from the subliminal consciousness. James's conviction that ultimate truths exceed man's rational faculties has its counterpart in Browning's exaltation of the wisdom of the heart over the wisdom of the head, a tendency which the poet shared with many of his contemporaries—Carlyle and Dickens to name only the most famous.

In the second place and as an outgrowth of his insistence on the plastic nature of reality, James suggests that the will to believe may be the best means of actualizing the thing believed in. Inherent in this theory is the concept of a finite creative power whose purposes in this world can only be accomplished through the co-operation of its inhabitants. In his address, "Reflex Action and Theism," James had remarked: "God's being is sacred from ours. To co-operate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us. In such co-operation with his purposes, not in any chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretic drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny." And the same notion recurs in the Postscript to *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

Here, at first glance, the philosopher would seem to take radical issue with Browning's faith in the all-knowing, all-powerful deity of Biblical revelation. Yet, as James was at pains to emphasize in "The Dilemma of Determinism," the hypothesis which impugned God's sovereignty was not an essential article in the pluralistic creed:

. . . it is entirely immaterial, in this scheme, whether the creator leave the absolute chance-possibilities to be decided by himself, each when its proper moment arrives, or whether, on the contrary, he alienate this power from himself, and leave the decision out and out to finite creatures such as we men are. The great point is that the possibilities are really *here*. Whether it be we who solve them, or he working through us, at those soul-trying moments when fate's scales seem to quiver, and good snatches the victory from evil or shrinks nerveless from the fight, is of small account, so long as we admit that the issue is decided nowhere else than *here* and *now*.

With the general drift of this passage Browning could have had no quarrel; and it is doubtful whether James, on the other hand, would have found any significant basis for distinguishing between his own belief and Browning's concept of a transcendant God whose will remains inscrutable until brought to pass by the agency of his creatures. Certainly, Browning would have given full assent to James's assertion in "The Sentiment of Rationality" that "truths cannot become true till our faith had made them so," with its corollary: "There are then cases where faith creates its own verification."

Finally, man's creative potentiality, his capacity for embodying new truths in thought and action, constitutes for James the really hopeful element in the human situation. This meliorism, however, is not to be dissociated from its setting in the pluralistic habit of mind. For, as James declared in *A Pluralistic Universe*:

> What really *exists* is not things made but things in the making. Once made, they are dead, and an infinite number of alternative conceptual decompositions can be used in defining them. But put yourself *in the making* by a stroke of intuitive sympathy with the thing and, the whole range of possible decompositions coming at once into your possession, you are no longer troubled with the question which of them is absolutely true. Reality *falls* in passing into conceptual analysis; it *mounts* in living its own undivided life—it buds and burgeons, changes and creates. Once adopt the movement of this life in any given instance and you know what Bergson calls the *devenir réel* by which the thing evolves and grows.

Here, as it may well seem, is the proper perspective wherein to evaluate Browning's own optimism which can realistically confront a world so riddled with imperfection as that portrayed in *The Ring and the Book* and yet discern in such an environment the conditions for moral growth.

William James habitually appealed the tenets of his pluralism to the touchstone of individual experience. In explanation of this pragmatic procedure he offered the following statement in the concluding lecture of *Varieties of Religious Experience*:

> You see now why I have been so individualistic throughout these lectures, and why I have seemed so bent on rehabilitating the element of feeling in religion and subordinating its intellectual part. Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done. Compared with this world of living individualized feelings, the world of generalized objects which the intellect contemplates is without solidity or life.

Browning's intellectual temper was equally individualistic and empirical; and the kind of religious faith sanctioned by James's philosophy could

hardly be better illustrated than through the poet's rendering in *The Ring and the Book* of the experiences which motivate Pompilia, Caponsacchi, and the Pope.

Pompilia belongs in the company of Browning's saintly innocents, along with Pippa, the Duke's last duchess, Brother Lawrence of the "Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister," and so many others. She exhibits in its purest form what E. M. Forster has called "the holiness of the heart's imagination." For guidance in the crucial moments of her life she relies exclusively on the promptings of intuition; yet her actions, thus dictated, are the transcendent force for good in the world of the poem. It is a measure of Browning's artistry that Pompilia's impressionability compels the reader to imagine for her a role to which in her humility she would never have dreamed of aspiring. Thus, when she describes the morning on which she was first visited by the mystic intimation of approaching motherhood, she does so in language that can only evoke the scene of the Annunciation:

> When, what, first thing at daybreak, pierced the sleep
> With a summons to me? Up I sprang alive,
> Light in me, light without me, everywhere
> Change! A broad yellow sun-beam was let fall
> From heaven to earth, —a sudden drawbridge lay,
> Along which marched a myriad merry motes,
> Mocking the flies that crossed them and recrossed
> In rival dance, companions new-born too.
> On the house-eaves, a dripping shag of weed
> Shook diamonds on each dull grey lattice-square,
> As first one, then another bird leapt by,
> And light was off, and lo was back again,
> Always with one voice, —where are two such joys?—

To be sure, Gaetano's birth at Christmastide does wring from the dying girl the wondering admission, "This time I felt like Mary"; and at one point Caponsacchi likens her to "Our Lady of all the Sorrows." But it is otherwise left to the reader to shape the tragic context for her sufferings out of such intuitions as those which led her to worship when a child

> the poor Virgin that I used to know
> At our street-corner in a lonely niche,—
> The babe, that sat upon her knees, broke off—;

or to deny Guido's paternity of her son:

> No father that he ever knew at all,
> Nor ever had—no, never had, I say!;

or, finally, to go to her death with an unconscious recollection of the Assumption: "And I rise."

Their involvement in Pompilia's fate completes Caponsacchi and the Pope, the one as a man of action, the other as a religious philosopher. "She has done the good to me," says the priest. And he recalls the circumstances under which there had miraculously awakened in him the sense of mission which was to change him from a foppish worldling into Pompilia's Saint George, the Pope's "warrior-priest":

> Pompilia spoke, and I at once received,
> Accepted my own fact, my miracle
> Self-authorised and self-explained . . .

The revelation of truth, originating outside the rational mind with its logical inhibitions, had come like "the cleaving of a cloud, a cry, a crash":

> 'Thought?' nay, Sirs, what shall follow was not thought:
> I have thought sometimes, and thought long and hard.
> I have stood before, gone round a serious thing,
> Tasked my whole mind to touch and clasp it close,
> As I stretch forth my arm to touch this bar.
> God and man, and what duty I owe both, —
> I dare to say I have confronted these
> In thought; but no such faculty helped here.
> I put forth no thought,—powerless, all that night
> I paced the city: it was the first Spring.
> By the invasion I lay passive to,
> In rushed new things, the old were rapt away . . .

Yet, Caponsacchi is not fully "saved" by his initial meeting with Pompilia. Less incorruptible than she, he is not equal to achieving at a single leap the required pinnacle of heroism. At first he delays, aware as never before of the duties of his priestly function, but restrained from action by submission to those religious disciplines which have only now become fully meaningful to him. Caponsacchi's conversion is not completed until a second encounter brings him a deeper and truer intuition of Pompilia's need. After that he is to think of himself as God's militant deputy, dedicated solely to furthering the divine plan whereby

> one purpose and one will
> Evolve themselves i' the world, change wrong to right . . .

Pompilia's role with regard to the Pope, downhearted before the evil which surrounds him on every side, is that of a restorer rather than a

revealer of faith. Her saintliness conveys to the old man, as to Fra Celestino, a sense of personal reward:

> Yet if in purity and patience, if
> In faith held fast despite the plucking fiend,
> Safe like the signet-stone with the new name
> That saints are known by,—if in right returned
> For wrong, most pardon for worst injury,
> If there be any virtue, any praise,—
> Then will this woman-child have proved—who knows?—
> Just the one prize vouchsafed unworthy me,
> Ten years a gardener of the untoward ground,
> I till,—this earth, my sweat and blood manure
> All the long day that barrenly grows dusk;
> At least one blossom makes me proud at eve
> Born 'mid the briers of my enclosure!

This individual response, however, is absorbed in Innocent's concern for his official responsibilities, as he debates "what gain or loss to God" has come of his pontificate. In passing judgment, he is called on to speak as Christ's vicar; and his reading of the evidence irresistibly impels him to the conclusion that, by actively resisting Guido's menace to her unborn child and to Caponsacchi, Pompilia did "anticipate the office that is mine." To the extent, furthermore, that he recognizes in Pompilia's rebellion a radical outgrowth of the meekly submissive spirit in which she had accepted her earlier trials, the Pope is confirmed in his faith that higher truths are dynamically evolved from lower under the stress of conflict:

> Thou, patient thus, couldst rise from law to law,
> The old to the new, promoted at one cry
> O' the trump of God to the new service, not
> To longer bear, but henceforth fight, be found
> Sublime in new impatience with the foe!
> Endure man and obey God: plant firm foot
> On neck of man, tread man into hell
> Meet for him, and obey God all the more!

The conduct which the world has deemed unwifely on Pompilia's part, unpriestly on Caponsacchi's, and unchristian for both, the Pope thus understands as the manifestation of spiritual rebirth:

> . . . it seems
> As a new attribute were born of each
> Champion of truth, the priest and wife I praise,—
> As a new safeguard sprang up in defence
> Of their new noble nature . . .

That the advancement of truth should entail on heroic individuals great suffering and apparent waste is in the pluralistic view only to be expected. "Life is probation and this earth no goal/But starting-point of man": this for the Pope is "the foremost fact." On any other hypothesis the spectacle of evil would be insupportable:

> I can believe this dread machinery
> Of sin and sorrow, would confound me else,
> Devised,—all pain, at most expenditure
> Of pain by Who devised pain,—to evolve,
> By new machinery in counterpart,
> The moral qualities of man . . .

In Innocent's eyes, then, Pompilia and Caponsacchi are redeemed by their moral *creativity*. Whereas the other characters in *The Ring and the Book* have through their actions helped to compound the indeterminacy of this pluralistic world, they alone have ventured "the terrible choice" which is "life's business." And just as the Pope subjects to judicial scrutiny the deeds of the beings committed to his care, so, he thinks, will his own deeds be judged when shortly he faces God and hears:

> 'Since by its fruit a tree is judged,
> 'Show me thy fruit, the latest act of thine!
> 'For in the last is summed the first and all,—
> 'What thy life last put heart and soul into,
> 'There shall I taste thy product.'

Thus it is that, acting on a conviction no less intuitive than those which prompted Pompilia and Caponsacchi to vindicate the truth, each according to his own best lights, Innocent makes his choice: "And how should I dare die, this man let live?"

The truth which the Pope declared for the Rome of his day, Browning undertook through his poem to proclaim for all time. Enough has been said to suggest how closely *The Ring and the Book* corresponds, both in form and conception, to the central assumptions of William James's pluralistic philosophy. Equally amenable to discussion in the context of pluralism is the poet's own statement of his aesthetic relationship to his material, as set forth in the first and last books. Browning records that he was directed as if by predestination to the Old Yellow Book, wherein lay the "pure crude fact" of the Roman murder-case. Buried within the indiscriminate welter of detail which made up the volume, as he sensed from the outset, "lay absolutely truth,—/Fanciless fact."

Browning's equation of truth with fact, however, is somewhat misleading, since the facts ostensibly mirrored in the original documents had in actuality been refracted in passing through the minds of the various witnesses to suit their special purposes. Even the final verdict, however just, had been delivered under circumstances so ambiguous as to consign the truth to oblivion. Nor could the resurrection of this truth be accomplished by the simple skills of the literary detective. What was called for was a process of re-creation. The artist's approach to his subject must be that of the Jamesian pluralist for whom the given facts of existence are not intractable, but malleable, awaiting the act of human violence which will engender truth on them. "I fused my live soul with that inert stuff," writes the poet; "The life in me abolished the death of things." This does not mean that the artist in the process of creation has any disposition to relax his grasp on the actual. On the contrary, his effort is by intuitive means to identify himself ever more intimately with factual reality:

> Yet by a special gift, an art of arts,
> More insight and more outsight and much more
> Will to use both of these than boast my mates,
> I can detach from me, commission forth
> Half of my soul . . .

In Browning's view, then, the imagination is instrumental to the elucidation of truth. "Fancy with fact is just one fact the more," writes the poet; and rhetorically he asks

> Are means to the end, themselves in part the end?
> Is fiction which makes fact alive, fact too?

Browning's many poems about painters, musicians, and poets attest to the author's exalted concept of the creative faculty. His most notable spokesman, perhaps, is Fra Lippo Lippi, that passionate lover of life in all its pluralistic variety. To the captain of the watch, who has taken him in custody, the artist explains how the vicissitudes of existence have made the "soul and sense of him grow sharp alike." And his gain as a painter has been the capacity so to represent appearances as to enable men to see through his eyes the beauty and the ugliness which they were incapable of perceiving for themselves:

> For, don't you mark? we're made so that we love
> First when we see them painted, things we have passed

> Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see;
> And so they are better, painted—better to us,
> Which is the same thing. Art was given for that;
> God uses us to help each other so,
> Lending our minds out.

Lippi, however, thinks of himself as the interpreter of existing, rather than the discoverer of new truths; and Browning is careful in the opening monologue of *The Ring and the Book* not to claim more for his own poetry. God alone is truly creative. Individual man tries to duplicate the divine process, not with the intention of usurping God's prerogative, but because in imitating it, however distantly, he produces works which embody as much of the ideal as lies within human scope:

> I find first
> Writ down for very A.B.C. of fact,
> 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth;'
> From which, no matter with what lisp, I spell
> And speak you out a consequence—that man,
> Man,—as befits the made, the inferior thing,—
> Purposed, since made, to grow, not make in turn,
> Yet forced to try and make, else fail to grow,—
> Formed to rise, reach at, if not grasp and gain
> The good beyond him,—which attempt is growth,—
> Repeats God's process in man's due degree,
> Attaining man's proportionate result,—
> Creates, no, but resuscitates, perhaps.
> Inalienable, the arch-prerogative
> Which turns thought, act—conceives, expresses too!
> No less, man, bounded, yearning to be free,
> May so project his surplusage of soul
> In search of body, so add self to self
> By owning what lay ownerless before,—
> So find, so fill full, so appropriate forms—
> That, although nothing which had never life
> Shall get life from him, be, not having been,
> Yet something dead may get to live again,
> Something with too much life or not enough,
> Which, either way imperfect, ended once:
> An end whereat man's impulse intervenes,
> Makes new beginning, starts the dead alive,
> Completes the incomplete and saves the thing.

Yet, in asserting that through his poem he had educed the ultimate and enduring truth of Pompilia's story, does not Browning imply for the artistic imagination a higher function on pluralistic premises than he was willing explicitly to avow? The world of *The Ring and the Book* can

only be described as indeterminate, "half-wild, half-saved," as James would say. It is a world in which God relies on human assistance for the fulfilment of his intent, a world wherein heroic deeds and inspired words initiate the serial stages in the progressive revelation of truth. It is, in short, a pluralistic world, according to the Jamesian definition. And if this world seems, nevertheless, to exhibit moral order and purpose, that impression is ultimately dependent on nothing less than the poet's ability to impose his own will to believe through the resources of an art which does not simply enunciate, but which actually becomes the vital form of that belief:

> But Art,—wherein man nowise speaks to men,
> Only to mankind,—Art may tell a truth
> Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
> Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.
> So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,
> Beyond mere imagery on the wall,—
> So, note by note, bring music from your mind,
> Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,—
> So write a book shall mean, beyond the facts,
> Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.

EDWARD A. BLOOM

Johnson's "Divided Self"

"Silence," Kierkegaard has written, "is the snare of the demon, and the more one keeps silent, the more terrifying the demon becomes; but silence is also the mutual understanding between the Deity and the individual." Samuel Johnson recognized this paradox. Often trapped in silence by the demon of his fears, he was during dark, introspective moments in his closest communion with the deity. His need for intimate social exchange is summed up thus: "To have no assistance from other minds, in resolving doubts, in appeasing scruples, in balancing deliberations, is a very wretched destitution."[1] Yet this gregarious man experienced crises when, unable to confide in anyone, he surrendered himself spiritually and strove for relief in the composition of prayers. The intensity of his private fears was magnified on solemn occasions, most notably Easter, New Year's Day, and his birthdays. With the advent of these anniversaries, he was troubled by the urgency of his religious obligations. A recurrent awe of judgment and resurrection, of the duties he must fulfil in the period from one new year to the next or from one birthday to the next, filled him with fear and trembling. It was at such times, therefore, that he sought most directly for divine intervention.

On birthdays, especially, since these brought him his acutest warnings of personal responsibility and negligence, Johnson's prayers reveal him in his loneliest yet most reverential moods. At such times, often in the early morning hours, he habitually reviewed accomplishments and failures of the past year, only to find himself wanting. Struggling by himself for rational control over a conviction of guilt and inadequacy, he was deeply in need of a connection with reality to afford him the reassurance of his continuing place in the scheme of things. Like many individuals who, suffering from religious anxiety, fear a disharmony between themselves and the rest of nature, Johnson had a compulsion to rediscover the balance.[2] Each passing year of his life reminded him painfully of approach-

ing death, when he must face "the disruption of his union with visible nature" and prepare for judgment (*Rambler*, no. 78). Birthdays and religious anniversaries amplified Johnson's feeling that he carried an intolerable burden of sins for which he must account in his isolation, and harrowed him with the fear that he who had devoted himself to humanity was now a castaway.[3] Under such circumstances, desperate to regain confidence that he was not forever apart from mankind and that he could address himself to a supernal, redemptive force, he composed his prayers. By virtue of the familiar action of confessing responsibility for certain failures of obligation, he could at least hope to be forgiven and was thus fortified.

The religious terror implied by Johnson in his prayers was one by which he had been obsessed during most of his adult life. Some of his extreme fears were known to his friends, but only in a general way. For instance, his concerns over sin and death and redemption were no secret. At the same time, however, they were concerns characteristic of any practising Christian of his day, if not to the same degree. What he did not as a rule confide, apart from abstract theories which might lend themselves to particular application, was the intensity of his fears and their precise source. This tension and particularity belonged to his introspective self, buried under an accumulation of guilt feelings and held by the burden of personal responsibility. Like most individuals, Johnson could reveal but a limited part of his buried life to which the anxieties associated with birthdays and religious seasons belonged. Matthew Arnold was to express a comparable dilemma in his poem "The Buried Life," writing, "that which seals" the heart and lips "hath been deep ordain'd." Approaching the same matter philosophically, Wittgenstein was to say, "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen."[4] Articulation serves a formal or social need and it may, in intimate relationships, communicate certain states of inwardness. But egoistic feelings of the most profound kind remain buried, inhibited by artificial restraints of language or, as with Johnson about his birthday, by barriers of personality.

So obsessive was his reluctance to acknowledge his birthdays that he seldom mentioned the subject willingly, even to Mrs. Thrale, who thought of herself as the guardian of his secrets. Indeed, she was so far from appreciating the gravity of his feeling (although she had reason to suspect it), that she made festive occasions of his anniversaries.[5] Often compulsive

in his need for egoistic release about most matters, Johnson found Mrs. Thrale to be an unusually sympathetic listener. But about his birthdays he would not speak. Thus, he arrived with the Thrales in France on September 17, 1775, one day before his sixty-sixth birthday. During a sleepless night he composed a self-searching prayer, but there is no indication that he confided his fears to Mrs. Thrale. Similarly, on an earlier trip to Kent, which also coincided with his birthday, he experienced characteristic distress. Yet of this Mrs. Thrale was aware only because she had stumbled upon his written meditation.[6]

Johnson's silence about some things may be attributed to what Jung has called "a secret fear of the unknown 'perils of the soul.'"[7] Afflicted by an overwhelming, morbid imagination which warned him constantly of the insecurity of his hopes for eternal salvation, he had "a secret fear" no less than that of damnation. Magnified by awe of a supreme being which subsumed his finite existence as well as his hoped-for grace, Johnson's dread for his soul was in direct proportion to his fear of God. And it was a fear contingent upon the assumption that his obedience to divine mandate was ever inadequate or imperfect. This feeling of unworthiness, one associated with his "religion of fear,"[8] constantly tormented him. For Johnson the pressures of guilt and sin—and the judgment to which death would bring him—were fearful truths transcending human associations and thus beyond verbal articulation. His personality was in effect, as William James has described the religious phenomenon, a heterogeneous one. His was a divided self, an external part of it occupied by social obligations, and an introspective part sickened by "melancholy in the form of self-condemnation and sense of sin."[9] Since most of his profound secrets were buried in his religious life, Johnson would confide if at all only in his prayers. They were an aspect of him which became widely known only after his death, upon publication of the prayers by the Reverend George Strahan in 1785. But even these private devotions are formalized acknowledgments of fear and suffering and guilt. When he particularized certain of his sins, such as idleness and waste of time, he announced or confessed a condition but rarely exposed fundamental cause or essence. In communicating with the divine source to which he subordinated himself, it must be assumed, he had at least subconsciously in mind the precise sins to which he alluded. The formal prayer, since this was not public confession, allows generalized statement, and the thought is more significant than the word. As one "afraid of things that

seem to be overpowering," Johnson made his private confessions general, shielding himself from his pain by withholding the finite descriptions of his errors. His was a characteristic hesitation "to give a complete account of all the circumstances and complications which originally led him into a morbid condition."[10] He could not escape from these thoughts, to be sure, but he guarded them as best he could in his prayers.

Not only the expression of simple piety, but the temporary resolution of an emotional dilemma as well, the birthday prayers afford insight into Johnson's hidden feelings and his powers of self-restoration. They were a means for overcoming an immediate crisis, but also for gathering strength, for fortifying himself as he faced the days ahead. Physical solitude imposed on him a sense of religious awe, making death seem more imminent than ever. Believing "the whole of life is but keeping away the thoughts of it," Johnson "never had a moment in which death was not terrible to him." Believing further that his hopes for salvation lay in a life of virtue and fulfilment, he could not help being oppressed by the anxieties of guilt and wasted hours. Through private confession he sought the expiation which might bring calmness of mind; prayer became a positive resistance to irrational fears and in a very real sense preparation for death. In Johnson's attitude there is a perhaps conscious reverberation of William Law's warning, "that your mind may be possessed with such a sense of [death's] nearness, that you may have it always in your thoughts, do everything as in sight of it, and make every day a day of preparation for it." Despite his terrors of the unknown, he could not let himself be unnerved by despair. "I will be conquered," he said, "I will not capitulate." That he would be conquered by an overpowering force he accepted as the inevitable conclusion to his mortal state. He would be vanquished without relaxing his feeling of submission to that force. Capitulation, however, was alien to his will, for it was an unworthy surrender based upon stipulations or terms which he had no freedom to demand. Capitulation, as described in the *Dictionary* (in Matthew Hale's words), "was not a complete conquest," and only by total, uncompromising surrender—by "real nakedness of the soul," to borrow Screwtape's phrase—could Johnson affirm his obligation to an omnipotent deity.[11]

Torn by a "constitutional melancholy" which made a birthday or a religious event the occasion for depressing contemplation rather than for celebration, Johnson resorted to prayer instinctively for both mitiga-

tion and action. Urgently aware of his need to keep fear under control, he maintained that "to have the management of the mind is a great art, and it may be attained in a considerable degree by experience and habitual exercise." During this same conversation, on the subject of "constitutional melancholy," Johnson denied the ultimate possibility of burying unpleasant thoughts within one's own mind. Moderate emotional disturbance in the night, for instance, might be alleviated if not forgotten by positive, rational action such as reading, a course which he frequently followed. But severe disquiet required a more drastic outlet such as the composition of a prayer. Johnson's compulsive need for total awareness, for the preservation of his rational powers, is implicit in his nocturnal prayers, particularly those made up for his birthdays.[12] Here, then, we see a combining of moral responsibility, which acknowledges man's submission to divine power, and psychological expedience, which makes a fearful realization bearable.

In the *Dictionary* Johnson defines prayer as "submissive entreaty" and supplication. It arises out of a private religious condition like that described by James (p. 31) as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." Johnson's concept of prayer, further, depended upon a form of humility in which he subordinated his personality and will to a benevolent but demanding, all-powerful force. Repentance trembles "in the presence of the judge," he said, and "supplication to God can only cry for mercy." Every conscious moment of his life he indentified with this hope for redemption. Even as he believed "there must, in every society, be some power or other, from which there is no appeal," so he depended upon an absolute source of judgment in spiritual matters. Committed to a hierarchical principle, Johnson reasoned that his inner condition was determined by a transcendent order. Whether sanctification would be withheld or granted depended upon acquiescence to what he understood as divine will. The fundamental truth of Johnson's authoritarian religious belief was obedient surrender to the deity. Regarding himself inferior and imperfect before supernal omnipotence, Johnson relied for grace upon submissive yielding. As he wrote in the concluding lines of *The Vanity of Human Wishes*:

> Pour forth thy fervours for a healthful mind,
> Obedient passions and a will resign'd.

To balk at total surrender or to disobey would have been to commit a

cardinal sin. Through submission in his prayers he diminished his "feeling of loneliness and limitation." And while he lost "his independence and integrity as an individual," he acquired the sense "of being protected by an awe-inspiring power," becoming by his voluntary act of submission a part of that power.[13]

Johnson's broad religious views were orthodox and conventional. A firm adherent of the doctrines of the Church of England, he stated his prayers—and especially his birthday prayers—in forms and terminology closely identifiable with those of *The Book of Common Prayer*. The mingled tones of humble submissiveness, fearful confession and entreaty, and love, which echo throughout the services of the Church of England, are likewise the tones of Johnson's private worship. He accommodated his individual devotions to the necessarily general tenor of prayers designed for an entire congregation.[14] Within the formulas of *The Book of Common Prayer*, thus, he reveals at least the outlines of his own religious fears and desires, and he appears as a humble supplicant begging redemption and guidance from omnipotent authority.

Among the hundred or so prayers which he recorded, almost a score were for birthdays. The first, for 1736, was a general prayer, but the second, for 1738 when he was only 29, contains a fearful admission of time "spent in Sloth, Vanity, and Wickedness." Thereafter in prayers composed for his own anniversaries or for Easter, New Year's Day and the like, Johnson frequently alluded to the personal sin of misspent time: "Days spent in idleness and folly" . . . "time misspent in sinfulness and negligence" . . . "waste of time." Thoughts of slothfulness, even on secular occasions, invariably called up religious associations. In the *Dictionary*, for example, he illustrated the words sloth or slothfulness with quotations from Shakespeare, Milton, Thomson, and L'Estrange, but he paired them with quotations from Proverbs (18. 9; 19. 15; 21. 15) and Hooker. The sins of indulgence and scruples appear to prey most consistently upon Johnson's mind as specific instances of his religious failure, and are the most poignant evidences of an individual conscience preparing for judgment and hoping for redemption. Other confessions of guilt occur in phrases and ideas, however, which have more general application: "manifold sins and negligences" . . . "sins, negligences, and ignorances" . . . fear for "the death of a sinner" . . . intemperate appetites . . . late rising . . . inadequate use of his talents to assist his fellow men . . . harbouring evil and sensual thoughts.[15]

In many respects his fears of short-comings are those shared by the community in general. Only recently, for example, Joyce Cary had one of his characters, in *To be a Pilgrim*, reflect that a Protestant education "throws upon everyone the responsibility for the whole world's sins, and it doesn't provide any escape—not even a confession box." Similarly, Johnson's sense of guilt is not exclusively individual but is one ingrained at least in part by the Protestant tradition, which involves each person in the guilt of mankind. Thus, he subscribed to the doctrine of original sin, drawing to himself responsibility for man's universal guilt. Ironically, feeling so spiritually weak that at times his own sins appeared unbearable, Johnson considered his atonements to be on behalf of his fellow men as well as himself. He believed, therefore, in a concomitant doctrine of vicarious punishment whereby each man becomes culpable, even though his offense is not direct or immediate. In identifying himself with a universal guilt, Johnson consciously placed his hopes for redemption in a modified form of sacrifice. He felt certain that God before revealing His merciful nature would be appeased only by "universal sacrifice and perpetual propitiation." A few months before his death he asserted the rightness of individual punishment, and "as I cannot be *sure* that I have fulfilled the conditions on which salvation is granted, I am afraid I may be one of those who shall be damned." Nor could any man, he persisted in believing, be sure that God has accepted him. The Protestant, according to Jung, "has to digest his sins by himself; and . . . he is none too sure of divine grace." Illustrative of this notion was Johnson's reliance upon repentance as a means of calming his conscience.[16] Ever fearful that he would be found wanting in his striving for eternal grace, Johnson summed up the uncertainty of his future hopes (*Rambler*, no. 110):

> He that reviews his life in order to determine the probability of his acceptance with God, if he could once establish the necessary proportion between crimes and sufferings, might securely rest upon his performance of expiation; but while safety remains the reward only of mental purity, he is afraid lest he should decide too soon in his own favour; lest he should not have felt the pangs of true contrition; lest he should mistake satiety for detestation, or imagine that his passions are subdued when they are only sleeping.

In the customary, periodic reviews of his life, thinking of his unfulfilled obligations to the deity, Johnson became terrified that his soul was imperilled.

Much speculation has been devoted to the question of whether Johnson's guilt complex originated in some tangible, physical transgression. This

consideration has revolved around the possibility that he had indulged in illicit sexual relations during his early London years.[17] The evidence, though the possibility need not be ruled out, is cloudy and the sin even if committed could not reasonably account for the prolonged intensity of his despair. In seeking further causes of his disturbance, one may profitably turn to the birthday prayers, where the clue appears to lie in recurrent allusions to wasted time. But idle hours and days must not be construed as mere physical laziness, nor as time which Johnson could squander as he chose. Rather it was time allotted him by God for the performance of tasks through the application of abilities which had been entrusted to him. In short, Johnson felt himself to be the steward of God-given talents, and any real or imagined failure to fulfil those talents he regarded as the commission of a sin. Negligence of duty or obligation, he wrote (*Rambler*, no. 201), is "laxity of honour." As early as 1738 he prayed "to make use of thy Gifts to the honour of thy Name." In 1757 he repented "of the days and years passed in neglect of the duties which thou hast set before me." The next year he sought strength that he might "henceforward diligently attend to the business of [his] station in this world, and to all the duties which thou hast commanded." Again, in 1769, he repeated this petition. Elsewhere in the prayers he reiterated similar sentiments, and more specifically related the work on the *Rambler*, the *Dictionary*, and the *Lives of the Poets* (as well as preparation for special studies) to talents of which he was the steward for the benefit of his fellow men and the glory of God. Comparably in the secular writings, especially the serial essays, Johnson often implied anxiety as to whether he had successfully applied his talents to moral purpose (e.g. *Adventurer*, no. 137).[18]

The humblest man, like his friend Robert Levet, wins divine approval when he plays out his role in life:

> And sure the Eternal Master found
> The single talent well employ'd.

Unlike the "wicked and slothful servant" of the Biblical parable on the use of capabilities (Matt. 25. 14–30),[19] Levet had used his gift well, thus demonstrating his faith in life and God. But Johnson feared for himself as the errant servant, deficient in works and consequently in faith. Because he was convinced that he had been singled out to promulgate ethical and spiritual truths, he accepted his duties as a direct mandate from God. Consistent with this theory of subordination, he felt himself assigned a

"station" for the fulfilment of specially directed gifts. As the birthday prayers reveal, his being selected to carry out divine purpose imposed a need for unremitting diligence, and any failure of obligation must result in special punishment. He dreaded the spectre of his own negligence, the failure to use his talents—like the man in the parable—as he was intended to use them.

When a stringent sense of religious duty is, as Johnson himself said, "habitually interwoven with the whole texture of life," then piety may be assumed to reflect the consolidation of all experiences. Such immediate influences as Johnson's Anglican training and reading must figure prominently in the shaping of his inner life. But these are only segments of his total religious outlook, which was strengthened and intensified by assimilated elements of Puritan—more specifically, Calvinist—doctrine. Many churches which rejected Calvinist theology accepted its moral structure. And Johnson, whose readings in Christian theological writings ranged widely, spoke with approval of the Puritans, "whose want of general learning," he thought, "was atoned for by their skill in the Scriptures, and the holiness of their lives." He particularly admired the writings and preachings of one of the most distinguished Puritans, the Reverend Richard Baxter. He had read Baxter at least by 1750, continued to do so until the end of his life, and cited him favourably in the *Rambler* (no. 71). When asked to recommend specific works by the religiously practical and realistic divine, Johnson said, "Read any of them; they are all good." And when Johnson was troubled by scruples, he remembered uneasily that Baxter had been similarly affected.[20]

Among the significant respects in which Johnson's attitudes touch upon those of Baxter, these are to be emphasized: one is the characteristically Puritan horror of idleness (including such self-indulgence as excessive sleep) as a distraction from piety; the other is the dedication of personal talent to the service of God. For Baxter, as for Johnson, waste of time is a deadly sin because "God is most served and honoured by" action. Mortal existence is so short that each individual must work constantly to insure his own election to the life eternal, and unwillingness to work becomes a symptom of lack of grace, a defiance of supreme will. Anticipating Johnson, Baxter had written: "Consider . . . how sad the review of ill spent time is, and how you will wish you had spent it when it is gone." The parallel is again notable when we read Baxter's exhortation to value talent. "Especially be sure that you live not out of a calling, that is, such a stated course of employment, in which you may be best service-

able to God. . . . and to the common good." To "refuse to be God's steward and to accept His gifts and use them for him when he requireth" is sinful. Baxter, of course, is but a representative voice of the Puritan ethic, and Johnson probably absorbed like attitudes from other early sources. For example, Calvin had frequently insisted that the individual must give an account of his stewardship.) Of immediate pertinence here is the likelihood that Johnson assimilated the Puritan eschatology, directly or indirectly, making it vital to his religious purpose.

A conflict raged within him, causing him at times to feel that he was caught between irreconcilable forces. The powerful inner compulsion to serve was frequently balked by psychological apathy. As Mrs. Thrale was aware, his "daily terror lest he had not done enough, originated in piety, but ended in nothing less than disease."[22] He made unreasonable demands of himself, constantly fearful that if he did not do more his very salvation was endangered. He understood the irrationality of his drive, analysing in his Easter Day prayer for 1776 (April 7) the psychological dilemma with which he could not always cope:

> My reigning sin, to which perhaps many others are appendent, is waste of time, and general sluggishness, to which I was always inclined and in part of my life have been almost compelled by morbid melancholy and disturbance of mind. Melancholy has had in me its paroxisms and remissions, but I have not improved the intervals, nor sufficiently resisted my natural inclination, or sickly habits.

That his indolence had a deep-rooted neurotic cause, then, Johnson was amply aware, though he never attained a capacity for identifying his compulsive feelings of guilt with his irrational psychological states. Because of his morbid religious fears, he desired to do more than he could ever accomplish. Consequently, persistent dissatisfaction with the amount of work he had done aggravated his sense of inadequacy to an abnormal degree.[23] The result then might be the freezing-up of his creative powers—a virtual paralysis of will—which he rationalized as idleness, negligence, and the bad use of time.

There were intervals, to be sure, when he was not productive and reproached himself with cause. During other periods, however, his guilt feelings were disproportionate to his accomplishments and his self-recrimination was not rationally justifiable. In the year preceding the anguished birthday prayer of 1775, for instance, he had written the book-length *Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland* and two substantial political tracts, *The Patriot* and *Taxation no Tyranny*, among other things. Yet he assumed blame for "time misspent in sinfulness and negligence."

On Good Friday of 1779 (April 2), reviewing the past year he found "little but dismal vacuity, neither business nor pleasure; much intended and little done." Yet he had recently published four volumes of the *Lives*. Two years later (Good Friday, April 13) he noted the completion of the *Lives*, but with the observation that he had written in his "usual way, dilatorily and hastily, unwilling to work, and working with vigour and haste." If Johnson failed in his own estimation, his failure was far less significant than he would admit. Undoubtedly, granted another temperament, he could have done more because in his productive moments he was an exceptionally vigorous writer. But the fact remains that his turbulent conscience often nullified his power to work. In straining too hard emotionally, he accomplished, in his own view, too little. Thus, he involuntarily perpetuated a dilemma in which mental and spiritual anguish constantly aroused kept him off balance, the one provoking the other.

Anxieties and fears such as he suffered and recorded during solemn seasons of the year could be diminished only by self-admission or by admission to higher authority that he had failed in his duties.[24] Only to God, the source of his obligations, could be acknowledge his sinfulness and negligence. While he could discuss with acquaintances the philosophical nature of Christian duty and expiation, he reserved his innermost states for pious contemplation. Prayer to a personal God was Johnson's way of confirming that his life had supra-rational meaning and that there was a point at which he must separate his secular from his spiritual experiences. Prayer, to paraphrase Kierkegaard's metaphor of "the dialectic of faith" (p. 49), was Johnson's spring-board for his great leap into infinity. In those utterly private moments when he reviewed his life, he held himself strictly accountable to the deity. Anticipating the solemn moment of his death, he did not know "whether [he] should wish to have a friend by [him], or have it all between God and [himself]." Reminders of his birthday, similarly, were not only the stimuli for morbid speculations but intrusions into a secret world which existed for Johnson in relation to God. Hence, he "was content enough to escape into a house where [his] Birthday not being known could not be mentioned."[25] For Johnson, then, the ultimate temporal need was self-containment, to be aware, to have full control of his faculties. Through the composition of a prayer he exercised that control and, in the privacy of that action, re-established his identification with eternal purpose. The self-examination which prompted each prayer was literally between God and himself.

notes

1 Sören Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), 134; *The Letters of Samuel Johnson*, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford, 1952), no. 906.

2 Cf. Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New Haven, 1950), 24.

3 Sir John Hawkins, *The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.* (London, 1787), 563–4.

4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London, 1922), 189.

5 See James L. Clifford, *Hester Lynch Piozzi* (Oxford, 1941), 75; *Diaries, Prayers, and Annals*, ed. E. L. McAdam, Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde (New Haven, 1958), 119 (hereafter referred to as *Prayers*, this volume will provide the text of Johnson's prayers); *Letters*, nos. 326, 423; *Thraliana*, ed. Katharine C. Balderston (Oxford, 1942), 158, 454–5, 1008. Boswell, who also knew of the aversion to birthdays, was obviously excluded from Johnson's confidence. See *Life of Johnson*, ed. G. B. Hill and L. F. Powell (Oxford, 1934; 1950), III, 157, and V, 222 (*The Tour to the Hebrides*).

6 *The French Journals of Mrs. Thrale and Dr. Johnson*, ed. Moses Tyson and Henry Guppy (Manchester, 1932), 69ff.; *Thraliana*, 318; *Prayers*, 228; cf. 218; Clifford, 75.

7 C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion: West and East* (vol. II of the *Collected Works*), trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York, 1958), 14; W. B. C. Watkins, *Perilous Balance* (Princeton, 1939), 71ff.

8 See J. H. Hagstrum, "On Dr. Johnson's Fear of Death," *ELH*, XIV (1947), 308–19.

9 *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, 1902), 166ff., 171.

10 Jung, 10.

11 See *Johnsonian Miscellanies*, ed. Hill (Oxford, 1897), I, 219; *Thraliana*, 180; *Life*, II, 93; III, 153; IV, 374; William Law, *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* [1728] (Everyman's Library, 1955), 339; C. S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (New York, 1951), 28. For important parallels between Law and Johnson, see K. C. Balderston, "Doctor Johnson and William Law," *PMLA* LXXV (1960), 382–94. Miss Balderston, who read an earlier draft of this essay, has made several useful suggestions.

12 *Life*, II, 440 (cf. I, 446–7; II, 178; III, 135). See Johnson's *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. Hill (Oxford, 1905), I, 31; *Letters*, no. 79; James, 464–5, 477; Walter Jackson Bate, *The Achievement of Samuel Johnson* (Oxford, 1955), 159ff.

13 *English Poets*, I, 292; 181–2; *The Works of Samuel Johnson*, ed. F. P. Walesby (Oxford, 1825), "Taxation no Tyranny," VI, 234; also "Cheynel," VI, 415; and E. A. Bloom, *Samuel Johnson in Grub Street* (Providence, 1957), 232ff.; Fromm, 35.

14 Cf. Balderston, "Dr. Johnson and William Law," 389.

15 See Hawkins, 84, 271; *Life*, II, 421, 423; V, 62; *Prayers*, *passim*; *Thraliana*, 191; Raymond Carter Sutherland, "Dr. Johnson and the Collect," *MLQ*, XVII (1956), 111–17.

16 *Life*, IV, 123–5, 299; *Rambler*, no. 110; *Johns. Misc.*, I, 268; II, 387; Jung, 48–9 (and 350, 352). Cf. James, 128; Fromm, 50ff., William Ames, *Of Conscience* (London, 1642), Bk. IV, chap. XV.

17 Watkins, 50ff.; Frederick A. Pottle, "The Dark Hints of Sir John Hawkins and Boswell," *MLN*, LVI (1941), 325–9.

18 See also *Rambler*, nos. 80, 85, 108, 111; *Adventurer*, nos. 108, 119; *Idler*, nos. 1, 3, 21, 31, 48; *Rasselas*, chap. IV. Cf. *The Whole Duty of Man* (London, 1714), 156–7, a work known to Johnson since boyhood.

19 For an extended discussion of this parable, see *The Interpreter's Bible*, ed. George Arthur Buttrick, *et al.* (New York and Nashville, 1951–7), VII, 558–62. Cf. Luke 19.11–27, *ibid*; VIII, 327–34. Also see Law, 130–2, *et passim*; *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven, 1960), II, 22.

20 *English Poets*, I, 182; Hawkins, 540–1; *Life*, IV, 226, *et passim*; Prayers, 106–7.

21 Richard Baxter, *A Christian Directory* (London, 1673), 133, 278, 448, *et passim*; John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. J. Allen (London, 1838), Bk. III, chap. VII, 4, 5; chap. X, 5. Cf. Law, *passim*; Lewis, 107.

22 *Johns. Misc.*, I, 223–4, 277; *Thraliana*, 203.

23 See Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1939), 229–30; Oscar Pfister, *Christianity and Fear*, trans. W. H. Johnston (London, 1948), 57; Bate, 149, 155–6; Watkins, 49ff.

24 Cf. Law, 325, 326, *et passim*; *English Poets*, I, 292.

25 *Life*, II, 93; *Prayers*, 298. I know of only two occasions—and these late in life, assisted by old friends—when Johnson voluntarily celebrated his birthday. *Prayers*, 309; *Letters*, no. 881.

Review Article

AMERICAN LITERATURE OF SOCIAL CONCERN

The preacher who was against Sin probably took longer to say so than Coolidge took to epitomize the sermon. There is, indeed, a good deal to say on the subject, especially to presidents. The parts played in public affairs by moral and intellectual considerations—both the effect they have had and the effect they ought to have—is a theme which runs through a very solid crop of recent writing.

Not all of it would suffer equally from being submitted to the Coolidge treatment. Easily the most quotable sentence in Professor Northrop's *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics* runs (in part) as follows: "Stated as briefly as possible, a nation is any group of concrete, particular human beings who possess in the hierarchically ordered neural nets of their brains a similar set of elementary trapped impulses . . . for firing or inhibiting their motor neurons and thereby mechanically causing a similar cognitive behavioristic living law response to any given stimulus." Professor Northrop is a man of respectable academic attainments, and one's elementary trapped impulse to laugh at this kind of thing should probably be resisted. All the same, the labour of stripping off the top few layers of jargon to get at the meaning is scarcely justified by the result, as my quotation will serve to show. The author has some quite sensible things to say about the conditions in which aid to under-developed countries will and will not work, and it is a pity he could not say them intelligibly, but the main message of the book is a hankering for the rationalism of the dear old eighteenth century, combined in the most incongruous way with the phantom hand of Arnold Toynbee.

The phantom of Toynbee—a genial, smiling, urbane phantom, but a very dangerous one to travellers in uncharted territory—seems likely to flit a good deal about the mists that divide the social-science disciplines, as they are laughingly called, in the days ahead. Another, much more venial, instance is Carlton J. H. Hayes' *Nationalism: A Religion.* Professor Hayes is as well equipped to write on this subject as anybody can be, and the present volume represents a résumé of a large part of his life's work as a historian. This being so, and the book being a small one, there is a tendency for outlines to become blurred by distance, and for things which are really very different to be made to seem similar by omitting the details. I noticed only one tiny error of fact—he puts Boccaccio

*See page 58 for bibliography of books discussed in this article.

in the sixteenth century—and he is much better at defining a "nation" than the example I just quoted; yet I find the over-all impression misleading, and for the Toynbean reason—that broad generalizations of a debatable nature are presented to readers who, not coming near the author in expertise, are *not expected* to be able to check the facts. It would be a rare author indeed who could always rise above the temptations of such a method, and Professor Hayes is mortal after all.

Hayes accurately reflects the general disenchantment with nationalism as a guide to conduct or belief. But some such guide, surely, there must be; it would seem that liberals are as lost as the most die-hard reactionaries without the armour of an orthodoxy. Professor Northrop, for instance, would have Jeffersonian democracy established by law as a compulsory cult, and taught in all the schools. Professor Wild, in his *Human Freedom and Social Order: An Essay in Christian Philosophy*, is perhaps less naïve, but as his title implies he thinks that there ought to be a "Christian Philosophy," and that we have not got one. His orthodoxy is, broadly speaking, existentialist. I am content to be told, by professional philosophers, that attempts to base a specifically Christian world-view on any of the older academic schools have invariably failed. I suspect that if that is the case future attempts will fail also, and need we worry? Surely schools of philosophy are very transient things in comparison with religious faiths, and none of the major faiths have ever been identifiable with a particular "philosophy" in theWestern sense of the term. Professor Wild appears to argue with a good deal of authority in defence of his system, but never fully to appreciate the necessity of arguing that the construction of such a system was worth while.

Human Freedom and Social Order is a publication of the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics. In turning to another work in that series, *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy*, by Kenneth W. Thompson, it is agreeable for once to be able to speak in terms of unqualified appreciation. It is possibly a slighter work than those already mentioned, and certainly does not read like a major contribution to ethical theory, but as a piece of applied ethics its lucidity and persuasiveness leads one to wonder why jargon is ever considered necessary. To the non-American reader its most refreshing feature is a genuine recognition that the viewpoints of foreign nations have some relevance in questions of foreign affairs. Perhaps one might venture to suggest, as a very minor criticism, that there is nothing exclusively "Judaeo-Christian" about common sense.

The proper relationships of these two factors, Christianity and practical politics, even perhaps faith and reason, are thrashed out in what are probably the two most substantial offerings in this group, *Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy*, by Robert O. Byrd, and *The Protestant Search for Political Realism* by Donald B. Meyer. The titles are enough to indicate that each deals with a different side of the debate. Mr. Byrd was converted to Quakerism while in the course of studying it for a thesis, and his book as a result is one of fairly straightforward advocacy. He traces the Quaker tradition back to Fox and Penn, but

is understandably more concerned with the future than with the past. He talks from the inside, with the object of convincing us on the outside—whom he describes, in all innocence, by the unfortunate, rather Orwellian term "non-Friends." The book is quite definitely addressed to those who do *not* share its author's views, and this involves its chief strength and its chief weakness. The strength is that Mr. Byrd takes great trouble to explain what makes Quakers tick, and how far, and in what sense, a religion which renounces both dogma and central authority almost *in toto* can still be said to have a common way of thought and a common will. The weakness is that having explained all this he seeks to persuade others to share the same attitudes on completely different grounds. The inner light is not the light of pure reason; judged solely by intellectual standards, Quaker optimism becomes the politics of Polyanna. Neither is the inner light to be simply equated with a Bertrand Russell–type "progressive" approach to all questions. It has given clear guidance in the past against war and against slavery, but not against child labour in factories nor the colour bar—things which the kind of people who become Quakers are doubtless opposed to, but not as a result of their Quakerism. Mr. Byrd, on the whole, is enlightening rather than persuasive.

Mr. Meyer, with a more modest purpose, comes closer to making out a case. His theme is the checkered history of the social gospel between the wars, with an inevitable spill-over into the contemporary world. *The Protestant Search for Political Realism* is not an easy book to read; the reader who gets the impression, towards the end, that the chapters are getting longer and longer may or may not be relieved to discover that this is actually the case, and no illusion. His task is not rendered any simpler by the fact that the title might just as well have been "The Politician's Search for Real Protestantism." The material, however, is fascinating in itself, and it is churlish to blame the author for heaping it up in such generous abundance (even if, in places, it is unduly concentrated on the single figure of Reinhold Niebuhr; there is enough material on Niebuhr, easily, to make a small book by itself).

The title is misleading in more than one way, for Mr. Meyer is concerned exclusively with the politics of left-wing clergymen, occasionally silhouetted against a background of right-wing laity. This may give a just picture of all that was vital in American Protestantism in the period concerned, though I should like to see the point clearly argued. The author does, however, trace with admirable thoroughness the process of gradual disenchantment with the utopian hopes of 1919, and the heart-searchings that had to follow, and in doing so demonstrates beyond doubt that this necessity was caused not by the political but by the religious inadequacies of the social gospel. The former were no worse than miscalculations of strength; nothing has happened in the last forty years to make the ideal of a just society in a peaceful world invalid. The movement was vitiated by its addiction to Screwtape's "Christianity and"—by the readiness to concentrate on secular ends and to invoke the aid of secular means. Prohibition—as much a part of the social gospel as the right to strike—showed the impossibility of making men virtuous by statute; even today there are many who do not see the *impropriety* of

such an attempt. The outstanding moral of Mr. Meyer's book is that those who followed Niebuhr back to a truer conception of the Church's role (and of original sin) were thereafter able to take a shrewder and more fair-minded part in public affairs.

The disastrous effect of renouncing shrewdness and fair-mindedness in the name of high ideals is shown by Stanley M. Elkins in his *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life*. Mr. Elkins' approach to his subject is novel and must prove highly controversial; in particular the comparison he draws between the old plantation and the modern concentration camp in terms of their psychological effects seems calculated to make colonels reach for duelling pistols (he is not talking wild, either; he means it). If the book has a villain, however, it is Garrison. Broadly Mr. Elkins would claim that the cultural rootlessness of the early Republic forced both sides to construct an idolatry around their principles and rule out any but extreme—and inevitably violent—solutions. On the Southern side, part of the background for the building up of an ideology which still serves the Talmadges today is filled in by William Stanton in *The Leopard's Spots*, which it is useful, and entertaining, to read along with Elkins. Here we see how the Book of Genesis, phrenology, and perfectly genuine science, sometimes in collision and sometimes working together, shaped the views of a group of American anthropologists (by no means all Southerners) who were convinced that Negroes and Whites were two different biological species, products of independent acts of the Creator. Mr. Stanton argues vigorously that the scientists concerned were not biassed, one way or the other, by their views on the peculiar institution, and actually their influence on its defenders was slight. One must sorrowfully conclude that this particular delusion about the essential otherness of the Negro is more widespread in the centennial year of Fort Sumter than in the year itself.

Heaven knows, it has been hard enough—a point which Mr. Elkins documents at length—for historians to be fair to the ante-bellum South without sentimentality or wilful blindness. It must have been much harder when the issues were painfully alive, and almost certainly the North has taken too much of a beating from the holier-than-thou in recent years, just as the South did at the time. All in all, and most of the better books in this group say this in one way or another, it may be a Christian's duty to forgive his debtors but reason requires that he should first make sure how much is actually owing, by whom and to whom. In some ways, of course, it is harder to forgive your creditors, but you can at least try to understand their point of view.

The effort to see *why* those awful Other People are so awfully Other, why they are so arrogant as to have ideas of their own and how they can pretend to doubt the purity of our intentions, is always difficult but always worth trying. It seems to me that there are encouraging signs that the exercise is more fashionable than it was (and as evidence of a trend, bad books are more encouraging than good ones). This will not please the Moral Rearmers, and it scarcely amounts to an Ideology for the West. But if we keep our fingers crossed, it may prove to be the reason why the West does not need an ideology, having understanding instead. (ELLIOT ROSE)

The following books are considered in this article:

Robert O. Byrd, *Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1960. Pp. xxii, 230. $5.00.

Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1959. Pp. viii, 248. $4.50.

Carlton J. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion*. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan]. 1960. Pp. xii, 187. $5.00.

Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919–1941*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1960. Pp. x, 482. $6.75.

F. S. C. Northrop, *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics*. New York: The Macmillan Company [Galt: Brett-Macmillan]. 1960. Pp. xii, 384. $6.50.

William Stanton, *The Leopard's Spots: Scientific Attitudes toward Race in America, 1815–59*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [Toronto: University of Toronto Press]. 1960. Pp. x, 225. $4.00.

Kenneth W. Thompson, *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 148. $3.50.

John Wild, *Human Freedom and Social Order: An Essay in Christian Philosophy*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 250. $5.00.

Africa: The Political Pattern

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Foreword

The five essays which follow are based on public lectures delivered at Carleton University in December, 1960. This series was made possible by the generosity of the Aluminum Company of Canada and the fortunate presence at that particular time of an unprecedented reservoir of talent at McGill, Queen's, Toronto, and Carleton universities. There was no attempt to present a comprehensive survey of the political problems of sub-Saharan Africa; rather the topics were chosen on the basis of the special qualifications of the speakers.

It was hoped that the lectures would not simply comment on the current African scene, but instead probe some of the underlying factors of lasting significance. Evidence of our success in this respect is the fact that it is possible to present the lectures here in substantially the form in which they were given, despite the passage of time and the rapid pace of development throughout the African continent.

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JAJA WACHUKU

Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Nigeria and Canada have always had very happy and friendly relations. As a result of my experiences at the United Nations, I have been encouraged to think that this friendship, which was established long before our independence, will not only be strengthened, but also prove very useful to both countries. By our mutual co-operation, we should be able to play a vital role together both in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations.

Last August, just before Independence, the Government of Nigeria formulated a short declaration of the principles which it would pursue in the field of foreign policy after Independence. I shall begin by giving this statement in full, and then analyse it to bring out its full implications. Speaking in the House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared:

In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign affairs, the Federal Government recognizes that its primary duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the Federation and of its citizens.

We have already declared our intention of applying to join both the Commonwealth and the United Nations. In regard to the former, it is important to understand that all members of the Commonwealth are autonomous communities equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. While therefore benefiting greatly from the free interchange of ideas and consultation between the members of the Commonwealth, and from experience within the framework of the United Nations, we shall nevertheless have a free hand to select those policies which we consider to be most advantageous for Nigeria, subject always to our belief in the principles of the United Nations.

We shall, of course, endeavour to remain on friendly terms with every nation which respects and recognizes our sovereignty, and we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone. So far as is possible, the policy for each occasion will be selected with a proper independent objectivity in Nigeria's national interest. We consider it wrong for the

Federal Government to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs. This freedom of action will be an essential feature of our policy and will ensure that full attention is paid to the opinions expressed by our representatives. Our policies, as I have said before, will be founded on Nigeria's interests, and will be consistent with the moral and democratic principles on which our constitution is based.

Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practicable policies as regards Africa. It will be our aim to assist any African country to find a solution to its problems and to foster the growth of a common understanding among all the nations, and especially among the new nations of this continent. We are determined to encourage the development of common ties between all states. The difficulties which will confront us in promoting the friendly association of independent countries in Africa are fully appreciated, but we believe that they can be overcome if a start is made by emphasizing and building upon the cultural and economic links which already exist.

This will be followed up by a policy of securing an agreed plan for the improvement of interterritorial communications and transport facilities, and by the pooling of resources for higher education and scientific research. Although it would be premature at this stage to think in terms of a Common Market for Africa, we are intending to work towards the expansion of trade and travel, and to secure an agreed plan for the improvement of interterritorial communications and the like.

On the problem of boundaries, our view is that although in the past some of these were created artificially by the European powers, which even went so far as to split some communities into three parts, each administered by a different Colonial Power, nevertheless those boundaries should be respected and, in the interest of peace, must remain the recognized boundaries until such time as the peoples concerned decide of their own free will to change or merge into one unit. We shall discourage any attempts to influence such communities by force or through undue pressure to change, since such interference could only result in unrest and in harm to the overall plan for the future of this great continent.

It is true that Africa is changing every day. We rejoice to see so many countries becoming independent, but with the good developments there are bound to be some bad ones and we are troubled by the signs which we see of the ideological war between the Great Powers of the world creeping into Africa. We shall therefore take steps to persuade African leaders to take serious note of this distressing trend and we shall make every effort to bring them together, so that having been made aware of the danger we may all find a way to unite our efforts in preventing Africa from becoming an area of crisis in world tension.

We shall not, however, allow our direct and primary interest in African affairs to blind us to the grave and vital issues which darken the wider international scene. In the United Nations and in any other way possible we shall direct our energies and influence to helping to reach solutions which will contribute to the peace of the nations and well-being of mankind.

To sum up, we shall do everything in our power to foster cooperation among the countries of Africa and particularly of this part of Africa and, in so far as compatible with the national interest and with our membership in the British Commonwealth and of the United Nations, we shall maintain cordial relations with all the other nations of the world, firmly opposing all forms of aggression and striving always to obtain the observance everywhere of those human rights which all parties in Nigeria have agreed upon as fundamental, in particular freedom from racial or religious discrimination. (*House of Representatives Debates, Official Report*, 20 August 1960.)

You will note we lay emphasis on three things: the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and the continent of Africa. As a member of the Commonwealth, we have rights and privileges, as well as obligations to other members. As a member of United Nations, we have responsibilities to other member states and, through them, to humanity at large. Finally, as a member of the African State Community and as the largest single African country, we have a grave responsibility thrust on us to safeguard the vital interests of Africans and people of African descent everywhere. All this has far-reaching implications.

The Commonwealth is composed of people of different races and different colours: dark brown people, chocolate-brown people, black people, yellow people—as you call them—and pink people. There are no white people. Naturally, each of them has distinctive characteristics which are peculiarly its own. For this reason, we believe that each unit has got its own unique contribution to make to the common good of the world as a whole. No Commonwealth member is subject to the will and caprice of any other one. Even the forms of government in the Commonwealth are not uniform. For instance, some members recognize the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth but not Head of State. That does not cause anybody to go to war. What is significant is that certain vital institutions are shared in common. An understanding of the Rule of Law is fundamental to the institutions of all members of the Commonwealth, with one exception. South Africa alone does not believe in Rule of Law. All the other members of the Commonwealth believe that no one should be above the law. Admittedly, some of them may not respect the Rule of Law completely, but they have not violated it very flagrantly.

The Commonwealth also represents an experiment in inter-racial relationships. Even when its members are not able to agree, they are still prepared to agree to disagree. This unity amidst diversity is real. This is why Nigeria can work harmoniously with Canada without friction. This

is why your representatives can feel at home in Nigeria, and I can feel at home here. Such things would have been impossible, if it were not for this unique institution, the Commonwealth. There would simply have been no means by which Nigerians and Canadians could have come to know each other so well. Yes, the Commonwealth is truly an experiment in international living.

In the United Nations, the conglomeration of states is even more diverse than in the Commonwealth. You meet and discuss international problems with people representing entirely different economic systems and political ideologies. Nevertheless, Nigeria firmly believes that, if all countries of the world were genuinely and sincerely true to the Charter, it would be possible to solve world problems without resort to war and the complete destruction of mankind.

Although Nigeria strongly supports the United Nations, we are not prepared to take on the prejudices of its members: The day we became independent, we broke loose from the links of the past. When we were governed by an imperial power, we were bound by its commitments, but not now. We are not prepared to soil our hands. We come with a clean slate. We know our old friends and we want to retain them as friends, but we also want to leave the door open for new friends provided they are genuine and sincere. It is not the right or privilege of anybody to tell us who should be our friends or who should not. "Intellectual imperialism" of this sort would be inconsistent with our independence. We should be free to examine every problem critically and draw our own conclusions. Once we have arrived at conclusions that we consider honest, fair, and just according to our light, we will stick to them regardless of opposition.

A curious type of bloc politics has developed in the United Nations. The real decisions are taken in the lobby or over lunch rather than in Committee rooms or in the General Assembly, where the resolutions are formally passed. The danger of bloc politicking is that if you line up with any particular bloc without looking right and left, front and back, before you realize where you are you are so completely tied up that you have no more freedom of thought. Accordingly, before coming into the United Nations, we made it clear that we were not going to join "as a matter of routine" any power bloc. We reserve to ourselves the right to examine each problem as it comes, and draw our own conclusions. Therefore, no state, however powerful, should think that Nigeria is going

to follow it blindly without consideration of the issues at stake. We are not going to jump on anyone's band-wagon.

We have already demonstrated our independence by our recent actions at the United Nations. When the question of discussing Chinese representation came up—the issue was not whether China should be admitted to the United Nations but whether the item should be included on the agenda—we favoured a full-dress debate. In this way, both those who opposed admission and those who favoured it could explain why. We felt the General Assembly should analyse the whole situation and see whether Red China is prepared to accept the obligations that other states have accepted. Well, certain people said no; the question should not be discussed at all. Our immediate reaction was that this was intellectual imperialism, which we are trying to suppress. Consequently, we voted that the question should be discussed. Some of those that were hurt were friends, but that could not be helped.

We want to see every subject treated on its merits, not on the basis of prejudice. It has been recognized that Nigeria is likely to play an important role in Africa. But our leadership would be hollow and meaningless if we rubber-stamped other people's decisions. We must be active participants in negotiations at every stage before a decision is reached. That is why we say that we shall not as a routine join any power bloc.

This policy also applies to relations with the Afro-Asian group. Nevertheless, Nigeria recognizes that there are Asian and African states that have gone through similar experiences, suffered under the same conditions, and become independent about the same time. Their shared experiences, their new status of freedom, and their poverty make it easier for them to co-operate on common problems. It is only right and proper that they should draw together in friendship and amity. However, the Afro-Asian group is still only a group; it is not a bloc in the ordinary sense of the word because its members rarely manage to agree on anything. One reason for this is that none of them is powerful. No one member can tell the others, "You must do this, whether you like to or not." Moreover, they are all poor countries. None of them can dangle either the dollar or ruble in the face of another state and say, "If you do not do this, we will not give you that." It is, therefore, easier for them to co-operate in certain vital matters on a basis of equality.

The role of the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations can be illustrated by two incidents which irritated the Great Powers very much indeed. In the first case, the Afro-Asian states were trying to find a

solution to the Congo problem, while the Great Powers wanted to play politics. We felt that, with human life at stake, society on the verge of anarchy, and destruction widespread, it was not the time for a cold-war debate in which one great power would hurl abuse at the other. We had had too much of the cold war already; the sooner we had something a little more lukewarm the better. The smaller powers, therefore, got together and decided that this subject should not be discussed; it should be adjourned. The Great Powers did not like this, and so we mobilized our forces and put the question to a vote and succeeded in getting the subject adjourned, thus preventing the Great Powers from using the Congo issue as a stepping-stone for their usual power politics.

The second incident was connected with the question of the Afro-Asian representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. At present, the twenty Latin American states have two seats on the Security Council, whereas the forty-five Afro-Asian states are represented by only one Middle Eastern state. Moreover, the European group of states have two non-permanent seats and three permanent seats in the Security Council. We said the time had come to redistribute the seats. The Great Powers opposed this and called for an election. We again mobilized our forces to back our demand that the election should be postponed until our rights had been considered, and again, we won. This caused consternation in the Assembly. The worms were now turning, and the big powers were no longer always having their own way. Thus where there is a vital issue at stake, it is possible for the smaller and less powerful states to get together and use their voting power to force the Great Powers, particularly in the Assembly where there is no right of veto, to do what is right.

Nigeria feels that she must be free to come to decisions on the basis of her own considered judgment whenever the need arises. In doing so, the most important consideration will be: what is in the best interest of Nigeria? The test is not whether a proposed course of action pleases A or B but whether in the light of the prevailing circumstances it is worthy of support on its merits. Independence would mean nothing to us if it meant that others should continue to do our thinking for us and we should just follow their orders. In such circumstances, we could not give effective leadership. The leadership would be coming, not from Nigeria, but from the country whose policies we were echoing.

In the Prime Minister's statement, you will notice that Nigeria attaches great importance to the existence of the United Nations as an instrument

of peace. Nigeria wants to do everything possible to strengthen the United Nations. In the past, there has been too much mere lip-service paid to the Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter. It is our firm belief that if the Great Powers spent less time on mud-slinging and more in trying to implement the provisions of the Charter, the danger of war and destruction would be considerably more remote than it is today. We believe in service politics and not power politics. Power politics is a matter of expediency, rather than of right and wrong. In the United Nations, expediency has taken its toll of human resources, intellectual, moral, and physical. Unless there is a change of heart on the part of the Great Powers, the world may yet be brought to the brink of total annihilation. Even if no other area of the world wants peace, Africa wants to live in peace.

This brings me to an examination of the third aspect of our foreign policy, our duty to Africa and people of African descent.

In addition to our membership in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations, we are acutely conscious of our membership of the African continent. Here we recognize two major objectives: the complete eradication of all remnants of racialism and of colonialism.

"Freedom from racial and religious discrimination" was referred to in the concluding portion of the Government's declaration on foreign policy. It is also embodied in a Code of Human Rights entrenched in both the Federal and Regional Constitutions. The reason we feel so strongly about this is that for centuries people of African descent have been humiliated. They have been treated as anthropoid apes rather than members of the human community. Consequently, Nigeria is committed to using her independence through all legitimate means to see that the humiliations which have been the lot of people of African descent throughout the world are wiped out and that Africans are received into society on a basis of equality with all other members of the human race. Nigeria does not accept the doctrine of the inferiority of the races, because it is nonsense. In the past, some scholars have prostituted knowledge and taken advantage of the ignorance of the masses to abuse the privileges they have had, but with the media of mass communication now available, the people need no longer be deluded.

The total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination, then, is one of the pillars of Nigeria's foreign policy. We will never regard racial discrimination as an internal affair of any state. Nowhere in the world, in no state, however powerful, however wealthy, will Nigeria countenance humiliations to people of African descent; and we will not consider any

action on our part as interference in the internal affairs of another state. This includes South Africa. South Africans are suffering from a kind of psychosis. They have imposed on themselves a kind of fear which is more psychological than anything else. As a result, people of our race are suffering humiliations. Some three million people have banded together to deny eleven million others the right to live; they only exist. The Europeans are quite prepared to employ Africans in their mines, in their fields, and in their households. Yet they deny them the basic human rights, rights which are part of our fundamental law.

Our attitude to South Africa is that, provided the three million people of European descent are prepared to concede equality to Africans and abide by the Rule of Law, we will accept them; we will not expel them from the continent. Otherwise, they cannot escape the course of history. There must be one law for everybody in the Union of South Africa—not two laws, one for three million people and a different law for the other eleven million. That is where we part company with the present rulers of South Africa. Of course, opinions differ as to the attitude to adopt toward South Africa. Some African states would like to rely on traditional diplomatic methods. But such methods have been shown to have had no lasting effect. They are wasteful and merely embitter the soul of man. We recognize the path of history and will continue to preach our doctrine of vigorous opposition to racialism to all African states whose views differ from ours.

Our second major objective in Africa is the total liberation of the whole of the African continent from foreign domination. There can be no going back on that; colonialism in all its manifestations anywhere in Africa must be ended. We would be failing in our duty if we did not use our full resources—mental, moral, and material—in the struggle for emancipation of the rest of the continent.

It is pure fiction for Portugal to claim that Angola is an "overseas province," inseparably linked with the metropolitan country. Similarly, when some Frenchmen talk of Algeria as part of continental France, they are using the language of the colonial period rather than of the age of African independence. Just as independent Nigeria has established a peaceful and harmonious relationship with the United Kingdom, so France could reap the same reward if she were to act with a gentle heart. If she could only forget economics and think in terms of human beings, there is no reason why all the former French territories should not turn out to be among her best friends. Meanwhile, the toll of lives in the

Algerian war continues to mount. The reason for this is not the presence of a million French settlers in Algeria, but the desire to bolster the French economy. France is fighting, not to defend the French *colons*, but for the iron, oil, natural gas, copper, and manganese discovered in the Sahara.

While we insist on the total liberation of the African continent from European rule, we are equally opposed to any African state starting off on any imperialistic escapades of its own. There must be no extension of boundaries by force by anybody. This was made clear in the Prime Minister's declaration of August, 1960. When, in 1884, the leaders of the European powers met in Berlin, there was a great repast. The continent was carved up with everyone receiving a share of the Christmas turkey. Now that all those shares are gradually returning to their original owners, it has been suggested that the artificial boundaries drawn by the Europeans should also be erased. But just because foreign powers did not consider the interests of Africans when they partitioned Africa in accordance with their own whims and caprices, it does not follow that today these divisions are not real. If we were now to set about restoring ethnic unity by force, we would set in motion a chain reaction which might result in interstate war. In any case, all our energies and our resources would have to be devoted to maintaining armies and police forces, and little constructive effort would be possible in the sphere of economic and social development. Nigeria recognizes the facts of history. Even though existing boundaries were created by alien forces, they should be respected.

This does not mean that we will oppose eradicating the mistakes of the past if this can be done by peaceful agreement. There are examples of adjoining states composed of the same people speaking the same language and sharing the same culture. There are even instances where the border runs through a family compound with some members of the extended family speaking English and others French. If, in such cases, people should decide amicably to come together, Nigeria will not stand in their way. However, it would be a very different matter if stronger and wealthier African states attempted to incorporate their smaller and poorer neighbours against their will. Nigeria would not stand for that, and we have made this clear to all African states. If there is any political leader in Africa who has an appetite for swallowing up any other state, he had better go elsewhere. We will not allow any African state to undermine the political structure of any other state with a view to subjecting it to its own will. We have made that abundantly clear.

Nigeria herself has no expansionist ambitions. She does not plan to

build up a huge army to extend her territory. All around us, there are peoples of the same languages, the same culture, the same names. There are millions of Nigerians in West Africa outside Nigeria. Fifty per cent of the army of Dahomey is Nigerian. But just because we are a big country with immense resources and more developed than our neighbours is no reason for using our strength to dismember or even to create difficulties in (say) Dahomey, or Niger. We could even upset Ghana if we wanted to, for there are 600,000 Nigerians living there. We will not do that. We want to live in peace with our neighbours; and we believe that the best way of ensuring that others do the same is to set an example of practising what we preach.

But, while we want Africa to live in peace, we do not want her to continue in pieces. Nigerians believe in the integration of the African continent. We look forward to the time when all independent African states will voluntarily draw closer together to assist in the common problems of nation-building and continent-building. We feel confident that they will be able to co-operate on the basis of mutual understanding, even though this is not very evident in the Congo today.

Pan-Africanism is no longer merely a theory; it is a fact. But, while all Africans agree on that, our methods of pursuing this goal differ. There are some who want political union now—with themselves on top. We in Nigeria believe in being realistic about Pan-Africanism. An African union of states may be likened to a pyramid; I say a pyramid because it is peculiarly African. It has a broad base, and a sharp point which is the apex. We must begin with a sound and solid foundation and then build upon it until it reaches the point of political union. The moment you reverse the process and put the pyramid on its apex, there is a danger that the slightest wind that comes will blow it down, and many may be destroyed. For this reason, as the Government's statement made clear, we believe that the African states must first come together on the cultural and economic level.

We must begin by building mutual understanding and confidence among ourselves. We have been divided among ourselves for so long by foreign and alien forces that we must rebuild the confidence that has been lost. This can be done through our schools, universities, and research institutions. We can also help by breaking down border formalities. There is no good reason, for instance, why, in travelling from Lagos to Accra, a distance of under four hundred miles, it should be necessary to pass through three sets of customs barriers. Similarly, new economic policies

can serve to sweep away the artificial restrictions imposed by the imperial powers to keep apart peoples of the same culture and traditions. There is no reason why Nigeria should not use her resources to assist the development of her neighbours. If Nigeria, Ghana, Togoland, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and others co-operated, their combined resources would enable each of them to advance more rapidly economically.

In this matter, we in Nigeria are thinking in terms of decades—not years or centuries, but decades. We live in the atomic age. We must scale the centuries in a few decades. The world will not wait for us. After your struggles for dominion status, you in Canada had time to build up your industries and institutions slowly. There is no time for us to do this. We have to do in ten years what you took a hundred years to do. We cannot wait because the world will not wait.

The world cannot have confidence in Africa unless Africans have confidence in themselves. For this reason, Nigeria considers it her duty to instil confidence in the new African states. They must feel secure. They must be assured that no new African state is going to bully them. We will not tolerate any form of bullying by one African state of another. At the same time, we believe firmly in the co-operation of all the African states as it is only by such co-operation that we can hope to solve the problems that face Africa today.

The African continent is perhaps the richest continent in the world. It is also the least exploited. In spite of centuries of exploitation Africa still has sufficient resources to enable her quickly to attain a position which will command respect throughout the world. Today the Sahara is arid, but we know that all it needs to regain its fertility and reveal its riches is water. The Sahara is thirsty, but its thirst will be quenched. That is certain. When a people are forced to the wall, they will transform their environment. Russia proved that. China is proving that. Today there are 200 million people in Africa. Properly developed, Africa could sustain twice that population. Hence the emphasis we place on scientific development and technical knowledge, and the premium we place on modern education.

At the same time, we are also reviving our traditional culture, with its roots in remotest antiquity. If it is a question of the age of civilizations, the competition is between Africa and Asia, not between Afro-Asia and Europe. As a result of her contributions to the world, Africa has a right to

ask other continents to pay her due respect. Although they have borrowed much from her they have not acknowledged all that they have borrowed. There have been great empires in Africa in the past—in Egypt, in old Ghana, and elsewhere. Civilization moves in a circle. It has travelled from Asia and Africa to Europe, across the Atlantic and now it is coming back to Africa again. The knowledge of this fact makes us conscious of our responsibilities to the world. When we see the heritage that was ours, we realize the extent to which it has permeated modern society and left its imprint in the fields of religion and the arts. Therefore, it is our duty in Nigeria, in collaboration with other African states, to re-create our culture. Our cultural contributions are well known in scholarly circles, but in the past people have not had the courage of their convictions to say so. But now, as a result of research and discoveries, we can speak authoritatively, without any fear of contradiction of our great heritage to mankind.

It is our duty as a new African nation to restore confidence in the African, to eliminate the humiliations that have been his lot in the past, to make him appreciate that the path of war and destruction is a thing of the ancient regime, and to try to persuade the Great Powers to leave Africa alone. Africa has already known too much war. She has experienced so much scrambling. She has contributed so much to the rest of the world through the blood, sweat, and toil of her sons and daughters. She has created wealth for other countries, and built up their economies. The time has come for African nations to concentrate on re-creating their own economies and exploiting their own resources. In doing so, we might help to restore a sense of balance to a world that has gone insane.

We are not pacifists. Do not make the mistake of imagining that we are going to throw away the independence that we have won in order to accept another form of domination. We are not pacifists in that sense, but we feel that we can be more useful to Africa and people of African descent throughout the world by pursuing the type of policy I have enunciated than by plunging into power politics. We think this policy is more constructive and more realistic, and above all takes into consideration human values. In our policies, both external and internal, we will seek to restore man to his proper status. It seems to us that the Western world has paid too much attention to material values. Man created material things for his own end; he does not exist by bread alone. This may seem too philosophical an approach, but often what seems most idealistic turns out in the end to be the most practicable.

THOMAS HODGKIN

The New West Africa State System

In seeking to understand the extremely interesting processes of change that are taking place in contemporary Africa, and the new forms of state that are emerging, we—non-Africans, and "Westerners" in particular—must give up altogether any idea that we can any longer control these processes or manipulate these states. This assumption, that we are entitled to try to manage African affairs for our own British, French, American, etc., purposes, too often recurs in the talks and writings of "Westerners"—a regrettable inheritance from our imperial past, which does us no good. Granted we can no longer behave as rulers, we tend to behave as governesses, or maiden aunts, giving unwanted advice. Our real responsibility is simply to understand, as intelligently and sympathetically as possible, these processes of change, recognizing that their eventual outcome must depend upon the decisions of Africans—peoples, parties, governments—not, as in the past, on the decisions of external powers.

It is from this kind of standpoint that we should consider the "West African state system." By this I mean the relationships between the various states and peoples of West Africa, and the factors influencing these relationships. "West Africa" I define loosely and provisionally as the region lying between the Sahara in the north, the Atlantic in the west, the frontiers of the Republic of the Sudan in the east, and the Congo River in the south.

Certain points should be emphasized at the beginning. In the first place, it is only fairly recently that the West African state system, in this sense, has begun to be a subject of study and investigation. It has not yet attracted, on any scale, the attention of institutes of International Affairs, university Political Science departments, Ph.D. students, and other seekers of truth and consumers of foundation funds. During the first half of the twentieth century, the emphasis was rather on the relations between the various European colonial powers which had established themselves in Africa. With the rise of African national movements after World War II—in Ghana, Nigeria, A.O.F., Cameroun, etc.—there was a shift of interest

to the relations between these movements and the ex-colonial powers, Britain and France. But it has only been with the appearance on the international scene of some 17 independent West African states, enjoying, in varying degrees, control of their own external policies, that the importance of inter-African state relations is beginning to be recognized, outside West Africa, at any rate; a number of West African political leaders have been interested in these matters for some time. Hence this is not a subject about which there is as yet a great deal of material.

Secondly, one characteristic of the existing West African state system, clearly, is its extreme fluidity. For some time it has been evident that a process of decolonization was taking place throughout the African continent and with particular rapidity in West Africa, where European resistances have been less powerful than in other regions, and African national movements relatively mature and well organized. But it has not been at all clear what would be the character of the successor states that would replace the dissolving colonial systems. One could not have predicted with any assurance, say five years ago, that an independent Nigerian federal state would take the place of the former colonial Nigerian state, or that the former French West African Federation would break up into eight separate, formally sovereign, republics. One certainly could not have predicted the Ghana-Guinea Union, nor the creation and subsequent disintegration of the Mali Federation (both reflections of the will to regroupment across territorial frontiers). One must, I think, expect this fluidity to continue and the system to undergo sudden, major, unpredictable (or, at least, unexpected) changes.

Thirdly, one cannot hope to understand the West African state system in isolation from other African systems and, of course, from other non-African systems, the Western bloc, the Soviet bloc. Let us confine ourselves, for the moment, simply to the African aspects of the situation. It is clear that the existing alignments of West African states—the relationships between them—are greatly influenced by developments in two African territories lying outside the West African system—Algeria and the Congo—and the differing attitudes of West African governments to these developments. Crudely stated, the Governments of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, take a "tough," anti-colonial line on these two major issues. Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroun, for the moment, take a "moderate," somewhat uncommitted line. Nigeria lies somewhere between. Consider likewise the Mauretanian question under consideration recently at the UN. What this question is about is, partly, whether the existing Maure-

tanian Government is a genuine government or a French puppet government; but it is partly also about the more fundamental question whether Mauretania—Shinqit—belongs to the West African or the North (Arab) African system. Thus, it can be seen that the West African state system is extremely sensitive to developments in any part of the African continent, from Egypt to the Union of South Africa.

Fourthly, this West African region, with a total population of some 75 million, is characterized by a good deal of internal diversity, though not necessarily more diversity than characterizes the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. For example, there are the differences between the territories of the beidan (Arabs and Berbers—Tuareg) and of the sudan (Negro-Sudanic peoples); Muslim and non-Muslim (Animist-Christian) regions; the economically more developed, export-producing, forest belt, and the more retarded, subsistence-farming, savanna hinterland; socially hierarchical, highly stratified communities as in Mauretania, the northern region of Nigeria, and relatively equalitarian communities as in Ghana, southern Nigeria, the Ivory Coast; partially English-speaking and partially French-speaking—and, to a minor extent, Portuguese—and American-speaking territories.

It will be noted that the first four differentia can and do occur within the same state, e.g. Nigeria; only the last is necessarily a basis of differentiation between states.

Against this background, let us look more closely at this West African state system. It may be easiest to do this from some definite point of view. The most important single issue in contemporary West Africa, I would suggest—in regard to which every West African government is bound to take up some kind of position and in which, in varying degrees, peoples and popular movements, as well as governments, are interested—is the issue of fragmentation versus closer West African union. Should West Africa continue to be organized on the basis of a number (approximately 22, if ex-A.E.F. is included) of relatively small (Nigeria apart) political units—permitting, possibly, even greater fragmentation? Or should a serious attempt be made to combine these units into larger, more comprehensive, political systems, with the eventual aim of establishing a "United States of West Africa"?

With the issue of national independence, which dominated African political thought and activity during the 1950's, settled in principle (Portuguese Guinea remaining the one territory in the region in which the colonial Power continues to resist the general trend), this other issue

of closer union is tending to become the dominant question of the 1960's. It is the subject of a great debate, in which all the West African states are involved. This is a debate, not only about aims—between what one might call the "Pan-Africanists" (for whom the Presidents of Ghana and Guinea, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and M. Sékou Touré, have become two of the principal spokesmen) and the "particularists" or "states' rights men" (e.g., the President of the Ivory Coast, M. Felix Houphouet-Boigny); but also about methods—between the "functionalists," who want to work towards closer union by gradual practical measures of interstate co-operation (customs unions, abolition of passport controls, closer cultural ties, etc.), and the "federalists," who want to press forward to an actual pooling of sovereignty at the earliest possible date.

To speculate about the outcome of this great debate would be very rash. It would be more useful simply to consider the actual situation, and to ask: What are the forces making for fragmentation on the one hand, and for closer union on the other? And what can be said about their relative strength?

On the one side of fragmentation or particularism there are, first of all, the various differences of which I have already spoken—geographical, ethnic, linguistic, religious, ideological. This means that various types of frontier have to be taken into account. West Africans, in their effort to achieve closer union, lack one great advantage which North Africans, the peoples of the Maghrib, enjoy—a common language (Arabic). They are confronted with a situation in which no African language, even the most widely diffused, embraces more than a few million people, and in which there are two distinct dominant languages, English and French. This fact, as Canadians know, is not an insuperable obstacle in the way of creating a common political system. But, for the moment at any rate, the existing frontiers between zones of French and of English language and culture severely limit the possibilities of communication between the African élites, though considerable efforts are being made in both zones to improve communications. Moreover, the partition of West Africa into zones *de l'expression française et anglaise* has involved the development of institutions of different types—different educational, administrative, and judicial systems, for example—the channelling of trade towards different markets, and the creation of different networks of commercial relationships. These are obstacles, obviously, which any attempt to link English-speaking and French-speaking West African territories together in a common system would have to overcome.

In this connection I should no doubt mention the force of "tribalism," or it may seem that I am attempting to evade the issue. Actually tribalism, as the term is commonly used, seems to me a somewhat confused idea. "Ethnic loyalties" are certainly a fact in West Africa as elsewhere in Africa and in Britain, and they tend, certainly, to stand in the way of the new loyalties and of the emerging state, or wider "pan-African" idea which governments, parties, and political leaders (for the most part) are trying to build up. But these ethnic loyalties tend, or have tended, in fact, to be strongest among peoples like the Hausa-Fulani in northern or the Yoruba in western Nigeria, the Ashanti in Ghana, the Moshi in Upper Volta, who had behind them, in the pre-colonial period, well-developed and powerful states, which were not in any intelligible sense "tribal." Moreover, even if "tribalism" is understood in this extended sense, in most of West Africa it is, I believe, a declining force. Given, as in Ghana, a conflict between a tribalistic movement and a centralizing government, based on a mass party, the balance of advantage lies clearly on the latter's side.

Very important, clearly, is the economic factor. Elliot Berg,[1] in a recent article on the relationship between economic facts and political attitudes in the states of French-speaking West Africa, brings out very well the connection between the political role of the Ivory Coast, and its dominant party, the P.D.C.I.-R.D.A., as the principal defender of particularism and opponent of the preservation of the unity of "ex-A.O.F.," and its special economic position, as the wealthiest of the French West African territories, much the largest exporters, etc. Thus Ivory Coast "particularism" expressed the standpoint of the Ivory Coast cocoa and coffee farmers and "bourgeois" generally, who did not see why the wealth which they possessed should be used to support and subsidize the more backward economies of other French West African territories. Even in the case of the poorer territories of ex-A.O.F.—Upper Volta, Niger, Mauretania—there are certain obvious short-run arguments for the particularist attitudes of their governments: the guaranteed prices, subsidies, loans, investments, derived from France, which they would be likely to lose if they opted for association with some larger political system—Upper Volta with Ghana, Niger with Nigeria, Mauretania with Morocco.

In this connection I must add what seems to me the plain truth—though I am doubtful whether representatives of metropolitan France

[1]Elliot J. Berg, "The Economic Bases of Political Choice in French West Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (1960), 391–405.

would altogether agree with me—that French policy, particularly since 1956 and the promulgation of the *Loi Cadre*, has tended to promote this process of Balkanization and has worked towards the breaking up of the old French West African Federation. During the critical period 1956–8, the French supported the particularists like M. Houphouet-Boigny against the federalists like Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita, when there was strong popular pressure within French West Africa to preserve the unity of the Federation. As a French writer put it at the time: "Le Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer, sentant son existence menacée, a cherché des consolations dans la multiplication de ses enfants."

I am not arguing that the French Government at this time foresaw the possible advantages of bringing 14 new French-speaking voices into the Assembly of the United Nations, of which 11 (or 12 with Mauretania) would be reasonably sympathetic to the French position. Indeed, until 1959, French governments of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics acted on the assumption that the French system, first the "Union" and then the "Community," would continue to function as a centralized affair, with metropolitan France controlling external policy. But what I think is clear is that when in 1955–6, at the time of the introduction of the *Loi Cadre* the French Government recognized that the transfer of political power in Africa south of the Sahara was inevitable if there were not to be other Algerias, it decided to transfer power, by stages, to the individual territories, implying the dismantling of the Federation which France itself had constructed fifty years earlier.

Finally, of course, there are the interests of various kinds which tend to grow up around any government. There are ministerial offices, junior ministries, *chefs de cabinet*, permanent secretaries, embassies, delegations to the United Nations and to a variety of international bodies, eventually military posts. As President De Gaulle said, in one of his more inspired moments, "Le souveraineté, c'est quelque chose"; it is indeed "quelque chose." In crude terms, it increases the range of opportunities for an interesting and reasonably comfortable life for members of the ruling class. Thus every establishment, even a young one, is liable to develop an attitude of resistance to change, especially where change means the absorption of minor states into some larger system. It is understandable that there should be those who feel that it is better to reign in Wagadugu than serve in Dakar or Accra. Africans are no different in these matters from the rest of us.

All this might seem to suggest that I believe the forces making for

fragmentation or Balkanization in West Africa are likely to be dominant; that the existing state system, and the existing frontiers, are likely to become frozen with minor modifications for some considerable time to come. Yet this is not what I in fact believe. Why not? What are the forces working in a contrary direction, tending to stimulate closer West African union? They can be fairly simply stated.

First, communications. Talk about frontiers must not obscure the fact there is a vast and constant movement of Africans across state boundaries. As M. Paul-Marc Henry has put it: "The great masses of Africans prove themselves to be superbly unconcerned with the frontiers established by the European powers. They . . . are far more mobile than any other population in any other continent." West Africans have, throughout their history, been great traders and travellers. The colonial epoch has generated new incentives for movement—plantations, mines, cities—and has made available new techniques of transportation, above all, the lorry. Hence there is a great flow of people throughout the region, for example, from the Niger Bend and Upper Volta down to Ghana and the Ivory Coast, and the continual circulation of Hausa and Dioula traders. This movement of people assists the movement of ideas. The ideas of the C.P.P. were carried into Timbuktu. The influence of the P.D.G. seeped through into Sierra Leone. Sawaba in Niger and N.E.P.U. in the northern region of Nigeria echoed each other's slogans and ideologies.

These communications across existing frontiers are evident at the level of the élites as well as of the masses. They also are constantly on the move. One important consequence of decolonization has been the great expansion of inter-African contacts, not only among political leaders, but also among trade unionists, civil servants, teachers and students. This is reflected in the fact that people are usually not where you expect—or hope—them to be, but somewhere else.

Hence West African frontiers, I would be inclined to argue, lack solidity. As products of the period of colonial partition, they are somewhat disreputable from the standpoint of radical nationalists. In most cases they are ethnic and economic nonsense. While, as Jaja Wachuku has said, there would be opposition to any attempts to change them by force, in a number of cases—for example, Gambia-Senegal, Togo-Ghana, Niger-Nigeria—it is difficult to see how they can be maintained in their present form for long. "Revisionism," in fact, is a force in contemporary West Africa.

Secondly, there are what might perhaps be called "the lessons of history"—a dangerous expression, possibly. What I have in mind is simply this. Those West African nationalists who are seeking to achieve closer union have been stimulated, obviously, both by the great multi-national empires of the mediaeval period—Ghana, Mali, Gao, Kanem-Bornu—and by the *empires combattantes* of the nineteenth century—for instance, of al-Hajj 'Umar al-Tal and Samory Touré—associated with the later phases of resistance to Western colonial penetration. (Hence the importance of the memories and legends of Hajj 'Umar and Samory for the dominant parties in modern Mali and Guinea.) Thus it is argued, "If our ancestors, with the simple techniques of communications, administration, economic organization, public education, etc., at their disposal, were able to construct, and maintain for a period, political systems covering large regions of West Africa (larger, in some cases, than any existing state), surely we, with the much more advanced techniques at our disposal, should be able to organize a more extensive and stable form of West African Union."

This argument is reinforced by another implied in the use of the term "Balkanization." West African political leaders have certainly paid attention to the experience of other regions of the world where the elimination of an established imperial power—Spanish or Ottoman—was followed by the emergence of a number of weak, competing states, exposed to the play of great power rivalries—not only the Balkans, but also Latin America, and, in more recent times, the Arab states. Hence the desire, or rather determination, to avoid a repetition of this experience in post-colonial Africa and the acceptance of the equations: fragmentation implies political (and economic) weakness; closer union is a pre-condition of effective independence. History does not have to repeat itself, since a new factor is always present, men's awareness of past history.

Thirdly, Pan-Africanism. In the last resort, I suppose, one's estimate of the prospects of closer West African union depends upon one's view of the effectiveness of the "Pan-African" idea or cluster of ideas. In essentials the Pan-African position might be summarized in some such way as this:

(*a*) African peoples, as a consequence of their experiences during the pre-colonial and colonial epochs, have certain common characteristics, ties, and interests.

(*b*) There is therefore a need for mutual aid between national liberation movements in the various African territories, until systems of a colonial type have been eliminated throughout the entire continent.

(*c*) It is also necessary to prevent the intervention of non-African powers in the affairs of the "African family"; to settle inter-African disputes as far as possible "within the family."

(*d*) As a means partly to express their common outlook, partly to resist external "colonial or neo-colonial" pressures, partly to develop African resources for African advantage, there should be created, in the first place, "regional groupings" of African states, and, eventually and ideally, an "African Commonwealth."

One point, at least, is clear. A few years ago Pan-Africanism in this sense might have been dismissed as a utopia, the pipe-dream of a few African intellectuals in Bloomsbury or the Quartier Latin. Now, unquestionably, it has transferred itself into an ideology, an operative system of ideas. It has begun to express itself through actual institutions, even though they may be still only embryonic in process of formation: the Conference of Independent African States, the All-African People's Conference, the Ghana-Guinea Union, the Saniquellie Declaration of Principles, etc. And it is essentially the ideology of some of the major radical mass parties which are at the same time some of the best organized —C.P.P. in Ghana, P.D.G. in Guinea, Union Soudanais in Mali. As these parties, or at least their leaders and militants, see the situation, the African revolution must necessarily involve two states. The first takes the form of the winning of formal political independence. This stage has already been reached in most of West Africa. The next involves the creation of larger political systems—and, in this region, a United States of West Africa—as a pre-condition of real independence and social progress of Africans making an adequate contribution to humanity.

Are they justified in their view? Does this Pan-African movement possess, or can it develop, the kind of compelling ideas, the range of appeal, the effectiveness of organization and leadership, the favourable external situation, which have played a part in other revolutionary movements, from the Prophet Muhammad to Mao Tse-Tung, and which have given a new direction to human history? I don't know. There have been setbacks, as, for instance, in Mali. But since many Western observers entirely misjudged the extremely rapid tempo of this first phase of national revolution, prophesying another two hundred years, or even a millennium, of quiet colonial rule in Africa, we would do well to show a certain modesty in any judgments we may make about the prospects for this second, "Pan-African," phase.

ARTHUR KEPPEL-JONES

South Africa: Racialism and Republicanism

Till about a generation ago, white South Africans spoke and argued with straight faces about "the two races" in their country—the relations between the two races, their co-operation or lack of it—and they meant the English and the Afrikaners. The black race was not in the picture. This usage is not possible today. In any case the very meaning of "race," if it has any scientific meaning at all, is now doubtful. But out of the old usage came the word "racialism," meaning hostility and prejudice on the part of one of the white communities with regard to the other, and the word is still often used in this sense. The hostility and the prejudice exist and are profoundly important in South African politics. The republican issue, or the political struggle for and against a republic which culminated in the recent referendum and subsequent withdrawal from the Commonwealth, is related to this hostility.

Canadians are generally aware of the more fundamental South African conflict between black and white, but know much less about the division within the white group itself. A comparison with the division between French and English in Canada naturally suggests itself, but I am not competent to make the comparison, and shall confine myself to the South African case. It is a difficult subject to treat impartially. One needs to see the conflict objectively, from the outside, but at the same time to know and to feel from the inside the attitude of each of the participants. A journalist pointed to the heart of the problem when he wrote that "South African politics are intellectually superficial but emotionally profound." The emotions have to be understood. I have belonged to one of the two groups, but I shall try to explain the emotions and the points of view of both.

Whatever "race" may mean, it is certainly irrelevant to the division between Afrikaners and English in South Africa. Not only do the two peoples come from closely similar stocks, but there has been a great deal of absorption in both directions. There are Afrikaners with names like Barnard, Murray, Robertson, Holloway, and Tomlinson, and English-speaking South Africans called Cloete, Van der Byl, Van der Riet, Meiring, and De Villiers. The groups are not two races, but rather two communities, with different languages, cultural heritages, historical and political traditions, moving in different mental and spiritual climates. The difference of language has been the fundamental factor in causing and maintaining the division. Without this, the two groups would have fused; there is no religious barrier comparable to that in Canada. But, given the barrier of language, one may still ask why these communities have not drawn together in close association and mutual understanding. They have not done so. Rather has each society become more distinct, its identity more sharply outlined, in reaction to the strain of its relations with the other. Yet there is a very real desire by many people on both sides to bridge the gulf, and there have been constant appeals and unceasing efforts to this end. Both the attraction and the repulsion are real. Why then has the repulsion proved the stronger force?

To explain this, as good a starting-point as any would be the party system. In 1912, two years after the formation of the Union, the Prime Minister was General Botha, whose government was based on wide support from both sections of the white population. But some Afrikaners were uneasy about the price, in concessions to British sentiments and interests, that was being paid for English support. General Hertzog, a minister in Botha's cabinet, gave voice to this feeling, resigned office, and within two years had formed a new party. This, the Nationalist party, was the expression of the distinctively Afrikaner point of view. Afrikaners flocked to Hertzog's standard, and by 1924 he and his party were in office. It is true that they depended on the support of the mainly English-speaking Labour party, but this dependence, as well as the strength of the Labour party itself, rapidly decreased.

In 1933–4, largely as a result of the world depression, Hertzog and his opponent Smuts patched up their differences and fused their parties together as the United party. Many of Hertzog's followers refused to follow him in this. As the "purified" Nationalists, they were led by Dr. Malan into the political wilderness. On the outbreak of war in 1939 the

fusion experiment came to an end. The two elements in the United party broke asunder, Smuts formed a government, and the ex-Nationalists after years of recrimination and negotiation were eventually united with Malan's followers. It was this new Nationalist party, more exclusive, more radical and extreme than the old, which came into power in 1948 and is in power now.

The party is supported by approximately eighty per cent of the Afrikaner voters; it has no significant English support. Thus the party division comes near to coinciding with the ethnic or language division. Each of them reinforces the other. Party strife is more bitter because it takes on something of the character of a war between two nations. The hostility between the two national groups is more bitter because a member of one sees in every member of the other a political opponent, even though in exceptional cases he may be mistaken in this assumption. There are, of course, the exceptions, notably among the United party politicians, many of whom are Afrikaners. But the generalization still holds good. That party division should take this form is widely deplored. Yet it is not accidental or artificial. On the few occasions when handfuls of English-speaking people have attached themselves to the Nationalist party, they have soon come to feel that they were unwelcome, and have been frozen out. The fusion of 1934 to 1939 was marred by much distrust and a feeling on each side that it had been "sold down the river" by its leaders.

Given a party system of this kind, the Nationalists have an overwhelming advantage. The Afrikaners are rather more than fifty-five per cent of the white population. The rural areas, outside the greater part of Natal and an area in the eastern Cape Province, are almost wholly Afrikaans-speaking. Until about thirty or forty years ago the converse was true also: that almost all Afrikaners lived in the countryside. Then the industrial revolution began to drive many of them into the towns. There they are found mostly in certain poorer residential areas, both in the city and on its periphery. The English on the other hand are highly concentrated in the more prosperous parts of the cities. The anti-Nationalist Afrikaners are scattered. Moreover, under the South African electoral system urban constituencies may contain up to fifteen per cent more, and rural constituencies up to fifteen per cent less, than the average quota of voters. As a result of all these factors the Nationalists win large numbers of seats against substantial but helpless opposition minorities, while the

opposition votes are wasted in piling up large majorities in their areas of concentration. In many places the majorities are so large that the Nationalists never contest these seats. It was the voting in the referendum that revealed opposition majorities as great as eleven to one. With about fifty per cent of the votes the Nationalists can win two-thirds of the seats in the House of Assembly.

The United party, if it is to get into power, has thus to capture a large number of seats in which the Afrikaner vote is predominant, and specifically to win support from that side; the English-speaking voters would be anti-Nationalist anyway. Hence the apparently irresistible temptation to the United party to lean backwards in the Nationalist direction, to cry "me too," and to play down the distinctively British sentiments and points of view. It has long been an axiom in South African politics that everything un-Afrikaans must be kept out of sight by anyone who seriously wants to win a general election. Until the appearance of the Liberal and Progressive parties on the scene the same rule applied to liberal opinion. Strictly speaking it still does, since these parties have no hope of coming into power. The United party, which entertains that hope, avoids the liberal taint like the plague. For the same reason a party which tries, like the former Dominion party, to carry the British banner can get nowhere. The English-speaking voters sense this, and have never given large support to such parties; never, that is, since Nationalism began to make its weight felt.

It is clear that for a specifically Afrikaner party the electoral system is tailor-made. But why did a specifically Afrikaner party ever arise, and what is the nature of its appeal? A proper answer to those questions would have to include the whole history of the Afrikaners, for which this is not the place. The essence of it was a steadily growing national consciousness, provoked by and associated with the conflicts and struggles between the Boer republics and the British. These culminated in the Boer War and the defeat and annexation of the republics. With this growing nationalism there went also a language movement, at first distinct from it but ultimately merged in it, to make of the spoken Afrikaans a literary language. By the 1920's Afrikaans was substituted for Dutch in the schools and as an official language.

Before 1924, when Hertzog came into power, the Union bore in many ways a British stamp. British customs, the English language, and to a less extent English-speaking personnel were dominant in the state

And there was a marked tendency among the English to regard and to treat the Afrikaners with contempt. An English-speaking politician, of the present generation, has told of how he tried to explain to his uncle that the great obstacle to be overcome was the Afrikaners' notion that the English thought themselves superior to the Afrikaners. The uncle's comment was "But of course we are." The language was despised even more than the people. I am old enough to remember a time when Afrikaans was commonly called "kitchen Dutch." The language of people's intimate thoughts, of home and prayer and courtship, always has a special emotional value for them. But in the case of Afrikaans the value has been reinforced by the consciousness that it is new, its status a little uncertain, and that till recently it was generally regarded as a peasant patois. Thus the Afrikaners have had on a number of counts a powerful sense of grievance, of humiliation, of being second-class citizens in their own country. The Nationalist party throve, and still thrives, on these feelings. But the Afrikaners also had the electoral power. It never pays to humiliate people who are left with the power to hit back.

Once in power, the Nationalists—apart from their policy of white supremacy, which is another matter—gave free rein to their sense of grievance and resentment against everything associated with the British tradition and heritage and connection. Their opponents began to store up a mental catalogue of the sacrileges, beginning with the removal of the King's head from the postage stamps and running through the flags, emblems, crowns, anthems, and terminology. The inscription "On Her Majesty's Service" was dropped from official envelopes. There was an attempt to substitute the old Boer titles of military rank for the universal ones used in the army. The substitution of "field-cornet" for "captain" was apparently unacceptable even to the Nationalist officers, and was abandoned, but a lieutenant-colonel became, and remains, a commandant. Military and naval uniforms and badges of rank were changed, and a national system of service decorations substituted for the British. Though all this was superficial, its psychological effect was far-reaching. It served to link the state historically with the Boer republics and to sever its links with the British part of its background. It gave deep offence to the British part of the population.

But the Nationalists could not have done otherwise. To quote Stanley Uys in the *Forum*: "People who believe that the republic will bring unity

forget that the Nationalist government seeks to dominate not only the non-whites, but the non-Nationalist whites as well. This is not a casual ambition of Afrikaner Nationalism, but its fundamental aim. The binding force in the Nationalist Party is not apartheid, but the assiduously nurtured dislike of 'the English.'" But this does not take only the forms I have quoted. It includes discrimination against English-speaking people. And of more substantial importance than changes in words and forms, even perhaps than petty discrimination, is the abandonment, less obvious to the superficial observer, of the conventions and spirit of British parliamentary government.

One of the most important aspects of Nationalist policy was the enforcement of bilingualism in the public service. For this there was in the first instance a strong case. The civil service was very largely English, and too many of its members could not speak to Afrikaners in their own language. Hertzog at once insisted on bilingualism for all new recruits to the various services of the state. It happened to be convenient for his purposes that bilingualism was much more common among the Afrikaners than among the English. Consequently the civil service, police, railways, etc. began to be staffed increasingly with Afrikaners, until they became almost exclusively so. But the purpose of this policy was not only practical. Inability to speak Afrikaans is usually taken by Afrikaners, and often rightly, as implying contempt of the language; it hits them on the most sensitive spot. This explains the enforcement of bilingualism even upon people, such as the technicians servicing aircraft, who have no contact with the public.

The Nationalists have now enjoyed unrestricted political power for twelve years. But power has not given them a sense of security. Apart from the fundamental insecurity of the white minority as a whole, the Afrikaners fear the power of English culture. Those who move from the country to the towns are at once brought under its influence. Although the English-speaking South Africans are culturally less productive than the Afrikaners, they draw upon a culture which has its sources of strength elsewhere. Afrikaans cannot compete on equal terms with the literature, magazines, movies, and drama of the whole English-speaking world. English is the language of commerce, and the material civilization and values of the cities, in whatever language they are expressed, are themselves alien to what is regarded as the Afrikaner ethos. All this seems to be a danger to the national identity. The Nationalists think it important

to protect their people, as far as possible, from contact with it. Nationalist Afrikanerdom is so monolithic that even a little anglicization is enough to separate an Afrikaner from his *Volk* and so start him on the road that leads to his becoming completely English.

To avert this danger the Nationalists have enforced the complete separation of Afrikaners from English in the schools. As some Afrikaans parents think an English-medium education good for their children, the authorities dare not allow parents to decide in which language their children shall be taught. This is decided by the provincial Director of Education. The separation goes much further than the schools. It has arisen in trade unionism and chambers of commerce, and has been extended to such organizations as students' unions, Boy Scouts, and automobile associations. It has taken a curious form in the world of business. A generation ago business was almost entirely in the hands of English-speaking people. A movement was then set on foot to promote Afrikaans business enterprise. The motive was not economic but political; capital was raised on the initiative and under the direction of politicians, and made available to suitable applicants. This was in itself, and in some of its effects, an excellent development. But it was given a political twist which made it very different from the mere profit-seeking business of the English.

The Nationalist ideal is to knit together all these exclusively Afrikaner organizations into what is called an "organic whole." Each is tied to the others. Good Afrikaners must do business with Afrikaner firms. The Afrikaner capitalist joins an Afrikaner automobile club, his employees belong to a trade union with a distinctively national character. All belong to the Dutch Reformed Church, and their children go to Afrikaans schools and join the *Voortrekkers* instead of the Boy Scouts. Everything possible is done to make Afrikanerdom a self-contained world. As the government itself is in the same hands, it is able to help by a careful bestowal of patronage. If you arrive at a large railway station or airport and want to change your money or cash a cheque, you will find a bank available: it will be an Afrikaans bank, not a branch of one of the much larger banks run by "the English."

Afrikaners are thus bound together by so many interlocking institutions that it is very difficult for them to break free from any one of these. And over all stands the ultimate political beneficiary, the Nationalist Party. Because of the disciplined uniformity, anyone who thinks for

himself, criticizes, takes an independent line, and refuses to conform when the whip cracks, soon finds himself outside the entire "organic whole," ejected from the *Volk*. Though he may be altogether Afrikaans in feeling and loyalty, his hope of working for his people from the inside is usually at an end. If he is a schoolmaster, he will never become the principal of an Afrikaans school; if in the academic profession, he will never get a chair at an Afrikaans university. So he moves to an English-medium school or university. He makes new friends, his children grow up in a new atmosphere, and in the next generation the family is likely to have become completely anglicized.

From all this it is apparent that Afrikaner nationalism has close resemblances to nationalism elsewhere. But there is also a radical difference between this nationalism and others. In most countries a nation has its own distinctive territory, of which it is in exclusive occupation. The nationalist drive is directed against outsiders and external controls. But the Afrikaners have no territory exclusively their own. They live intermixed with other peoples in the same country. This is their great frustration. Though their national animus often purports to be directed against Britain, its real object is the other peoples who share South Africa with them. They want to have their country to themselves. The essential aim of the Nationalists is to make South Africa the exclusive preserve of the Afrikaner nation. A prominent exponent of this philosophy—so at least he was, though he has now become too independent and has been thrown out of the party—summed it up in these words: "We reject completely the conception that all South Africans must be counted together as one people: Afrikanerdom is for us the people of South Africa, and the rest of the South Africans are, in so far as they are white, either potential Afrikaners or foreigners."

Now you will at once want to ask the question, what is the reaction of the English-speaking South Africans to all this? Up to about the 1920's their reaction was simple and direct—a vigorous defence of their own. During the crisis over the flag in 1927 there was a feeling that civil war was not impossible. But from that time the attitude of the English began to change. Two facts about the situation gradually penetrated their minds. First, the political fact which I have explained, namely that the electoral system was so weighted that the public expression of British sentiments could only have the effect of winning more seats for the Nationalists. Second, that violent resistance must end in the supremacy

not of the English but of the Africans. So the United party, supported by all the English and by a minority of Afrikaners, had, as I have said, to play down the English case. Its leadership was left for the most part to the Afrikaners, the heirs of Botha and Smuts.

The English, disheartened, tended to turn their backs on politics and to divide their attention between business and sport or other amusement. I think of one of my acquaintances, only a slight exaggeration of the average British South African, who has only two subjects of conversation: insurance and golf. This is partly the effect of political frustration, but it has had other causes too. The English have been attacked on what may be called the ideological front. The conventional school-book interpretation of South African history has made the Afrikaners the heroes and has assigned a negative role to the British and, generally, the liberal factors in the story. English-speaking children have thus been conditioned to an almost apologetic attitude to the part played by their own ancestors, except where it was in harmony with the role of the Afrikaners, as in the Kaffir Wars.

The Nationalists have managed also, helped by favourable political conditions, to build up a convention or unwritten understanding that disrespect of Afrikaner traditions and heroes is blasphemous and unthinkable, whereas even violent attacks on British traditions and British historical characters are merely the exuberance of South African patriotism. The English have been placed by all this in an ambiguous position. On the surface they have tended to conform to the patterns of thought and behaviour imposed on them. Beneath the surface the fires of old loyalties, and of resentment against their impotence and political subjection, continue to burn. In moments of crisis or emotional release the fires are likely to flare up. I remember for instance a performance of *H.M.S. Pinafore* in Johannesburg. The members of the audience were the sort of people who at most times would conform to the conventions imposed by dominant Afrikanerdom. But their real feelings were released by the song which ends with the lines:

> But in spite of all temptations
> To belong to other nations,
> He remains an Englishman.

This provoked one of those waves of emotion which sometimes surge through a crowd. It was the most powerful wave of the kind that I have

ever experienced, though I have heard a large crowd sing the unfortunate third verse of *God Save the Queen*—confound their politics, frustrate their knavish tricks—with peculiar gusto.

Gradually, under the pressure of Nationalist rule, the suppressed feelings of the English have been rising to the surface and becoming explicit. Neglected aspects of history have been brought to light. John Bond pointed to the role of English-speaking people in *They Were South Africans*; after reading it one is left wondering whether any other section of the population really contributed anything constructive to the country. M. S. Geen has written a school history text-book which gives a very different picture from the conventional one. A. C. Martin's *Concentration Camps* has strongly counteracted the prevalent Nationalist version of that chapter of history. An organization called UNESSA—the United English-speaking South Africans—has been formed to fight for the distinctive interests of the community, especially in the field of education. Curiously enough all this reaction, this turning of the worm, has been widely respected and admired by Nationalists. But it can have no positive political effect, except perhaps to condition increasing numbers of the English-speaking to support the real opposition, the Progressive and Liberal parties, which fight the government on another plane.

I have spoken, so far, only in terms of politics. But the antipathies between the two groups cannot be explained only in these terms. While it must be emphasized that there are innumerable friendships and, indeed, marriages across the language line (hardly across the political line), it remains true that each group sees the other largely in the form of a rather unpleasant stereotype. On each side there is distrust. "Never trust an Englishman" and, especially in the older generation, "Never trust a Dutchman" are commonplace generalizations. And to each side one of the common characteristics of the other is hypocrisy. Perhaps in the peculiar circumstances of South Africa hypocrisy is a necessary lubricant to keep the wheels of society turning at all, even in a noisy and over-heated way. At any rate the English are regarded as hypocrites because they so often outwardly accept Afrikaner political conventions while rejecting them in their hearts. And in racial (that is, black-white) relationships they commonly talk the language of liberalism, but do not practise what they preach. They enjoy the fruits of white supremacy but leave the Afrikaner to bear the moral responsibility for it. The Afrikaner is seen as a hypocrite partly for similar reasons. He is glib

and friendly to the Englishman's face, but behind his back carries on the vendetta. He is thought hypocritical too in the matter of sexual morality. There may not be much to choose between the two groups in sexual behaviour, but the English are relatively frank about it. As the Afrikaners belong to a rigidly puritanical church, there is in their case a discrepancy between practice and profession which exposes them to the charge of hypocrisy.

In general, the stereotyped picture of the Afrikaners includes the characteristics of the poor, the ignorant, and the boorish. The stereotype of the English represents them as smart alecks, arrogant, disdainful, materialist, and irreligious. You will notice that this is, roughly, the universal contrast between the countryman and the townsman.

What truth is there in these stereotypes? Each has some basis in fact. The English have both the qualities and the defects of a prosperous, educated, urban society in touch with overseas thought and culture. They are tolerant of differences of opinion, pragmatic, and willing to compromise. In a general way their political attitudes are mature, but about this there must be at least two important reservations. Being so largely a business community, they are apt to put business before political principles, to be afraid to commit themselves to anything for fear of offending potential customers. And they share the general inability of the English-speaking world to understand the totalitarian mentality, or to believe the evidence of their senses that a party like the Nationalists really means what it says. They are fundamentally self-confident and assured, but at the same time contemptuous of others. What riles the Afrikaners in their attitude is not hatred but an almost good-natured contempt and disregard. And there is much truth in the idea that they are materialist, irreligious, and interested in money.

Their political impotence strengthens their sense of identity with England. They are generally—it is impossible to measure the extent of this attitude with any precision—unwilling to commit themselves totally in spirit to an environment that is fatally weighted against them. This, too, exasperates the Afrikaners, who are themselves in a very dangerous position, probably in the long run a hopeless position. Their very nationality is likely in the course of events to be extinguished. They are irritated by the way the English insure themselves against this fate by placing, as it were, their spiritual capital in a safe place. Whatever happens to the British South African community, it will not be the ultimate

disaster as long as they regard themselves as an outpost of a nationality that has its headquarters elsewhere.

The Nationalists would not explain their annoyance as I have explained it. They would say that the English are bad citizens because they have a divided loyalty, or dual allegiance, instead of a single undivided loyalty to South Africa. Yet this is not what they really mean. In two world wars it was the Nationalists who refused to fight for South Africa, and who gave passive or active aid to the Power with which their country was at war. The apparent inconsistency is explained by their identifying South Africa with themselves.

The Afrikaners have qualities and defects which in some respects are the opposites of those I attributed to the English. They are a close-knit society with its roots in the land. They are hospitable to strangers. Though not despising money, they are religious after their own fashion, and inspired by nationalism to sustained efforts in politics and culture. But in politics they are really immature. They are willing to cut off their noses to spite their faces—they pursue a principle to its logical conclusion, regardless of the consequences. They are intolerant of opposition and unable to compromise. In matters relating to race and nationality they are essentially humourless and in deadly earnest. Their humour, of an earthy kind, is different from that of the English, and each community has difficulty in understanding the humour of the other.

The Afrikaner drive for a republic, and the English resistance to it, must be seen against the background of all this. The chief motive in the struggle for a republic was no doubt the desire to reverse the decision of the Boer War, to remove the last symbol of Britain's former triumphs, to give the Afrikaners the sense of being on top, of having a state derived entirely from Afrikaner roots. They hoped also to cut the spiritual link between the British South Africans and their motherland, to cut off at its source the stream of influences that have given the English strength and confidence in spite of the weakness of their position in South Africa. Thus, perhaps, the English would be absorbed into Afrikanerdom, in feeling if not in language, and all would at last be in the same boat. These aspirations are so strong among Afrikaners that some five to ten per cent of the anti-Nationalists among them voted for the republic.

There were, in addition, motives that were specially Nationalist rather than Afrikaner. At least since 1942, when the Nationalists anticipated a German victory by drawing up a republican constitution of a Nazi type,

they have thought of the republic as giving them an opportunity to make fundamental changes in the Constitution. Though it appears that such changes will not be made when the republic is inaugurated, there will certainly be a demand for them once it is established. They have indeed been foreshadowed by much of the legislation of the last twelve years. On this ground, and because the prestige of the government was bound up with the issue of the referendum, many people who had no sentimental aversion from a republic, as such, voted against it. The core of the opposition was, however, the English-speaking people, whose attitude to an Afrikaner republic designed by the Nationalist party needs no further explanation.

The English-speaking people must have voted fairly solidly "No," and they were supported by the majority of anti-Nationalist Afrikaners. But together they mustered only forty-eight per cent of the votes, and the die is now cast. The victors are talking of national unity and tolerance, though their record in this line is not encouraging. All the shrewd observers from whom I have heard regard this talk with misgiving and disgust. Their attitude may be expressed in the words of Lord Halifax's warning to the Dissenters when they were given toleration by James II: "You are therefore to be hugged now, only that you may the better be squeezed at another time." It is possible that some of the English, out of their fear of the "black peril," will make their peace with their present masters. But most of them will probably become more, not less, conscious of their links with the English-speaking world. And some will move nearer to the real opposition, the Progressive and Liberal parties. Not that they are likely to defeat the Nationalists in an election—but that is another story.

BRYAN KEITH-LUCAS

Sierra Leone: Problems of Independence

In April, 1960, a conference assembled in London under the chairmanship of Mr. Macleod to discuss the granting of complete independence to Sierra Leone. It attracted little attention in the newspapers, compared with recent conferences on other African territories. There were no dramatic conflicts between opposing groups; it was attended by no defiant African leader recently released from prison to represent his people; it lacked the theatrical qualities that have been so evident in other countries. There was no great political conflict, because everyone there was already agreed that independence should come soon; there were only administrative details to be settled. And the leader of the Sierra Leone delegation was a man in ways more remarkable, but less dramatic, than those who have spoken for the Africans of other territories.

In similar circumstances Ghana was led by the dominating figure of Nkrumah, recently in prison as a leader of sedition, and endowed with some of the romantic glory of a Garibaldi or a Bolivar; Nigeria by the volatile Zik, and Awolowo, with, from the north, the stately and magnificent Sardauna of Sokoto. From the other side of Africa we have Dr. Banda and Tom Mboya, and other figures such as the Kabaka of Buganda, who have become familiar in the headlines of our daily papers.

But the leader of the people of Sierra Leone is a very different sort of person; a quiet, elderly physician, Sir Milton Margai. He is not a great orator, nor has he a history of defiant opposition to the colonial rulers; indeed he has been the friend and colleague of successive governors; and yet he was able to come to London as the unchallenged leader of his country with all political parties united in his support.

A few years ago, Ghana had just won its independence, and Nigeria was obviously about to do so; but it was generally taken for granted that complete independence was impossible for Sierra Leone. The country was considered too small to stand alone; economically too poor to stand

without the props of colonial support; politically too weak and too diverse to aim at becoming a full member of the Commonwealth, on the same level as Canada and Australia, India and Pakistan. Some rather vague suggestions were being made of an intermediate status, appropriate to the smaller colonies as they outgrew their colonial institutions. Yet now, without a dissentient voice, Sierra Leone has become a full and independent member of the Commonwealth.

Until recently the development of the country was retarded by two main factors: the poverty of the land, and the division between the peoples of the Protectorate and the Colony. The soil, alternately washed by torrential rains and baked by the tropical sun, is infertile and easily exhausted. Mineral wealth was apparently limited, and difficult to exploit.

The political and social problems seemed even more intractable. Besides the divisions created by the presence of a dozen or more tribes and languages in the Protectorate, there was a yet greater barrier between the people of the Colony and the tribes of the Protectorate. The Colony was founded in the eighteenth century as a home for liberated slaves from Canada and the United States who were brought to Freetown by Wilberforce and the Anti-Slavery Society. They were collected in a camp in Nova Scotia, and long retained the habit of calling themselves Nova Scotians. Though African in origin, these people had forgotten their tribal languages and customs, and came as settlers, as British subjects, speaking English, living and dressing as Europeans, trading and following such professions as law and medicine. Their ambition was an English ambition—to succeed in their businesses and professions—and they hoped that one day the colony would be incorporated as a part of the United Kingdom. Among these settlers, or Creoles, there have been many very able and distinguished men, including several bishops of the Church of England and High Court judges, Staff Surgeon Ferguson who was for a time Acting Governor of the Colony and Sir Samuel Lewis, a King's Counsel and the first African to receive a knighthood. The College of Fourah Bay by Freetown was founded in 1827, and for nearly a hundred years has prepared students for the degrees of Durham University in the United Kingdom. The capital, Freetown, has, since the nineteenth century, been governed like an English borough, with a mayor and corporation, a town clerk and a mace. Though the climate and the mosquitoes made this coast the white man's grave, a Little England grew up, peopled by Creoles.

But the Colony was small, and the Creoles few. Behind them lay the much greater area and population of the Protectorate. Here were Africans, living in their traditional ways, speaking their tribal languages; though the missions were busy, most of the people retained their old religions, and many of those in the north are Moslems. Here were some two million tribal Africans, outnumbering the people of the Colony by nearly fifteen to one. Education depended upon the scattered mission schools, and communication upon rough earth roads and unreliable ferries over the numerous rivers. Administration was in the hands of a few District Commissioners and the paramount chiefs, chosen by the tribal elders from the "crowning families" of the tribes. These chiefs had accepted, not always willingly, the suzerainty of the British Crown, but they were still the rulers, and the British function was to keep the peace and protect the people from their enemies. The Creoles of Freetown saw the tribal peoples of the Protectorate much as a Roman Briton might have viewed the Picts and Scots across Hadrian's Wall. They were savages, speaking strange tongues, indulging in human sacrifices, and dominated by the mysterious secret societies of Porro and Wunde. The Creoles never forgot the rebellion of 1898, when the people of the Protectorate had massacred white men and Creoles alike.

But this contrast between the civilization of the Colony and the barbarism of the Protectorate is now losing its meaning. After the last war the Government began to take a more active part in developing the Protectorate. Roads and bridges, schools and colleges were built. The abler youths from the tribal villages found their way to the University College of Fourah Bay or to England, where they qualified as engineers, as barristers and teachers. In many ways the country remained as it had always been, but changes were beginning, and the Creoles could no longer justify their claim to be the only men of education in the country. They might stress their superiority as British Subjects over the British Protected Persons of the Protectorate; they might emphasize the darker aspects of tribal custom, but their claims were beginning to sound a little hollow. The distinction between Creole and non-Creole was becoming vaguer.

So, up to 1950, political progress was slow. The country was ruled, in the traditional colonial pattern, by a Governor advised by an Executive and a Legislative Council, which was still dominated by the senior executive officers, being composed of eleven *ex officio* members; seven

men nominated by the Governor, including three paramount chiefs from the Protectorate; and three members chosen by the people of the Colony on a narrow ratepayer franchise. It was not until 1951 that unofficial members came to have a majority voice in the Legislative Council; but of these unofficial members the largest group was not popularly elected; seven only were chosen by the ballot, and they, elected by the wealthier people of the Colony, represented the views and opinions of the Creole middle class, not of the people at large. These seven were outnumbered by fourteen from the tribal areas of the Protectorate; and these also were not chosen by a popular franchise, but were nominated by the District Councils; and these Councils were essentially assemblies of chiefs and their henchmen. So the power began to pass from the officials of the Secretariat; but not to the old established Creole group, who felt they had a claim to political power, nor to the representatives of the common people, who had as yet no vote either in the Colony or the Protectorate, but to a group based on the strength of the paramount chiefs and the tribal authorities. And herein lay the great difference between the development of Sierra Leone and that of Ghana and Southern Nigeria. In those countries the electoral laws led political leaders to rely in the early stages on the support of the mass of the common people of the towns and villages. Zik, Awolowa, and Nkrumah came to power as the spokesmen of popular movements, winning support by their demand for independence and self-government. The C.P.P., N.C.N.C. and Action Group were all parties based on the popular appeal of nationalism and anti-colonialism. But in Sierra Leone the early conflict was not that of nationalists against the colonial Power, but of Creoles against the tribal powers of the Protectorate. There was neither any popular demand for self-government, nor any electoral machinery through which such a demand could have expressed itself.

It was at this stage, in 1951, that the Executive Council was reorganized, to include the leaders of the majority group in the Legislature, with the title of Ministers, but without any personal responsibility for the departments to which they were attached. And the party which took office was the Sierra Leone People's Party, the party of the Protectorate, supported by the paramount chiefs in the Legislature, and led by a Protectorate man of the Mende tribe—Dr. Milton Margai.

It was obvious however that this constitutional system could not last for long; the Creoles were hurt and resentful at their treatment; they felt

that, despite their education and experience, they were being elbowed out of the way to make room for the nominees of pagan chiefs and secret societies. Many others felt that Sierra Leone, the oldest of the West African colonies, was getting left behind by Ghana and Nigeria, which were moving much more quickly towards complete democracy and independence. So there was a deadlock between the Creole parties and the party of the Protectorate. Both sides protested their faith in democratic principles. The people of the Protectorate felt that the small oligarchy of wealthy Creoles still had an undue and disproportionate influence; that the common people were as fit and able to use the ballot box as those of Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The Creoles qualified their protestations with provisos and warnings of the danger of putting power into the hands of the illiterate tribesmen, with, dimly in the shadows behind them, the mysterious powers of Porro and Wunde, and in the foreground the authority of the chiefs.

In an attempt to solve this problem, a commission was appointed, including members of the Government party and the leader of the Creole Opposition. It tried to find a solution which would lead to a wider suffrage, but yet would not entail the immediate swamping of the Creoles. At the same time it tried to find an answer which was administratively possible, and which would lead to assimilation of the two parts of the country rather than a widening of the gulf between them. The outcome of its discussions was a proposal for development in two stages; in stage one it was proposed that the vote should be given in the Protectorate to all taxpayers and all literate women; in the Colony the existing ratepayer franchise was to be retained, but on a wider basis; and it was proposed that the existing alternative qualification of £60 a year income should be retained, though it seemed unlikely to include many people who did not come within the extended rating provision. In stage two, it was suggested, Colony and Protectorate alike should advance to universal adult suffrage.

In dealing with the Protectorate the commission had to consider the position of the chiefs; should they, or should they not, be eligible for election? On the one hand they were the accepted leaders of their people, with a wide experience of public affairs, and a number of them were already sitting in the Legislature. On the other hand, their duties lay primarily in their chiefdoms, not down in Freetown; and there was doubt whether, if they took part in elections, there would really be free elections. So it was decided to advise that they be excluded from elections, but

that some other way be found to bring some of them into the Legislature.[1]

These proposals, with minor modifications, were accepted, and, after some delays, the first general election was held in 1957.

Meanwhile there had been riots in the Protectorate and a general strike in the Colony. The general rate of wages had risen, and the £60 a year clause made the franchise in Freetown practically universal. The number of names on the register was increased tenfold, and the Creole electorate was swamped by tens of thousands of people from the Protectorate who had come down from their tribal areas to work in the docks and workshops of Freetown. The result was startling. The old Creole party—the National Council of Sierra Leone—was swept out of existence, its leader losing his deposit. Dr. Margai and his party won a resounding victory, and their strength was increased by the paramount chiefs; for the electoral law provided for twelve of them, elected by their peers, to sit in the new Assembly; and they have in general given loyal support to the Government party.

It was in this election that the demand for self-government was first widely heard; but it does not seem to have been a major political issue. All the assorted political parties (except the Creole National Council of Sierra Leone, which omitted to issue a programme or manifesto) included it in their platform, but only as one part of a general programme of reforms and improvements. Dr. Margai and the S.L.P.P. promised independence within the lifetime of the legislature then being elected; that is, before 1962. Other parties offered other dates.

So it came to be generally accepted that independence was the next step, to be achieved within the next few years; and from this view neither the Opposition parties nor the British Government dissented. Arrangements were made for a conference in London to work out the details, and, shortly before the opening of the conference, all the other political parties agreed to accept the leadership of Dr. (by this time, Sir) Milton Margai. He went as the leader of a united team, and, on his return, reorganized his government to include members of all groups, now merged into the United National Front.

The London agreements provided for no drastic changes in the constitution, apart from the fact of independence. Thus the Governor lost his reserve powers; but it appears that he had not in fact used them during the last eight years; the system of judicial appeals to the Privy Council was

[1] *Report of the Electoral Reform Commission* (Freetown, 1954).

retained; the composition of the House of Assembly remained as it was, including the twelve seats reserved for paramount chiefs; the working of the Cabinet and House of Assembly was modelled as closely as may be on the English pattern; and these and other basic rights and principles were incorporated in a group of entrenched clauses, which can only be upset by a two-thirds majority of the House, followed by a general election, and then a two-thirds majority in the new House.

This policy of safeguarding or entrenching the basic principles of the constitution is a common one, which has been adopted in a number of recent instances; the new constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria, for example, include similar provisions. The classic prototype is the constitution of the United States, which is so hedged around with safeguards that amendments are only achieved with the greatest difficulty, and more often the formal framework is circumvented or bent to meet changing circumstances.

The primary purpose of such provisions is presumably to assure that the country will, after independence, be governed in a democratic way. For the British Government assumes that independence should not be granted except on this condition, and that unless it has some such guarantees, Great Britain would not be justified in handing over power. But there is also an assumption that the new rulers or their successors may not be equally determined to maintain the basic rules of democracy, and that, given a free hand, they might ignore or override them. So, at the moment of granting independence, Great Britain tries to stretch out a hand into the future, to control the way in which the new freedom will be used. Of course this cannot fix the system of government to all eternity, but it can establish the principles and structure of government so that they can only be altered with the full and considered approval of the people as a whole. It can guarantee that no fundamental change be made surreptitiously or as the outcome of a chance majority in the House of Assembly. Admittedly the entrenched clauses in the South African constitution, protecting the rights of the Africans, were ultimately overcome, but only after years of manoeuvring, and in the full light of publicity. In Ghana, on the other hand, the entrenched clauses proved to be of little avail to maintain the old constitution, because, though the machinery was there, there was no effective Opposition to use it.

The entrenched clauses in Sierra Leone are of two kinds. Some establish basic principles in the form of a Bill of Rights, protecting the liberty of the subject; others define the machinery of government. The first of these

groups calls to mind the recent Bill of Rights adopted in Canada, and similar declaratory provisions in the constitutions of many other countries. It is aimed at protecting the individual against the arbitrary use of power by the government and its agents; for in any society, however democratic it may be in its structure, there is a danger that officials will misuse their power, and that the rights of ordinary unimportant people will be forgotten or ignored. Basically the justification for entrenched clauses of this sort is the belief that generations of experience have enabled us to establish some fundamental rules of government, of justice, and of individual liberty. These rules, we feel, have something of eternal truth about them. They should therefore be established by laws more permanent and on a higher plane than ordinary Acts of Parliament; laws which can not easily be ignored or overruled to suit the convenience or prejudice of the administration in power at the moment.

But the position is perhaps rather different in the case of those entrenched clauses which define the exact machinery of government—such as that safeguarding the arrangement by which twelve seats in the Assembly are reserved for paramount chiefs. The political and social status of chiefs may change; the actual working of the constitution may prove that they would be better in a separate chamber, or in an advisory body, or relegated to their chiefdoms where their primary duties lie. Indeed, the future of the paramount chiefs is far from clear. It used to be assumed without argument that the chiefs were the "natural leaders of the people," and as such were entitled to a place in the government. But in 1956 there were serious riots over much of the country, and these were, to a great extent, demonstrations against the arbitrary power of the chiefs and its irresponsible use. The subsequent inquiry by the Cox Commission[3] disclosed how much feeling there was against the power of the chiefs. Inevitably, it made one wonder whether the old assumptions had been correct; whether chiefs should be given, more or less for ever, a guaranteed place in the Legislature. It is impossible now to argue that the right of paramount chiefs to nearly one quarter of the seats is an eternal verity, to be placed in a position such that no one can change it without the gravest constitutional upheaval. Moreover, if we assume that the chiefs in the Assembly will not vote for their own exclusion, a two-thirds majority of the House means that thirty-four out of the thirty-nine non-chiefs would have to unite to change this section of the constitution. This makes the chiefs' position almost impregnable.

[3] *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces* (Freetown, 1956).

But the power of the chiefs reaches far beyond that given them by twelve seats in the legislature. Dr. Scott, who made a detailed study on the spot of the 1957 election,[3] suggests that the majority of the people of the Protectorate voted then as their chiefs instructed them. It may be, as the report of the Cox Commission suggests, that their power is waning; but apparently it still remains predominant in many parts; strong enough, at least, to control a number of seats in the legislature, in addition to those specifically reserved for them.

The argument is not that the constitution is a bad one; but that there is a danger in entrenching too securely the details of the system, lest it become so rigid that it cannot be adapted to changing circumstances, a danger of believing that we, now, have found the answer, which must never be altered. It is, after all, a constitution based on guesses and assumptions which may not prove to be true.

These assumptions include the doctrine that the chiefs are the natural leaders of the people, and should therefore be guaranteed a place in the legislature, and also that the political scene will resemble that of England and Canada, with a Government faced by an Opposition which is capable of taking its place. For the constitution is copied from that of Westminster, which has evolved round that assumption. Remove Her Majesty's Opposition, and you alter the whole system and structure of government. Ghana, Pakistan, and Sudan have all started with this assumption, and found it unworkable. Is it wise, one wonders, having built the constitution of Sierra Leone on this assumption, to entrench it so securely that it cannot be adapted to changing circumstances without something in the nature of a revolution? After all, there is not at this moment an Opposition in Sierra Leone, since the formation last year of the United National Front. The post of Leader of the Opposition is vacant; the salary unclaimed. The only aspirant is Mr. Siaka Stevens, who published some trenchant criticisms of the London Agreements, and demanded that a general election be held before they are implemented. At the time of the independence celebrations in April this year, he and a few of his supporters were imprisoned, apparently to avoid the trouble which it was feared they might create. He has since been convicted of a libel, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. He remains a lonely figure without a seat in the Assembly, and with no substantial following.

If a real opposition party is to arise in Sierra Leone, we may speculate

[3]Published in *Five Elections in Africa*, edited by W. J. M. Mackenzie and K. E. Robinson (1960) See p. 173.

on what its basis is likely to be. At the moment the various parties are all merged in the United National Front. A few years ago one would have assumed that the conflict would be between the Colony and the Protectorate; between the National Council of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone People's Party. But now the National Council has ceased to exist as a parliamentary force. It won not a single seat in 1957; its leader, Bankole Bright, lost his deposit, and died soon after. It would seem that this old conflict will never again be the major issue in national politics. Many of the Creoles of the Colony are accepting a new role as members of nation-wide political parties. Probably only a few of the older Creoles still dream of a separate destiny for the Colony, closely linked to the United Kingdom, turning its back on the Protectorate.

In other West African territories the parties have tended to be based on the separate interests of the regions—the Northern People's Party and the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement in Ghana, for example. But there is as yet little indication of this happening in Sierra Leone; it has been suggested that the present Government is dominated by members of the Mende tribe—the largest in the country and the one to which the Prime Minister belongs—and that a Temne Opposition might arise. But the Cabinet now contains five Temnes, five Creoles, and five Mendes. So it looks as if no such development is likely at present.

Alternatively an Opposition might be formed round the personality of some rival leader; but there is at present no obvious candidate, and it is probable that those who aspire to power, even though they have recently been in opposition, are unlikely to challenge the great prestige of Sir Milton Margai. They are more likely to fix their eyes on the chance of succeeding him when he retires; he is sixty-five years old, and for some years there have been constant rumours that he proposes to retire. It may be that when he does, but not till then, an Opposition will arise, perhaps out of the conflict between the candidates for the mantle of the prophet.

So there are serious grounds for doubting whether political behaviour in Sierra Leone will in fact follow the pattern of Westminster, and so whether a constitution, based on that assumption, and safeguarded with entrenched clauses, is really appropriate. May not Sierra Leone find, as Pakistan and Ghana have found, that the Westminster pattern does not really suit its soil? No doubt it would have been impossible to start off on any other assumption, but yet there are these obvious questions: Will a parliamentary Opposition arise? Will the chiefs forever fit into the existing pattern? And behind these two questions there lurks another:

What is, and will be, the power of the secret societies—particularly Porro?

Dr. Scott refers to Porro as "potentially probably the most important political force in the country."[4] If this be so, what does it portend? We know so little about the working of Porro and the other secret societies, that even guessing is futile. But all the time one has an uneasy feeling that the structure of ballot boxes, cabinet responsibility, and rules of parliamentary procedure are only a facade, while the real power is to be found in the Sacred Bush of the Porro. At other times one tends to dismiss this as idle fears and fancies, as really no more than the bogies one imagines on a windy night in the forest.

But when Sierra Leone's survival as an independent nation was commonly doubted, it was more often on economic than on constitutional grounds. The land is poor, and its financial position has never been strong. In the last few years, however, the situation has changed in several ways.

First, and most dramatic, has been the discovery of the great wealth of the diamond fields. Why this had been unnoticed so long is difficult to explain; but the fact remains that only in the last few years has anyone noticed how rich the soil is—and not with mere industrial stones, but first-class gems. The realization came slowly, and the development was mishandled. At first a complete monopoly was granted to the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, but later this was bought out at a high price; there was a rapid development of illicit digging and smuggling. Farmers left their crops to dig for diamonds instead; foreigners flooded in from the neighbouring French territories. In all, forty-five thousand people were engaged in illicit digging. The police at first found themselves outnumbered and defeated, and most of the stones were smuggled across the unguarded frontiers, and still today much of the trade is in the hands of smugglers. Even so, the official figures show a monthly export of a million pounds worth of stones. It is much the largest export of the country, but it is an unstable one, which may fail at any time if the artificial control of diamond prices should collapse. Moreover, it is not possible to tax this trade substantially, as an increase in tax is so easily countered by an increase in smuggling.

Secondly, there is the problem of overseas aid. As a Colony, Sierra Leone has been receiving valuable, but not spectacular, assistance from Great Britain, through the Colonial Office. This would normally cease

[4] *Five Elections in Africa*, p. 174.

with the end of colonial government, just at a time when new expenses are bound to fall on the infant nation. But the London agreement provides for a grant of £7½ million to take the place of this "normal colonial type assistance." It also provides for a military pact which will relieve the country of the burden of providing its own army, navy, and air force. This provision was sharply criticized by Mr. Siaka Stevens, who sees it as a form of continued tutelage. Economically it is difficult to see how such a country could provide its own armed forces, and Britain would be reluctant to lose the port of Freetown, the finest natural harbour in West Africa.

It looks, however, as if this continued aid will be of secondary importance beside the help that is promised from other quarters. Events in the Congo have shocked the world into a realization of what can happen when an African state achieves independence; both the United Nations and the Commonwealth are discussing the possibility of helping the new African nations on a scale which will make the old assistance look mean and parochial. Moreover, the experience of Ghana has shown that when a territory becomes independent, American capital becomes available on a scale unknown before. Up to now the Government of Sierra Leone has had to think of capital development in terms of the available grants from the United Kingdom and of the capacity of the Public Works Department. Now new horizons appear, and it may be that the whole economic situation will change. The development of water power, the introduction of agricultural machinery, and the building of roads and bridges are all urgently needed. There is potential wealth in the iron ore of Tonkolili if capital can be found to develop the mines; timber and chrome mining could also be developed.

In the London conference the greatest attention was paid to the problem of keeping the expatriate officers wherever they are needed. Thus, with the coming of Independence there was no sudden change in the process of administration. Now, bit by bit, as occasion arises, the Europeans are being replaced by Sierra Leonians, trained in the country's own University of Fourah Bay, or in the universities of the United Kingdom.

For these reasons, political, economic, and administrative, it seems that Sierra Leone is much more capable of survival as an independent nation than we thought a few years ago. But it may be that the artificial frontiers of the West African States will not prove to be permanent, and Nkrumah's dream of a United States of West Africa will come true; or even a

Federation of Black Africa. There have been several attempts to build up such a union in West Africa: the first, unstable, union of Mali, the nominal union of Ghana and Guinea, and now the union of the remaining part of Mali with Ghana. In the new constitution of Ghana it is provided that the President, on taking office, shall make a solemn declaration affirming "That the union of Africa should be striven for by every lawful means and, when attained, should be faithfully preserved; That the independence of Ghana should not be surrendered or diminished on any grounds other than the furtherance of African unity."

The vision is still there, but yet the reality is very different; the great French community has disintegrated into a dozen separate states; the original Mali has split into its component parts; and no one can say with certainty that this process of subdivision has yet run its course; the Congo and Uganda are faced with the prospect of partition; the Monckton report may lead to the secession of Nyasaland from the Central African Federation. In short, events are moving in exactly the opposite direction.

Moreover, Sierra Leone has as yet shown no interest in such schemes of federation or union. Perhaps it has resented the sudden rise of Ghana and of Nkrumah to the place of leadership in West Africa, leaving Sierra Leone with a feeling of being left behind. There is perhaps a fear that in any such union Sierra Leone would lose its identity in a larger whole, dominated by Dr. Nkrumah. So too, President Tubman of Liberia has given little active support to such proposals, though he occasionally endorses Nkrumah's declarations. And yet Liberia, much the oldest of the free nations of West Africa, might have become the champion and the symbol of West African nationalism. Instead it has continued, under the rule of the True Whig party, apparently undisturbed by events around. There is here perhaps a warning for Sierra Leone—a warning of the danger that the country may find itself playing no greater role than its neighbour Liberia.

On the twenty-seventh of April last Sierra Leone became an independent nation, a full member of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations, and one wonders what sort of a nation it is going to be. Will it do what other free African nations have so far failed to do, and make the system of British parliamentary government really work? I personally think that there is a very good prospect that it will, despite all the difficulties. I believe that Sir Milton Margai is a man who is capable of achieving this, and who intends to do so.

But, whether he does or not, there are still questions to be answered. Will Sierra Leone become, as Ghana has, a real force in shaping the future of Africa, or even of the world? It is small, and it may be that it will be submerged in the larger whole of a West African Federation, or it may be that it will play only a minor passive role, as Liberia has done. But I myself think that the prospects are brighter than they have been in any other similar case of an African colony achieving independence.

CRANFORD PRATT

East Africa: The Pattern of Political Development[*]

In 1948, a Commission investigating some disturbances in the Gold Coast, stated in the course of its report that: "By far the most serious problem which the administration has to face in the Gold Coast is the suspicion that surrounds government activity of any sort. Its origin apart from political propaganda is dispersed and often obscured. It does not attach to persons or individuals in government service. It is an attitude of mind based on no specific grievance." This same generalized hostility has developed in recent years in East Africa as well. There is a discontent, an element of unrest that no specific reform, no change of policy is going to cure. It is derived from the very presence of colonial rule. It reflects an increasing sense of the indignity of the colonial relationship. This feeling of indignity more than any other factor gives shape and power and psychological force to African nationalism.

Once that stage is reached in a dependent territory it seems to me the case for independence becomes very strong. Colonial rule, especially British colonial rule, has always been a cross between government by consent and government by bluff, a consent that is largely passive and a bluff, thank goodness, that is very rarely called. But once that consent is withdrawn, once, so to speak, the bluff is called, the whole character of colonial rule changes. The energies of British officials are involved more and more in merely maintaining law and order. Colonial rule increasingly comes to rest on force, or on the show and threat of force. It was in fear of such a development and in the desire to avoid a developing pattern of increasing political repression, that Britain conceded political independence in her West African territories in recent years. No doubt for

[*]I am extremely grateful to Professor Douglas Anglin and Professor Millar MacLure for their most excellent and helpful editorial revision of the original transcript of my lecture.

much the same reason, Britain has now clearly decided to withdraw as soon as is feasible from her East African territories as well.

That decision having been made, it might then be thought that from now on the situation would be fairly straightforward. After all, Britain has had some experience in graceful withdrawals. But in fact the granting of self-government in East Africa is almost certain to involve problems of a most serious and complex nature. The objective is not just a British withdrawal, but an early replacement of British rule by an independent government that will offer some prospects of being both stable and just. It is the search for these latter qualities that generates most of the problems which I am going to deal with in this paper.

It has frequently been the case that the growth of general hostility to colonial rule has been accompanied by the emergence of a powerful nationalist movement led by modern and educated Africans who are not only anxious to be free of colonial rule but equally anxious that their territory should be a modern and progressive state. In such circumstances, the appearance of nationalist movements makes colonial rule more difficult, but it also means that there will be nationalist leaders of authority and prestige throughout the whole territory, leaders to whom power can be transferred with some confidence that they will be able to hold the territory together after the scaffolding of British administration is withdrawn.

But this coincidence of increasing discontent with colonial rule and the appearance of nationalist movements is not inevitable. Hostility to colonial rule need not express itself in the formation of a general nationalist movement. Such sentiments can as well express themselves in backward-looking assertions of tribal loyalty that defy accommodation within any framework of national institutions. They can express themselves in nativistic uprisings that offer no hope of stability for the future, or they can assert themselves in disorganized expressions of general mass dissatisfaction. When any of these happens, when there is mass political unrest but not the presence of an organized nationalist movement, then the colonial power is faced with a very depressing alternative. It must either decide to stay on in an atmosphere of mounting hostility in which there is little prospect of relationships improving, or it must leave before there can be any confidence that the territory will be a stable and progressive state on its departure. This is very nearly the choice that the British now face in Uganda and in Kenya.

There is in Uganda, as there was in the Gold Coast in the late 1940's, widespread general disaffection. Within the past three years, there have been two serious outbreaks of political lawlessness. One of these was a very effective boycott of non-African shops and of some non-African products, a boycott which lasted over a year, despite the combined opposition of the British government and the nationalists, and, near the end, of the tribal government as well. The discontent was so widespread and so deep that even these three forces of authority were unable immediately to check it. Yet this unrest in Uganda has not issued into any powerful and unifying nationalist movement. The parties are weak, and divided. They have no organization that extends with any effect throughout the rural countryside; they have been, at least until very recently, shifting collections of urban politicians.

One reason for the failure of nationalism in Uganda is the realization that Britain is genuinely going to concede self-government in the near future. The nationalists cannot convince the mass of Africans that they must rally together in a single nationalist movement in order to win independence. In fact the nationalists themselves do not believe it. Instead they have divided and quarrelled and manoeuvred amongst themselves to be sure that they, rather than their rivals, will enjoy the power which they recognize is soon to be transferred to Africans.

Edmund Burke has said that "it is a good thing at times to cast a veil over the origin of states lest we learn too much and thus find that the important myths have lost their appeal and their power to hold our loyalties." In Uganda, some of the cherished myths of Africa are becoming a little exposed. The myths of African solidarity and national unity against colonial rule have lost much of their appeal. The unedifying scramble for power has been a little too obvious, and, instead of the atmosphere of hope and enthusiasm which African nationalism has generated in so many other territories, there is scepticism and pessimism regarding the men who present themselves as nationalist leaders.

There is a further reason for the nationalist failure in Uganda. Nationalism was defeated by a political force stronger than nationalism itself—Buganda tribalism. Buganda is a kingdom on the north shore of Lake Victoria comprising some twenty per cent of the population of Uganda. It had had a long, proud, and continuous history as a separate kingdom before the European arrived. It is not an isolated part of Uganda. It is in

fact the wealthiest, the best organized, and the most highly educated region of the country. Within its boundaries is the commercial and the political capital of Uganda. Consequently, no nationalist movement can ignore Buganda, or be a general unifying force in Uganda unless it has a sizable support in Buganda. Yet, it is in Buganda, in this crucial tribal kingdom, that nationalism has suffered its most severe setback. The Ganda, the people of Buganda, have always regarded their tribal kingdom as their nation. They have formed a part of the larger entity of Uganda, but only because the British had incorporated them into it. It was not something in which they have shown much interest; certainly nothing to which they have felt any loyalty.

When the Legislative Council was first set up the Kabaka (or King) of Buganda wrote to the Governor, not to demand more African representation, but rather to say in effect, "You can have your Legislative Council if you want to, but it must not affect our tribal institutions." This has continued to be the attitude of the people of Buganda. A leading Buganda politician, Amos Sempa, recently wrote to the *Times* to explain the attitude of the kingdom. His letter included this observation: "We are a nation. We are not a tribe, like the Welsh or the Scots." The first part, at least, of this is correct. The Ganda's loyalty to Buganda can legitimately be labelled a national loyalty.

For decades the British accepted without challenge this tribal state view of Buganda. They left intact the whole structure of tribal government, and maintained the dignity and honour in particular of the position of the Kabaka. Both the people of Buganda and the British were content to see this tribal state come into the modern period with its loyalties and its pride intact, without any infiltration into it of anything that would draw the African interest towards national rather than tribal institutions. Then, in 1952, Sir Andrew Cohen became Governor. Although a Colonial Office civil servant who, until he went to Uganda, had never had any experience "in the field," he had had a great deal of experience in the Colonial Office, having risen to prominence under a Labour Secretary of State, and had been one of the major architects of the rapid advances to independence in West Africa. Sir Andrew brought to Uganda a conviction that colonial rule did not in fact have nearly as many years left for it as most of the administrators in Uganda thought. He also brought a determination to learn from the experience of West Africa and to keep

ahead of the game in Uganda. He was ready to concede independence before nationalist feelings became too exacerbated. And he was determined to build in Uganda national institutions to hold the territory together after independence.

The main obstacle to the implementation of this programme was obvious: Buganda. Here was a tribal kingdom which was not interested in taking part in any national institutions. It wanted to keep a direct line, so to speak, between itself and the British without any intermediary supertribal organization. While Cohen was trying to increase African participation and interest in central institutions, the Kabaka and many of his subjects realized that, if he were successful in this, the position of the Kabaka and the purely tribal institutions of Buganda would inevitably suffer in importance. The more Africans became concerned about national politics and central government affairs, the less interest they would take in their purely tribal institutions. Matters came to a head in 1953 when Sir Andrew Cohen ordered the Kabaka deported from Uganda. It was an odd crisis. Here was a liberal Governor attempting to promote nationalism, and having in consequence to deport a leading African. The deportation solved nothing. In fact, the Ganda were all the more intensely tribal in their loyalties. The demand that the Kabaka must return became the only thing that was of interest or concern in Buganda. As Sir Andrew was among the first to realize, the deportation was a mistake. The Kabaka had to be allowed to return.

Eventually, in 1955 after much bargaining the Kabaka did return to Buganda and a whole new bargain was struck between the British and the tribal government of Buganda. Under this, it was agreed that Buganda would participate in the Legislative Council, that the Kabaka would become a type of tribal constitutional monarch removed from tribal politics, and that henceforth the tribal government would be run by ministers responsible to an elected tribal parliament, the Lukiiko.

The result was an interesting paradox. What Sir Andrew had succeeded in doing constitutionally was to open the way for the advance to power of African nationalists in Buganda. It was now possible for them to fight and win election to the Legislative Council as well as to control through election the tribal council. But what Cohen had made constitutionally possible, he had made politically impossible. The crisis over the deportation had left tribal loyalties all the more intense. It had made the job of the nationalists all the more difficult. More than that, it had freed the leaders

of the tribal government from the liability that elsewhere in Africa had caused the defeat of a good many tribal chiefs. It was no longer possible for the nationalists to label the tribal government as the timid agents of British rule. The tribal government had in fact stood up to the British and had won the return of Kabaka. The people in Buganda have therefore been able to be both fiercely anti-colonial and also strongly loyal to their tribal government. This is a combination of sentiments not found in most African territories. More often, as anti-colonial feeling has mounted, tribalism has tended to diminish. Moreover, Buganda is just large enough for many of its people to feel that it could in fact become independent on its own. The nationalists have thus been robbed of the twin slogans of anti-colonialism and independence. The traditionalist leaders of the tribal government can talk the same language as the nationalists and make the same political claim to these anti-colonial slogans. As a result, in the years following the 1955 settlement, the tribal leaders in Buganda virtually eliminated the influence of nationalism in Buganda. Moreover, by adroit legal manoeuvring, they succeeded in withdrawing from the Legislative Council all Buganda representatives.

One might have thought that Buganda's success in maintaining its identity would have given it confidence in its ability to resist encroachments in the future, but such is not the case. Since about 1958, the expectation of an early self-government has been in the air. Once it was recognized that Britain was likely to grant independence to Uganda in the near future, the whole problem changed for Buganda. The crucial issue for Buganda has since been the future constitution of the independent Uganda. Buganda is determined either to win a loose federal constitution within which its tribal autonomy will be completely secure, or, alternatively, to break up the territory and secede completely from the rest of Uganda. Indeed, on December 31, 1960, the Lukiiko adopted by an overwhelming majority a declaration of immediate independence.

It is tempting, but probably wrong to dismiss this solely as a reprehensible parochialism. The Baganda are, in terms of the whole of Uganda, a disliked minority. They have every reason to fear that an independent Uganda controlled by members of other tribes who are nationalists would not respect their tribal institutions. Hence, they are determined to ensure autonomy for their tribal state before any further advance to self-government is granted. With Buganda refusing to take part in any further constitutional progress until the question of her relationship with the rest

of Uganda is settled, Uganda is advancing towards self-government with a deep, unresolved division that could easily destroy any chance of a stable, peaceful, and progressive independent nation.

In sharp contrast to Uganda, the situation in Tanganyika is most encouraging. Tanganyika has a strong and successful nationalist party which has successfully contained within it possibly dispersive tribal loyalties. Yet most of the factors that are normally cited as being the causal factors generating nationalism have had less of an impact in Tanganyika than in Uganda. Tanganyika is less developed economically and educationally. Communications are poorer. Moreover, until very recently, British policy has hardly helped the development of national institutions and national loyalties.

After the war for the first time Britain became concerned about the shape she wished to give to the national institutions of Tanganyika. For twelve years, from 1947 until 1959, the colonial government of Tanganyika promoted a series of constitutional policies that are best known collectively as "racial partnership" or "multi-racialism." It is worth looking at this in some detail, because it is fundamentally the same policy that Britain has until very recently attempted as well to promote in Kenya. The starting premise of this policy of multi-racialism, and the reason that it has really never had any chance of being acceptable to Africans, was the view that the presence of European settlers in East Africa required a completely different pattern of constitutional development—different from that which Britain was at that time guiding and encouraging in West Africa. The European settlements involved are comparatively small. There are some 20,000 Europeans in Tanganyika and about 65,000 in Kenya. All of these have, of course, not settled. Those who have established permanent homes there would be a much smaller number. By comparison, there are over eight million Africans in Tanganyika, and something like six million in Kenya. The Europeans therefore constitute but a very small percentage of the total population. Nevertheless, their presence was for twelve years the reason why Britain attempted to promote in East Africa a quite different pattern of constitutional development than in West Africa. The ultimate objective of British policy was the creation of a non-racial society, a society in which race no longer dominated social relations, no longer shaped political choice. But until that remote millennium was achieved, it was the British view that British rule must continue in East Africa.

In the interim, the Legislative Councils were to have balanced repre-

sentation from each of the races. In Tanganyika this meant racial parity. There was during this crucial period a 10:10:10 ratio on the unofficial side of the Legislative Council—ten Africans, ten Europeans, and ten Asians, the Asians being a further important minority community in East Africa. There was during these twelve years of multi-racialism no recognition that these territories were to have an African majority in the foreseeable future. Heavily weighted, disproportionate minority representation would continue for a very long time. This was the policy of both British political parties while in office. There was some hostility to it expressed within the Labour Party once it was out of power, but until 1951 it too accepted racial partnership as the goal of constitutional policy in East and Central Africa.

This multi-racial policy was fundamentally unacceptable to Tanganyikan Africans and especially to the Tanganyika African National Union formed in 1954 by Julius Nyerere who is now Prime Minister. At that time he was a young school teacher who was fired by the indignity that he sensed in colonialism and was determined to organize Tanganyikans into a nationalist movement. For several years, he and a few close associates moved about this really quite vast territory as best they could, organizing branches of TANU. At first, they drew support mainly from the dissatisfied and the malcontents within each tribal group, but gradually they spread their base and widened their appeal. To aid them in this, they had an ideal issue in their insistence that there must be no denial of the right of the vast African majority eventually to shape and dominate the political institutions of Tanganyika. The fear that Britain was not going to bring Tanganyika along the Gold Coast pattern, but would instead entrench the position of the minority communities and thus rob the vast African majority of an eventual right to self-government was a very real one. The political exploitation of this fear greatly assisted TANU to develop so effectively.

TANU in these years was not playing the normal role that one expects of a nationalist party in a British colony. Many normally think of colonial governments and nationalist parties as agreed on the objective but in dispute over the speed of development. This is the happy pattern that one likes to imagine. But in Tanganyika this was not the case. TANU rejected the whole constitutional programme that the government wished to promote. For this reason, as TANU grew stronger, the government did its best in a variety of ways to check its growth. The Governor, Sir Edward Twining, encouraged into existence a new party, the United Tanganyika

Party, a sort of government party, which attempted to win popular support for a multi-racial political programme. Simultaneously with this, the law was applied severely against TANU. During 1956–7, branches were closed or forbidden in some ten Tanganyika districts. At one point Nyerere himself was arrested and tried on a not very important slander charge against a district commissioner whom he had offended. The government also set up a Convention of Chiefs in an effort to build up the traditional rulers as a counterbalancing force to TANU.

But all this was to no avail. TANU and Nyerere demonstrated in no uncertain terms the scope and solidarity of their political strength. In September 1958 and March 1959, Tanganyika held its first national elections. (It is worth noting these were the first such elections, as it indicates how much more rapidly developments are taking place in East Africa as compared with the corresponding changes in West Africa.) The electoral system was a complex one. The territory was divided into ten constituencies and in each constituency three members were to be elected—one Asian, one African, one European. Each voter had to cast three votes, one for a candidate of each race. For administrative convenience, the voting took place at two different times, five constituencies in September 1958 and five constituencies in March 1959. There was a common electoral roll with fairly high franchise qualifications. In this election TANU swept the board. In the first round of elections, it not only won all five African seats, but, more impressive than that, it organized the African voters on the common roll so that the only Asian and European candidates who were elected were those that TANU chose to support. In consequence, every single supporter of multi-racialism was defeated. In the second round of elections six months later, all five African seats went by acclamation to TANU. Only two of the Asian and European seats were contested, and again they went to TANU-backed candidates.

At the same time, TANU won another crucial battle. The traditional chiefs were won over to its support. Prior to the election, as TANU's strength grew throughout the country, chief after chief hesitated to court unpopularity by declaring himself against TANU. The fence got very crowded as one chief after another climbed on to it. Then, in September 1958, TANU very shrewdly named a leading chief as a candidate in the election. With that, the chiefs *en masse* began to make their peace with TANU and quietly to demonstrate or at least assert their underlying sympathy with it. In March 1959, at a meeting of the Convention of Chiefs, created by the government as a counterbalance to TANU, the

political resolutions passed were indistinguishable from the TANU electoral platform. Thus the political support of the chiefs for the government was lost.

By 1959, the Tanganyikan government had no choice but to concede to TANU. Nevertheless, it did have the foresight and wisdom to recognize the inevitable in time and adjust to it gracefully. In December 1959, a crucial announcement was made. The Tanganyikan Legislative Council and Council of Ministers were each to have an elected African majority. Since then, elections have been held, full internal self-government introduced with Julius Nyerere as Prime Minister, and complete independence agreed upon for December 29, 1961.

Despite this happy outcome, Tanganyika faces a future fraught with problems and difficulties. It is still a very poor country. The supply of educated Africans is still extremely small. Moreover, the grant of independence came in the end with such ease that the cohesive and unifying force of nationalism proved in some areas too weak to withstand local reassertions of tribalism. Also, one cannot help but be a little afraid of a situation where so much depends on one man, on the terrific personality and ability and balance of Julius Nyerere. Nevertheless, when all is said and done, Tanganyika remains an exciting land of hope. Masses of people who have till very, very recently lived as the passive recipients of instructions which they meekly obeyed have now been activated politically. Their energies have been aroused and released and are being directed into constructive channels by the Tanganyika African National Union government. This firm and effective leadership has succeeded so far in containing adequately local tribal loyalties within a wider new national loyalty. Parenthetically it is worth observing that the prospects for stable government, effective administration, and I would also feel personal liberty are greater in Tanganyika due to the present virtual one-party character of its party system than in either Kenya or Uganda where there are multi-party systems. A single strong unifying national party may well be essential to many of the new African states as the main force generating a national consciousness and sustaining the measure of national unity necessary to stable government.

Tanganyika's contrast with Uganda in all these respects could hardly be more marked. It also has its important contrasts with Kenya. Tanganyika has made a successful transition to African majority rule without racial reprisals, without any mass exodus of the minority races. New and able non-African political leaders have appeared on the scene who are

willing to serve as subordinates under an African leader. They are more than willing; they recognize that this is the only way that a non-African can contribute politically to contemporary Africa. Tanganyika is thus a model of a new conception of partnership different from that which until recently the British have attempted to promote. Tanganyika illustrates a partnership in which members of a minority race have equal rights as individuals with the African majority, but have no permanently entrenched special rights as separate communities.

I have left until the last consideration of the complex problems in Kenya. I fear the problem of the Kenya settler is as thoroughly intractable a problem as is faced right now anywhere in Africa. I would agree that finally the European in Africa who feels that he cannot live with Africans on the basis of equality must leave. But to accept this either as a statement of fact, or, as I would, as a statement of political attitude, does not mean that one would welcome a sudden exodus of Europeans from Kenya in the early years of self-government. That would be a tragedy both because of the hardships it would involve for the Europeans and for its impact on the nation as a whole. The economic dislocation that would follow a collapse of European agriculture would be extremely serious. It would be matched in its seriousness by the effect of any European exodus on the adequacy and efficiency of government services.

In a way, the outline of the problem in Kenya is almost dreadfully simple. Until very recently, Kenya European settlers have been the aggressive and politically demanding community in Kenya. It is they, rather than the Africans, who have over the decades pressed the British for concessions. For decades, their leaders hoped that Kenya would become another White Dominion. Although in recent years this particular dream has been reluctantly abandoned, the Europeans have nevertheless retained for themselves a wide range of special political, economic, and social privileges won over the years. They have exerted a powerful influence within the Legislative and Executive Councils. The multi-racial pattern in Kenya in the 1950's was not a 1:1:1 ratio as in Tanganyika, but a 2:1:1 ratio—two Europeans to one Asian and one African, and this ratio was for a period almost sacrosanct. On one occasion, when a member of the Royal Family was visiting Kenya, three thousand guests were invited to a large garden party at Government House—1500 Europeans, 750 Africans, and 750 Asians. Certainly, the 2:1:1 ratio was felt by Europeans to be crucial to the protection of their interests. Not only did they win for themselves this powerful position

in the legislature, but they established as a policy of government that only Europeans were permitted to own land in what is called the White Highlands of Kenya, some 16,000 square miles in extent, much of it rich and all of it gloriously beautiful country. Socially, Europeans exist as an almost completely self-contained community. They have control of their own schools and hospitals, which until very recently have been completely racially segregated. Standards in these schools and hospitals are of course high, especially when compared with the standards which by and large are available for the other races.

However, when Iain McLeod became Secretary of State for the Colonies, British policy began to rest squarely on the realization that this pocket of white privilege in Kenya is an anomaly that has no future. At the Lancaster House Conference of February 1960, Mr. McLeod made it clear that Britain would not be drawn into defending any permanent entrenchment of vastly disproportionate political power for the European minority. He conceded to the nationalists that Kenya was soon to have an African majority government, and, having conceded that, he used all his influence to win acceptance of transitional arrangements and constitutional safeguards which might help to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the minorities. He was, in other words, really trying to use the same techniques that had proved so successful in Tanganyika. But that success is not likely to be duplicated.

In the first place, sensible and inevitable as McLeod's policy was, it represented a dramatic change from the policies of his predecessors. There was nothing in British policy towards Kenya until last year to suggest to the Kenya settler that Britain intended any sudden transformation of the existing political and social relations. On the contrary, there was every assurance that Britain intended to maintain a guiding hand in Kenya for a very long time to come. If there was to be any increase in African political participation, it was to be a gradual increase within the framework of ultimate colonial rule from Britain. There is no doubt that this policy had no future, and it was an act of wisdom to recognize this then rather than wait until recognition was forced upon Britain by a period of violence and repression. But the fact does remain that, until 1960, Britain had continued to talk of balanced racial ratios and of continued British rule. The slowness in making this change has meant that the transition now is much more difficult. Africans have been embittered by their lengthy struggle to win recognition of the ultimate right of Africans to rule in Kenya, and Europeans have been left unpre-

pared for the now very sudden changes that are beginning to take place. Moreover the European is probably right to argue that an African majority on the Legislative Council is going to make dramatic and, from the European point of view, unattractive changes in his way of life. It is difficult to imagine that an elected African majority in Kenya would agree to subsidize high standard schools and hospitals for Europeans only, or that they would enforce racial segregation in the Highlands, or permit the European minority to continue to dominate urban local government or rural government in the Highland area. All of these things will go with the first elected African majority and, when they do, much of the way of life that the Europeans have built for themselves within their island of privilege will also go.

Moreover, Europeans do have some genuine grounds to fear that even their legitimate rights may be endangered by an African majority, notably, their property rights in the rural areas of the Highlands. An independent African government will almost certainly be under very heavy pressure to act dramatically against the White Highlands. The Highlands have been for so long the focus of political discontent, an island of privilege, much of it under-farmed, whereas in neighbouring African reserves there is much pressure on the land. Only moderate and very firm African leadership is likely to be able to withstand the political pressure for a major influx of Africans into the Highlands. There is a danger, therefore, that, instead of an orderly and controlled introduction of Africans, there will be a gigantic and uncontrolled land-grab. Moreover, the competition which currently exists among rival nationalists makes moderation of that order even less likely. The temptation to play on the Highland issue may prove too great.

There is a final complication. For a little more than three very sad and savage years, 1952–5, Central Kenya was rent by a nativistic uprising which we know as the Mau Mau uprising. It has since died out, but it has left behind it inevitably a heritage of fear and suspicion, of misunderstanding and hate, that will take a long time to erase. What is of more immediate importance is that Jomo Kenyatta, the convicted head of Mau Mau, continues to be held in preventive detention by the colonial government, although he has served his actual prison sentence.[1] Both major African Nationalist parties hail Kenyatta as their leader; both

[1]Mr. Kenyatta was released from detention in August 1961. After a brief display of African unity the leaders of one of the two main parties have begun to disengage themselves from their commitments to him. There is thus the further risk of a serious political division within the African community that will be but a reflection of serious tribal animosities.

urge that he be released immediately; both promise that he must be the first leader of an independent Kenya. His connections with Mau Mau are forgotten, perhaps even denied, on occasion. He is seen only in terms of being the first and greatest of African nationalists. To the Europeans, in understandable contrast, Mr. Kenyatta is feared and despised. Whether justifiably or not, he is linked in their minds with all the savage bestiality that occurred under Mau Mau at its height. It would, I am sure, be repugnant to a large number of Europeans in Kenya, both settlers and civil servants, to remain in Kenya under a government led by Kenyatta, or even a government that paid Kenyatta high honours. Yet it seems almost certain that soon Kenya will have just such a government. The conclusion from all this is not that the McLeod reforms were misconceived. Whatever may be their risks, these are less than would result from any attempt to perpetuate white privilege.

This leads me to consider one final problem—the lack of experienced Africans in the civil services of all three territories. This is a problem everywhere in Africa, but it is much more acute in East Africa than in West Africa. For example, in 1959 there was in the whole of East Africa only one African District Commissioner. Several years ago, were you to stroll through the various East African Secretariats, the same depressing pattern would have repeated itself: Europeans sitting at the desks, Asians sorting the files and doing the typing, and Africans distributing the tea. The reliance on European expatriate officers is extremely great. There is no possibility that this can change rapidly. There are just not enough trained Africans available to begin to replace the present British officials in any substantial numbers. These territories will have to rely on a very large number of expatriate officers for a fair length of time after independence. If they do not do that, they face the prospect of a quite drastic decline in government services and in administration generally.

The two obvious questions are: Will the independent African governments be willing to keep that many Europeans, and will that many Europeans be willing to stay? The danger is that both answers may be no. Two important factors might lead an African nationalist government to reduce the numbers of British officers before they can successfully be replaced. One will be straight political pressure from below, for there will undoubtedly be a demand for a rate of Africanization more rapid than is consistent with the maintenance of even a basic level of services and standards.

The other factor is that the nationalists are bound to feel, and they are

probably right to feel, that some of the present British officers are fundamentally out of sympathy with what is now going on. In particular, very few officials have really supported the rapid advance to self-government. They were, after all, recruited to rule and they have ruled well. They have ruled with self-confidence and with a pride in their service. Their conditions of life and their general status in society will change drastically after independence, even though they may keep their actual jobs. Kenya and Uganda will be different places after independence, and to many expatriate officials not very attractive places. British civil servants will cease to be members of a ruling elite; they will cease to be members of a superior and aloof social community. It is likely that many who were recruited into a colonial service, especially those recruited before the war, will not be able to make this transition happily. It is scarcely suprising, therefore, that they have not welcomed the growth of nationalism. Rather the reverse. They have done what they could over the years to limit and control it. The crucial decisions to concede to the nationalists have tended to be made over their heads by new governors, as in the case of Cohen, or by Secretaries of State in London.

Overseas civil servants are also worried about what will happen after independence to the standards of the service that they have built up. They are skeptical about the integrity and ability of some of the African leaders. The British Government recently has offered to pay any British officer who stays after independence his full allowances over and above the local salary, as well as to guarantee and underwrite his pension rights. This is part of McLeod's effort to keep as many British officers as possible in East Africa. These proposals will undoubtedly remove some of the financial risks of officers staying on after independence. But more subtle factors are involved than the purely financial factor covered by McLeod's scheme: the attitude of the British official towards African independence, his judgment of the character of African rule, his fears concerning the risks of nepotism and corruption, the prospects of a lifetime career, and the personal advantages of leaving while still comparatively young if these prospects are not too good. There is certainly a risk, and particularly in Kenya and Uganda a very substantial risk, that a great many officers will choose to leave once independence is granted. Each territory is thus likely to face serious set-backs in its administrative and social services in the immediate years after independence. This is a sobering note on which to finish but it is, I fear, a realistic one.